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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the classification of chemical reactions in practice. It 
is  motivated  by  the  lack  of  discussion  in  the  natural  kind  literature  on  the 
classification of reactions and other non-entity like things. I appeal to the discipline 
of chemoinformatics and study a new approach to the classification of reactions 
which is aimed specifically at meeting the needs of chemists in industry. I show that 
this methodology consists of three stages; the identification of a type of reaction of 
interest,  the  identification  of  a  quantitative  structural  activity  reaction  and  the 
importing of this data into a neural network. The output of classification is a reaction 
landscape which represents the similarity relations that hold between the different 
reactions. 
My aim is to outline a metaphysics that is descriptively fit for purpose with 
respect to my case study. I argue that such a metaphysics must be descriptively 
accurate,  capture  appropriate  similarity  relations  and  promote  explanatory 
unification. I evaluate the entities and activities ontology propose by Machamer, 
Darden and Craver, an ontology consisting on entities and dispositional properties 
and causal dispositionalism, against my criteria. 
I argue that none of these accounts are descriptively fit for purpose and that 
commitment  to  an  ontological  category  of  processes  is  required  alongside 
commitment to entities and dispositional properties. I suggest that the types of 
processes revealed in classification fall in the category of processes. 
From  my  analysis  of  reaction  classification  throughout  the  course  of  my 
thesis, I generate a list of characteristics associated with reactions and use this to 
provide an account of the metaphysics underlying the category of processes. My 
proposal focuses on the relationship between potentiality and actuality in a given 
chemical reaction.                                                             Summary 
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Summary 
This thesis investigates the most appropriate metaphysics for the classification of 
chemical reactions in chemical practice. In chapter 1 I give an introduction to the 
notion of a chemical reaction and examine the ways in which chemical reactions are 
classified into types in everyday and scientific practice. I also introduce the different 
approaches to classification in the natural kind literature from social constructivism, 
weak realism to essentialism about natural kinds. My aim is to show that, as it stands, 
none  of  the  current  accounts  of  classification  are  able  to  accommodate  the 
classification  of  reactions.  This  is  firstly  due  to  the  accounts  being  primarily 
concerned  with  the  classification  of  entities.  Secondly,  those  accounts  that  do 
address  the  classification  of  reactions  do  not  do  so  in  a  scientifically  informed 
manner.  For  each  account  of  classification  I  discuss  the  prospects  for  further 
development with respect to accommodating reaction classification in practice.  
Chapter 2 explores the classification of chemical reactions in practice and 
commits to a naturalized approach to metaphysics. I focus on the chemical discipline 
of chemoinformatics and the classification of organic and enzymatic reactions in 
order to meet demand from industry for better, more efficient reactions. I introduce 
a  new  methodology for  classification  which  involves  the  search  for  quantitative 
structure activity relations in which lower level structural properties are associated 
with the instantiation of certain types of chemical reactions. I also describe the 
application of neural networking to provide a representation of a reaction landscape. 
This reaction landscape reveals the similarity relations that hold between reactions 
whilst clusters of reactions that correspond to a given type. 
I conclude this discussion by highlighting three criteria that a metaphysics of 
the classification of reactions must meet if it is to be descriptively fit for purpose. 
These include; descriptive accuracy, capturing similarity relations and promoting 
explanatory unification and the fruitful development of science.                                                              Summary 
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The discussion of chemical practice also allows me to conclude that social 
constructivism  and  strong  essentialism  are  incompatible  with  classification  in 
practice. This leaves several weak realist positions such as promiscuous realism, 
microstructuralism and homeostatic property cluster kinds that might be able to 
accommodate my case study. I identify that these positions commit to a range of 
different ontological components; entities, properties, processes and mechanisms. 
The remaining chapters will assess which components we must be ontologically 
committed to if we are to capture classification in practice. This discussion will help 
me outline my positive proposal in chapter 6.  
In chapter 3 I assess whether we can give a metaphysics of classification by 
appealing to mechanisms and, in particular, the entities activities ontology proposed 
by Machamer, Darden and Craver (MDC). I draw out the key features of activities and 
some of the advantages it has over an entities - dispositions ontology. I show that 
MDC use the term ‘activities’ in the same way as the chemists in my case study. 
I argue that in order for the entities – activities ontology to meet the criteria 
of  similarity  it  must  be  able  to  ground  possibility  statements  concerning  how 
reactions  might  proceed  under  a  particular  set  of  conditions.  I  undertake  an 
interpretive project in which I suggest MDC intend a modal reading of activities and 
examine how to flesh out this claim. I argue that a modal reading of activities is not 
feasible because they lack the required amount of potentiality. 
I suggest that MDC’s account requires additional ontological commitment to 
dispositions in order to be fit for purpose. I show that making an explicit commitment 
to dispositional properties where these properties are attributed equal status to 
entities and activities best meets the criteria of descriptive accuracy and explanatory 
unification.  
In  chapter  4  I  examine  whether  the  entities  -  dispositions  ontology  can 
accommodate the classification of reactions in practice. I begin by comparing the way 
in  which  chemists  treat  reactions  in  practice  to  the  treatment  of  entities  and 
dispositional properties in practice. I suggest that reactions are different to entities                                                              Summary 
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in the sense that entities are wholly present whilst reactions have temporal intervals, 
reactions are also treated as the means by which entities change.  
I  suggest  that  reactions  are  like  dispositions  in  the  sense  that  they  are 
potentials for something to happen. They are directed towards a certain end product 
and they bring about their own destruction as they cease to exist when the end 
product has occurred. However reactions are also unlike dispositions as they are 
associated  with  an  actuality  or  active  unfolding  which  can  be  measured  and 
interfered with. 
I also address whether reactions can be reduced to collections of entities and 
disposition. I show the restricted arity of dispositions means this isn’t possible whilst 
preserving explanatory unification and adequately capturing similarity relations. I 
end by concluding that we must have access to processes amongst our ontological 
resources. One option is to commit to a third ontological category of processes. The 
second option in to investigate whether we can get access to processes at no extra 
ontological cost.  
In  chapter  5  I  investigate  the  possibility  that  the  causal  dispositionalist 
account can provide identity conditions for processes at no extra ontological cost in 
addition to dispositions thus meeting the demand for a more minimal ontology. 
I introduce the disposes towards metaphor and the corresponding distinction 
between enabling conditions and causes. I show how, for the causal dispositionalist, 
enabling  conditions  place  a  limit  on  the  transitivity  and  as  a  result  are  able  to 
individuate causal processes.  I go on to argue that the causal dispositionalist account 
is not descriptively fit for purpose. It fails to give a descriptively accurate account of 
how processes are identified in practice due to a discrepancy between the notion of 
causing  of  an  event  and  the  causing  of  a  process.  I  also  argue  that  the  causal 
dispositionalist underplays the role of perspective when identifying processes in 
practice.                                                               Summary 
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I add that the causal dispositionalist account also fails to capture similarity 
relations and promote explanatory unification. This is due to the dispose towards 
metaphor being vague and unconstrained meaning that any possible situation can be 
explained by the presence of a particular power. I argue that the attribution of 
powers should come with a specification of the conditions under which powers might 
be  operative  and the  functions by  which those  powers  combine.  Mumford  and 
Anjum appeal to functions that govern the combination of powers but tell us they 
should not be considered laws of nature. A more detailed account of the ontological 
status  of  functions  is  also  crucial  if  the  causal  dispositionalist  account  is  to  be 
descriptively fit for purpose. 
In chapter 6 I outline my positive account for a metaphysics of classification 
of chemical reactions in practice. I propose a 3- category ontology consisting of 
entities, dispositional properties and processes where reactions fall into the 
category of processes.  
I outline the metaphysics underlying my category of processes by appealing 
to an Aristotelian account of change that captures the relationship between 
potentiality and actuality in a given chemical reaction. On my account, a type of 
process is one where all token processes engage in the actualising of the specific 
potentiality that is associated with that process type. I show how my proposal 
captures the way in which reactions are both similar and different to dispositional 
properties.  
I show two ways in which my account is different to the account of 
processes offered by Dupré. Firstly, unlike Dupré, I remain committed to entities. In 
addition, whilst my account of processes is similar in spirit to Dupré’s, my account is 
able to account for the relation between potentiality and actuality associated with 
processes in the context of scientific examples. My account also has the advantage 
over Dupré’s in that it can accommodate the types of reactions revealed in 
chemical classification, something which Dupré does not attempt. I end this chapter 
by offering a reason to believe my account has scope to be applicable beyond this 
particular aspect of scientific practice.      Acknowledgements 
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Introduction 
Scientists have long sort to classify particulars into types. These efforts at 
categorisation have helped bring order to the world and direct scientific inquiry. 
Scientists have engaged in classification in the physical sciences through to the social 
sciences, with some philosophers asserting that in at least some of these cases the 
resulting types form natural kinds.  For example, Russell (1905) took natural kinds to 
include 'dogs, wood, atoms, molecules, electrons, positrons, neurons and discrete 
energy levels,' whilst Putnam (1975) famously refers to kinds of ‘water, gold and 
tigers’.  
Just  as  philosophers  disagree  over  whether  beliefs,  diseases,  colours  or 
species are natural kinds, they also disagree on how natural kinds should be defined. 
In virtue of what is a kind, a natural kind? Some philosophers have asserted that 
natural kinds possess a ‘naturalness’ that sets them apart from kinds that are mere 
artefacts. For example, Guttenplan (1994) asserts that 'to understand the concept of 
a natural kind, one must focus on the difference between kinds as represented by 
the set of typewriters and those as represented by the set of tigers' (Guttenplan, 
1994, 449). There is a common set of properties that all typewriters have in virtue of 
being typewriters and this set of properties provides a degree of predictability about 
the way typewriters behave. Nonetheless typewriters do not occur in nature and so 
as Guttenplan points out they constitute artefacts rather than natural kinds.  They 
lack the required ‘naturalness’. 
Traditionally the naturalness associated with natural kinds involves the notion 
that these kinds cut nature at its joints. Slater and Borgihini (2011) take Plato's 
metaphor to suggest that the world comes to us 'pre-divided' and our scientific 
theories are successful in so far as they reveal these divisions by carving nature at its 
joints.  They  add  that  that  the  categorisation  of  individuals  into  kinds  represent     Introduction 
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discoveries not inventions. In so far as scientific theories are successful, they latch on 
to an independent objective reality. 
However LaPorte (2004) has argued that when considering the notion of 
‘naturalness’  that  is  associated  with  natural  kinds  a  more  nuanced  account  is 
required; 
‘Not all human made kinds fail to be natural kinds. Humans have produced 
minerals such as quartz and diamond in the lab. Humans have also produced 
elements. Techenetoum is a synthetically produced element that has not 
been found to occur naturally on earth’ (LaPorte, 2004, 18). 
He also questions whether all things that exist in nature independently of humans 
should constitute natural kinds. He suggests that ‘mud, slime or dust’ are more like 
‘trash kinds’ and should not be considered natural kinds. If natural kinds are not to 
be identified in virtue of their independent existence in nature then how should we 
proceed?  
As indicated by Guttenplan, traditionally kinds are identified on the basis of 
members of that kind sharing a number of natural properties in common. These 
properties constitute sufficient and necessary conditions for kind membership and 
are referred to by some philosophers as essential properties. In virtue of these 
common properties, kinds are deemed to possess a high degree of projectability. In 
the case of gold, for example, we can make predictions about the density, melting 
point or conductivity of a token instance of gold in virtue of it having the ‘essential 
property’ atomic number 79.  
Gold is a commonly cited example because this traditional conception of 
natural  kinds  is  particularly  applicable  to  chemistry,  with  the  Periodic  Table  of 
Elements  considered  paradigmatic  examples  of  natural  kinds.  Each  element  is 
identified  according  to  its  atomic  number,  where  this  constitutes  sufficient  and 
necessary conditions for membership of that natural kind of element. Interestingly, 
the history of the Periodic Table also reveals that classification is subject to revision. 
The Periodic Table was initially arranged according to atomic weight until it was 
established that a classification according to atomic number revealed more accurate     Introduction 
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similarities and patterns of behaviours. Taking atomic number to constitute sufficient 
and necessary conditions for kind membership for elements involved an acceptance 
of isotopes. Isotopes possess additional neutrons and therefore have a higher atomic 
weight. Nonetheless, this lower level variation was permitted within natural kinds of 
element.  
This traditional account of classification has been criticised for not accurately 
capturing classification in other areas of science. It is particularly problematic for 
biological kinds, where candidates for defining the extension of a kind include a 
shared ancestral history or a reproductive isolation. In addition, in the case of species, 
these two approaches are often in conflict with each other since it is possible for two 
organisms with no shared ancestral history to engage in interbreeding (Griffiths, 
2011). 
The philosophy of biology raises additional domain specific questions such as 
whether  species  constitute  natural  kinds  at  all.  Similarly,  the  philosophy  of 
psychology has addressed domain specific issues such as whether mental states 
constitute natural kinds. Questions concerning whether philosophical accounts of 
natural  kinds  are  consistent  with  current  scientific  knowledge  result  from  the 
increasing popularity of naturalized philosophy of science and metaphysics. This idea 
associated with Quine (1969) Sellars (1962) and more recently Ladyman and Ross 
(2007), suggests that the best evidence about the way the world is comes from 
science and so philosophers are wise to take this into account.  
Related to the notion of naturalised philosophy of science and metaphysics is 
the turn to practice in the philosophy of science. The Society for the Philosophy of 
Science in Practice states in its Mission Statement; 
‘Philosophy  of  science  has  traditionally  focused  on  the  relation  between 
scientific theories and the world, at the risk of disregarding scientific practice. 
We  advocate  a  philosophy  of  scientific  practice,  based  on  an  analytic 
framework  that  takes  into  consideration  theory,  practice  and  the  world 
simultaneously’ (Philosophy-science-practice.org, 2014).     Introduction 
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Philosophy of science in practice has its origins in accounts of naturalised philosophy, 
but hadn’t until recently entered the mainstream of philosophy of science. Lohkivi 
and Vikalemm (2012) describe this practical turn as the idea that we should be 
concerned not only with scientific theory but 'how science actually works'. Dupré, on 
the other hand identifies two ways of conducting philosophy of science in practice 
(Dupré,  2012).  Firstly  he  identifies  'philosophy-of-science  in  practice’ where  this 
involves direct engagement and interaction between philosophers and scientists on 
philosophical problems or collaborations on a common question. These questions 
might  concern  'background  assumptions,  logical  structure,  implications  of 
unexpected or even undesired test results' (Boumans and Leonelli, 2013). 
Alternatively, Dupré identifies philosophy of science-in-practice as the study 
of 'science in the making.' This addresses the everyday activities, aims, interests and 
methodology  of  science.  Philosophy  of  science-in-practice  does  not  necessarily 
require collaboration with scientists. My thesis certainly attempts to put into practice 
Dupré’s second definition of philosophy of science in practice. I also take the issue of 
classification to be an important point of intersection between metaphysics and 
science and have attempted to produce a metaphysics of classification that meets 
the needs of scientific inquiry. Nonetheless, whilst my project has been influenced 
by scientists I do not claim that it is a collaboration. 
My thesis examines the metaphysics of classification within chemistry. This is 
a particularly exciting project because the philosophy of chemistry remains a new 
and  fruitful discipline.  Chang  (2012)  Hendry  (2008)  (2010)  and Needham  (2000) 
(2004) (2011) have done important work in establishing the philosophy of chemistry 
in light of the anti-reductionist trend. This has involved addressing issues specific to 
chemistry such as the nature of substance, atomism and the chemical bond. They 
have also highlighted the lessons the philosophy of chemistry has for the philosophy 
of science more generally, with respect to issues such as realism, explanation and 
modelling. 
I previously stated that chemistry has provided the paradigmatic example of 
classification via the Periodic Table of Elements. My aim is to push forward debate     Introduction 
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regarding chemical classification by looking to current chemical practice. As I shall 
discuss in chapter 1, Hendry (2008) has already challenged the traditional conception 
of natural kinds by showing it to be problematic with respect to more complex 
chemical entities. My thesis will focus on another aspect of chemical practice which 
has been overlooked in discussions of classification; the chemical reaction. 
I will begin in chapter 1 by giving a brief introduction to chemical reactions 
and  identifying  some  familiar  classifications  of  reactions.  I  then  outline  the  key 
accounts  of  classification  in  the  natural  kind  literature  and  show  that  most  are 
directed towards the classification of entities. In addition, I show that those accounts 
that  address  the  classification  of  processes  do  so  in  a  scientifically  uninformed 
manner.  I  assess  the  potential  for  each  position  to  be  adapted  in  order  to 
accommodate the classification of reactions in practice.  
In chapter 2 I begin the project of philosophy of science in practice. I describe 
how the classification of reactions has become an important aspect of chemical 
practice due to increased demand from industry for more efficient reactions with 
larger yields. In particular, I identify a demand for a better manipulability and control 
of  chemical  reactions.  I  describe  a  recently  developed  methodology  for  the 
classification  of  reactions  and  show  how  it  is  used  to  produce  a  more  refined 
classification of enzymatic reactions. I use this discussion to draw out a number of 
constraints that a metaphysics compatible with chemical practice must meet. I call 
this kind of metaphysics descriptively fit for purpose. I argue that a metaphysics is 
descriptively  fit  for  purpose  with  respect  to  my  case  study  if  it  is  descriptively 
accurate,  captures  appropriate  similarity  relations  and  promotes  explanatory 
unification.   
I suggest that the accounts of classification outlined in chapter 1 refer to a 
variety  of  ontological  components  such  as  entities,  properties,  processes  or 
mechanisms. My strategy for adjudicating between these positions is to examine 
which ontological components are required to capture the classification of reactions. 
In chapter 3 I examine whether commitment to mechanisms by virtue of the entities 
- activities ontology is sufficient to capture the classification of chemical reactions in     Introduction 
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a manner that is descriptively fit for purpose. In chapter 4 I examine the entities - 
dispositions ontology and in chapter 5 I assess causal dispositionalism against my 
criteria.  In  chapter  6  I  give  a  positive  proposal  for  a  metaphysics  for  chemical 
reactions that is descriptively fit for purpose.  
My ontological positive proposal is two-fold; 
Part 1a: Realism about processes as a distinct ontological category is necessary 
Part  1b:  Realism  about  the  ontological  category  of  entities  and  the  ontological 
category of dispositional properties is also necessary in addition to the category of 
processes.  None  of  these  categories  are  on  their  own  sufficient  to  capture 
classification of reactions in practice 
Part 2: A type of process is one where all token processes engage in the actualising 
of the potentiality that is associated with that type    
 Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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Chapter 1: Accounts of Classification and 
Classifying Reactions 
1:1: Introduction 
A central aspect of scientific activity is the classification of token instances of 
a phenomenon into types on the basis of the similarities that members of that type 
bear to one another. In the philosophy of science and the metaphysics of science 
such  groupings  or  types  can  be  referred  to  as  natural  kinds.  There  are  many 
approaches to a philosophical account of classification and different philosophers 
have different things in mind when they refer to a ‘natural kind’. The details of each 
account will depend on the proponent’s particular philosophical and metaphysical 
position. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the different 
positions concerning classification systems in the philosophy and metaphysics of 
science.  The process of examining the nuances of existing positions is crucial to 
understanding which account, if any, is able to accommodate the classification of 
reactions in practice. 
When thinking about the different positions one could take with respect to 
natural  kinds  it  is  helpful  to  draw  a  distinction  between  natural  groupings  or 
classifications and ‘natural kinds’ construed as entities. Constructivists about kinds 
are  anti-realist  with  respect  to  both  options;  they  deny  that  there  exists  an 
objectively  natural  means  of  classification  and they  take  the  kinds  identified by 
empirical inquiry to be interest dependent (Kukla, 2001). At the other end of the 
spectrum  are  strong  essentialists  who  commit  to  the  existence  of  natural  kind 
entities which themselves have an essence. These essences consist of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for kind membership that correspond to the natural groupings 
identified by science (Ellis, 2001). Between constructivism and essentialism lie a 
variety of realist positions about natural kind classification which commit, to different Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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degrees and by different means, to the existence of objectively natural groupings 
(Boyd, 1991 & Dupré 2003). 
In addition to outlining these positions this chapter will raise the concern that 
the  natural  kind  literature  is  preoccupied  with  the  classification  of  entities  and 
objects; the paradigmatic examples of classification being gold, water and tigers.1  I 
take this to be problematic on the grounds that chemists also classify instances of 
other chemical phenomena into groups on the basis of the similarities they have to 
each other, however these other phenomena are not typically construed as entities. 
My thesis focuses on the classification of reactions although there may be other 
scientific phenomena that do not fall into the entities and objects paradigm but still 
undergo classification as a part of scientific practice. Other examples might include 
chemical  phenomena  where  a  change  occurs  but  the  atoms  and  bonds  do  not 
undergo rearrangement such as dissolution, heating, evaporation. I shall not discuss 
these cases in any detail.  
I suggest that we should aim to provide an adequate philosophical account of 
classification for all instances in which it occurs in science.2 Even if we were to accept 
a disunified picture such that an account of the classification of reactions is different 
from an account of the classification of entities the onus is on philosophers to fill this 
theoretical hole.   
I will begin this chapter with a brief introduction to the notion of a chemical 
reaction  and  will  examine  some  of  the  ways  in  which  reactions  are  commonly 
categorised  into  types.  This  discussion  provides  initial  examples  with  which  to 
examine the philosophical accounts of classification which I will outline in sections 
1.3 – 1.9. I begin in section 1.3 with social constructivism. In section 1.4 I examine 
semantic  essentialism  followed  by  metaphysical  essentialism  in  section  1.5.  In 
section 1.6 I discuss Quine’s weak realism about classification, in section 1.7 I address 
Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster kinds and in section 1.8 I examine Dupré’s 
                                                           
1 This is with the exception of Brian Ellis’ Scientific Essentialism which I shall discuss in section 1.5 
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promiscuous realism. Finally, in section 1.9 I focus in on debates about classification 
within the philosophy of chemistry.  
1:2: Chemical Reaction 
A  chemical  reaction  is  described  in  the  IUPAC  Compendium  of  chemical 
terminology as follows; 
‘a process that results in the inter conversion of chemical species. Chemical 
reactions may be elementary reactions or stepwise reactions. Detectable 
chemical reactions normally involve sets of molecular entities as indicated by 
this definition, but it is often conceptually convenient to use the term also for 
changes  involving  single  molecular  entities  (i.e.  'microscopic  chemical 
events')’ IUPAC, Compendium of Chemical Terminology, 2nd ed. (the "Gold 
Book") (1997). Online corrected version:  (2006–) "chemical reaction". 
A reaction is described in terms of a reaction equation. Chemical reaction equations 
consist of a chemical formula or structural representation of the reactants on the left 
hand side and a chemical formula or structural representation of products on the 
right. They are separated by an arrow which describes the direction of the reaction. 
Equations should be balanced according to the stoichiometry i.e. the number of 
atoms of each substance should be the same on each side of the equation. Reaction 
equations for more complex reactions also indicate the transition states between 
reactants and products. 
Chemists sometimes refer to the reaction centre and this includes all the parts 
of the entities that have bonds broken and formed during the course of the reaction. 
Typically, chemical reactions involve changes in the positions of electrons as a result 
of the breaking and making of chemical bonds between atoms; these are known as 
electronic changes. Nuclear changes, i.e. changes to the nucleus of reactions are only 
relevant  to  the  sub  discipline  of  nuclear  chemistry  which  deals  with  chemical 
reactions between unstable elements.  
As the definition above indicates reactions are typically characterised in terms 
of their reaction mechanism; this gives a step by step account of how the atoms and Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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bonds involved in the reaction rearrange themselves. However, to focus solely on the 
reaction mechanism is to only tell half the story. In any one reaction, many instances 
of the reaction mechanism will occur with the exact number depending on the 
amount of reactants used. In a reaction in which one mole of two reactants are used 
then there will be a total of 2 x 6.02214129(27) ×1023 entities involved in the reaction.  
The domains of chemical kinetics and chemical thermodynamics describe the 
properties of the reaction as a whole focusing on the many reaction mechanisms 
taken together, rather than the individual reaction mechanisms.  This is important 
for explaining and predicting features such as the rate of reaction, the activation 
energy required for the reaction to begin and the conditions for optimum yield. The 
rate at which reactants are turned into products is studied by chemical kinetics. 
Variables such as increased reactant concentration, increased surface area, increased 
temperature and pressure are known to increase the rate of reaction.   
As I previously discussed, the periodic table of elements has provided the 
paradigmatic account of natural kind classification however contemporary chemistry 
is no longer primarily concerned with the identification and classification of static 
entities such as these. It is stated that; ‘Chemistry deals with compounds and their 
properties  and  their  transformations,  thus,  two  objects  have  to  be  considered, 
compounds and chemical reactions, the static and dynamic aspects of chemistry’ 
(Gasteiger and Engel, 2008, 1). In addition, with the ever expanding numbers of 
chemical reactions being discovered, the question of how to classify has become an 
important issue in organic chemistry. Writing in the Journal of Chemical Information 
and Computer Science in 1984, Hermann-Winter noted that; 
‘organic chemistry has grown to the point where there is an overwhelming 
number of known reactions and syntheses, hence the problem of classifying 
these  reactions has  become much  more  important.  To  classify  means to 
develop  general  categories  and  gather  related  single  items  under  these 
classes. Such generalizations specify a mechanistic explanation in terms of 
intermediates such as ions and radicals.’ (Herman-Winter, 1984, 263). 
More recently it was stated that; Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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‘Classification  of  enzymatic  reactions  is  required  for  genome-scale 
reconstruction  (or  comparison)  of  metabolic  pathways,  computer-aided 
validation of classification systems, or comparison of enzymatic mechanisms’ 
(Diogo A. R. S. Latino, João Aires-de-Sousa, 2010, 325). 
The classification of chemical reaction is common to scientific practice as well as 
our everyday interactions with reactions. Six of the most basic types of reactions have 
been identified as follows: 
·  Decomposition reactions involve a complex substance breaking down into 
more simple parts 
AB → A + B 
·  Synthesis reactions occur when two or more compounds combine to form a 
more complex substance  
A + B → AB 
·  Single displacement reactions occur when one element trades places with 
another element in a compound.  
A + BC → AC + B 
·  Double displacement reactions occur when two different elements switch 
places, forming two different compounds. 
AB + CD → AD + CB 
More complex types of reactions include the following: 
·  Precipitation reactions are aqueous reactions that involve the formation of a 
precipitate or insoluble substance in the liquid. 
soluble molecule + soluble molecule -> insoluble molecule 
·  Neutralization Reactions are a special type of double displacement reaction 
that involves the reaction between an acid and base to form a salt and water.  
acid + base → salt + water 
·  Combustion Reactions occur when a hydrocarbon combines with oxygen to 
produce carbon dioxide and water.  
hydrocarbon + oxygen → carbon dioxide + water  Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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·  Hydrolysis reactions involve the breaking of chemical bonds by the addition 
of water. 
·  Polymerization is a type of chemical reaction that occurs when monomer 
molecules combine together to form polymer chains or three-dimensional 
networks.  
There  are  many  forms  of  polymerization  and  different  systems  exist  to 
categorize them. 
·  Photosynthesis reactions occur in all plant life. Carbon dioxide and water 
react with energy from the sun to produce glucose, oxygen and water 
6 CO2 + 12 H2O + photons → C6H12O6 + 6O2 + 6H2 
The types of reactions outlined above can be instanced by different token 
entities and in some cases different types of entities at different times. In addition, it 
is possible that certain token instances will fall into more than one category, for 
example, each photosynthesis reaction is also a double displacement reaction. I have 
already hinted that the classification of reactions into kinds is an integral part of 
chemical practice and these are just some of the types of chemical reactions that we 
are  most  familiar  with.  I  will  begin  to  examine  whether  the  types  of  reactions 
discussed  above  can  be  accommodated  by  the  literature  on  natural  kind 
classification. 
1:3: Social Constructivism 
Firstly  consider  the  social  constructivist’s  approach  to  classification.  The 
constructivist denies that the classification of scientific phenomena into natural kind 
groupings is ‘natural,’ or latches on to the causal structure of the world. This is 
because, according to the constructivist, the classification process is too heavily 
dependent on human action and influence; Kukla states: 'X is said to be constructed 
if it’s produced by intentional activity' (Kukla, 2000, 3).   
Scientific constructivism can be divided into strong and weaker varieties. 
Weak  constructivism  does  not  deny  that  there  exists  an  objective  classificatory Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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system but maintains that it is out of our epistemic reach. This is the view associated 
with Locke when he makes his distinction between real and nominal essence. He 
argues that we classify entities according to their observable properties and as a 
result decisions about how to carve things up are based on convention i.e. the 
application  of  human  concepts,  interests  and activities.  Nonetheless,  Locke  also 
commits  to  the  idea  that  kinds  have  real  essences  that  depend  on  their 
microstructure. A system of classification based on real essences would, according to 
Locke, be objectively real if access to it were not beyond the scope of science.  
A  stronger  form  of  constructivism  is  of  the  metaphysical  variety  which 
Hacking describes as follows; 
‘Constructivists tend to maintain that classifications are not determined by 
how the world is, but are convenient ways in which to represent it. They 
maintain that the world does not come quietly wrapped up in facts. Facts are 
the consequences of ways in which we represent the world’ (Hacking, 1999, 
33). 
 
Strong constructivists deny there is an objectively real system of classification and as 
a result there is no reason to believe classification based on scientific inquiry is any 
more real than that which is made on religious or political grounds. There are at least 
two  ways  in  which  human  interests  affect  classification  according  to  the 
constructivist; causal constructivism and social constructivism. 
1:3:1: Causal Constructivism 
In the case of causal constructivism, X causally constructs Y if and only if X 
causes Y to exist, or to persist, or X controls the kind-typical properties of Y. The idea 
is  that  natural  kinds  are  causally  dependent  upon  human  interests  so  that  in 
advancing our own classificatory system we cause some change in the objects we are 
interested in via a feedback loop. For instance, in classifying x as kind K we cause 
some change in x such that as a result it comes to possess some additional properties 
which then in turn have a bearing on the extension of K. An example of this is the 
kind  ‘multiple  personality  disorder’  which  is  described  by  Hacking  and  further Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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explored by Ali Khalidi (Ali Khalidi, 2010, 241). When an individual is classified as 
falling within the extension of this kind, they come to identify with the kind ‘multiple 
personality  disorder’  and  as  a  result  tend  to  develop  additional  properties  that 
further distinguish them from individuals that do not fall in this extension. These new 
properties  are  then  fed  back  into  the  definition  of  the  kind  which  is  used  for 
classifying  further  cases  of  multiple personality  disorder  and therefore  the  loop 
continues.  
1:3:2: Constitutive Constructivism 
The second way human interests influence classificatory practice is known as 
constitutive construction. X constitutively constructs Y if and only if X's conceptual or 
social activity regarding Y is necessary for Y to be a Y. The constitutive dependence 
of science on human interests maintains that 'what we call "facts about the world" 
are revealed to be facts about human activity' (Kukla, 2000, 21). For instance it might 
be argued that the notion of gender is constructed in this way since we can imagine 
a society that evolved in such a way that there existed no gender distinction over and 
above the distinction based on sex.  
Since constructivists reject realism about the classification of entities they 
would, for the same reasons, deny realism about the classification of reactions. There 
is  nothing  about  the  position  itself  that  indicates  that  a  constructivist  about 
classifications of entities should be realist about classifications of reactions. The 
question of whether constructivism is applicable to the classification of chemical 
reactions in practice will require a detailed examination of the methodology and the 
aims and interests behind each classificatory investigation. I will return to these 
considerations in chapter 2. 
1:4: Semantic Essentialism  
Essentialism about natural kind classification lies at the opposite end of the 
spectrum  to  constructivism.  It  is  the  thesis  that  for  any  kind,  there  are  certain Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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properties that must be possessed by individuals in order for those individuals to 
qualify as members of that kind; these are known as essential properties. Some 
essentialists make the stronger claim that natural kinds themselves have essences. 
In  this  section  I  will  discuss  attempts  to  arrive  at  essentialist  conclusions  from 
commitment to semantic externalism in the philosophy of language.  
The rise of essentialism is associated with the independent development of 
semantic accounts of reference by Putnam (1973) (1975) and Kripke (1972). Both 
were  responding  to  Frege  (1892)  and  Russell’s  (1905)  descriptivist  accounts  of 
meaning in which names were taken to be abbreviations for definite descriptions 
which provide the sense of the name and determine what it refers to . A consequence 
of Frege’s account is that meanings are ‘in the head’ in the sense that grasping a 
meaning  is  a  psychological  event.  Putnam  and  Kripke’s  versions  of  semantic 
externalism challenged this intuition and, as I shall discuss in the following sections, 
are thought to lend support to essentialism.  
1:4:1: Putnam’s Account of Meaning 
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment is his key motivation for semantic 
externalism. He asks us to imagine another possible world in which there is a planet 
named Twin Earth which is identical to Earth in all but a few respects. One of the 
differences is that the substance that is called ‘water’ on Twin Earth does not consist 
of H2O but XYZ, nonetheless H2O and XYZ share identical macro properties, they both 
boil at 100˙C and are found in lakes and rivers etc.  
Putnam then asks us to imagine a time before the development of modern 
chemistry in which the microstructure of water on each planet was unknown. Oscar 
is an Earthian in 1750 and  Oscar1 is his twin Earthian duplicate. They are both 
identical in terms of psychology. When confronted with the white colourless liquid 
known as ‘water’ in their respective worlds they will be in the same psychological 
state with regards to it, yet ‘water’ has different extensions in each case, H2O for 
Oscar and XYZ for Oscar1. It is just that each is unaware of the exact extension of the Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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term in question. As a result Putnam concludes that psychological states cannot 
determine extension (Putnam, 1975, 140). 
His argument rests on the notion that kind terms such as water have an 
indexical quality and so when we want to express what we mean by terms like 
‘water’, we give an ostensive definition, i.e. we say ‘this liquid here is water’.  There 
are two potential implications of this for a theory of meaning. Consider a situation in 
which there are two worlds in which I and my double exist; W1 is the actual world 
and W2 is another possible world. In both worlds I point at the glass and say ‘this is 
water;’ in W1 the glass contains H2O and in W2 the glass contains XYZ. We could 
maintain that water means the same thing in both worlds but it’s just that water is 
H2O in W1 and water is XYZ in W2. In this case ‘water’ would be world relative and 
constant in meaning. Putnam argues that this account is mistaken and instead we 
should consider water to be H2O in all possible worlds and concede that “water” 
doesn’t have the same meaning in all possible worlds.  
He defends this conclusion by asserting that when I say ‘this is water’ the 
explanatory power lies in the fact that ‘water’ is considered to be whatever bears a 
certain sameness relation to what we call water in the actual world. It doesn’t matter 
if we are unable to specify the nature of this relation; identifying the sameness 
relation is an epistemic problem and it is revisable in the light of new evidence 
(Putnam, 1975, 140).  
Putnam adds that not all ordinary speakers need to be aware of the sameness 
relation in order to correctly use the term; he points to a linguistic division of labour 
such that we recourse to an appropriate expert where necessary. Putnam’s account 
still allows for a description to be associated with a term; this forms part of his 
meaning vector and includes all the stereotypical features associated with the term 
by the linguistic community although it plays no role in determining the extension of 
the term.  
It is the idea that the ‘same L’ relation is a cross world equivalence relation 
that motivates essentialism. Were this to be the case then it would follow that there Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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is no possible world in which something either has the appropriate property (L) and 
fails to be a member of that kind or is a member of the kind without possessing it. As 
a result it is assumed that ‘same L’ is the essential feature of the kind in question.  
The possibility of deriving essentialist conclusions by appealing to Putnam’s 
cross world sameness equivalence relation has been criticized by Mellor who argues 
that the approach is question begging (Mellor, 1977, 300). He argues that even if we 
accept that reference is fixed on the basis of a sameness relation that holds between 
individuals of the same kind across possible worlds, it does not follow that these 
individuals must share the same all the properties in common. He asks us to conceive 
of a case in which water has 10 ‘important’ properties but could lack any one of them 
and still be water; in this case only the disjunction of all conjunctions of nine of them 
is essential to water. But then the sameness relation would not be one of equivalence 
since it is not transitive; it would be possible for a sample of water in another possible 
world to lack any one of the properties of water in the actual world. Mellor adds that 
the only way in which essentialism might follow from the notion of a sameness 
relation  would  require  prior  acceptance  of  essentialist  conclusions;  i.e.  the 
requirement  that  possession  of  a  common  property  is  a  requirement  of  kind 
membership (Mellor, 1977, 307). 
Mellor also objects to the anti-descriptivist conclusions Putnam draws from 
the Twin Earth thought experiment on the grounds that they too rest on a hidden 
essentialist premise. He rejects the conclusion of the Twin Earth thought experiment 
that meanings are not in the head because he rejects the premise that water on Earth 
and Twin Earth have different extension. This premise, according to Mellor begs the 
question.  Why  must  they  have  different  extensions,  he  asks;  ‘Because  its 
microstructure is an essential property of water? Well, that is what's in question’ 
(Mellor, 1977, 303).   If extension is determined by beliefs and Earthians and Twin 
Earthians have the same beliefs about the substance then the fact that they have 
different  microstructures  is  of  no  concern.  He  argues  contrary  to  Putnam,  that 
‘water’ has the same extension on Twin Earth and Earth in both 1700 and 1900 Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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(Mellor, 1977, 303).  Earthians and Twin Earthians always have and continue to mean 
the same thing by the term ‘water.’  
‘It is indeed quite plain to my Fregean eye that in 1950, as in 1750, 'water' 
had the same extension on Twin Earth as it had here. There was water on 
both planets alike, and there still is. We simply discovered that not all water 
has the same microstructure’ (Mellor, 1977, 303).   
To put it another way he believes that we have discovered that local varieties of 
water vary in microstructure, but that this has no impact on the extension of the term 
unless a form of microstructural essentialism is presupposed. Thus Mellor concludes 
that Putnam has not shown that it is possible to be in the same psychological states 
with respect to two substances that have different extensions and therefore he is not 
justified  in  his  rejection  of  a  Fregean  account  of  meaning  (Mellor,  1977,  309).  
Therefore  he  also  rejects  the  claim  the  Putnam  has  provided  independent 
justification for essentialism. 
1:4:2: Kripke’s Account of Meaning 
Kripke’s version of semantic externalism is also motivated by what he takes 
to be inadequacies with the descriptivist theory of meaning and specifically with its 
metaphysical consequences (Kripke, 1981, 113). Consider the case in which ‘John’ 
designates an individual and ‘α’ is the set of properties associated with John. On the 
descriptivist picture it is the case that sense determines extension and so it follows 
that, ‘necessarily if John exists, John has most of the properties ‘α’’. Kripke argues 
that this is false since even if John does possess most of the properties ‘α’, he might 
not have done. The difficulty lies in the fact that, names behave differently from 
descriptions in modal contexts. For example, ‘necessarily Elizabeth II is the Queen of 
England,’ is false since we can imagine a possible world in which she abdicated from 
her position, but the statement ‘necessarily the Queen of England is the queen of 
England’ is true (Kripke, 1981, 113). The reason for this is that names are rigid 
designators; they refer to the same entity in all possible worlds in which that entity 
exists and they never refer to anything else. Most definite descriptions, on the other Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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hand, are not rigid designators. Consequently, Kripke argues that names and definite 
descriptions cannot ordinarily be equated (Kripke, 1981, 48). Kripke extends the 
notion of a rigid designator to apply not just to proper names but also to selected 
definite descriptions; those descriptions that scientists associate with natural kind 
terms. In both cases the concept of rigid designation has important philosophical 
consequences.  
In  the  case  of  proper  names,  Kripke’s  case  of Hesperus  and Phosphorus 
provides an example of a necessary a posteriori statement since both ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ both rigidly designate Venus and this was discovered to be the case. 
The same idea applies to theoretical identity statements involving certain definite 
descriptions such as ‘gold = atomic number 79’. If ‘gold’ and ‘atomic number 79’ are 
both rigid designators then if it is true that ‘gold = atomic number 79’ in one possible 
world, then it must be the case across all possible worlds, i.e. the statement is 
necessarily true if true at all.  
This motivates essentialism since that if it is necessary that anything we call 
‘gold’  has  atomic  number  79,  then  this  serves  as  an  essential  condition  for 
membership of the kind gold. Even if by itself it does not constitute a sufficient 
condition on kind membership, we can assert that it is essential to gold that it has 
atomic number 79. 
Whilst  rigid  designation  provides  an  intuitively  appealing  argument  for 
essentialism,  attempts  to  derive  essentialism  from  rigid  designation  have  been 
shown to be problematic. As with Putnam’s account the key objection is that such 
attempts rely on a trivial essentialist premise. This problem is described by  Mellor 
who asks us to imagine that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are rigid designators and then asks 
what is required in order to construct the identity statement ‘water is H2O’ (Mellor, 
1977, 307). His answer is that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ must be coextensive in all possible 
worlds. Formulated in this way the identity statement trivially entails essentialism 
since it requires that all samples of water, in all possible worlds are also samples of 
H2O. Therefore, by definition H2O would be essential to water. Nothing about the 
necessity  of  the  identity  statement  ‘water  is  H2O’  entails  that  being  H2O  is  an Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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essential property of water; rather this is a requirement on the formulation of the 
identity statement in the first place (Mellor, 1977, 307).   
In addition, Kripke’s footnote 56 attempts to derive a special instance of 
essentialism from rigid designation. This has been discussed by Salmon who shows 
the proof to be problematic and concludes that essentialism cannot be derived from 
semantic  considerations  (Salmon,  1979,  703-  725).  The  particular  essentialist 
conclusion that Kripke hoped to derive in this case is that if a wooden table has its 
origins from a certain hunk of wood then it could not have had its origin in any other 
hunk of wood. If successful then the strategy could be extended to give stronger 
essentialist conclusions about natural kinds (Kripke, 1981, 114). The proof goes as 
follows: 
Let B name a table and A name a hunk of matter from which table B is constructed in 
World 1 (W1) and let C be the name of some distinct hunk of matter that also exists 
in W1.  
Kripke wants to show C1: ~◊ (B,C) that it is impossible for table B to originate from 
hunk C. It follows from this that if it is  possible  for  a given  table  to  originate  from  
a  certain  hunk  of  matter,  then  it  is necessary  that  the  table  originate  from  that  
very  hunk  of  matter.  Salmon formulates Kripke’s first premise as; 
P1: For any table B and any hunks of matter A and C, if it is possible for any table B to 
be originally constructed entirely from hunk A while hunk C’ does not overlap 
with hunk A, then it is also possible for table B to be originally constructed entirely 
from hunk A while some other table D distinct from B is simultaneously originally 
constructed entirely from hunk A’ (Salmon, 1979, 708). 
  The proof also requires the necessity of distinctness which states that, if 
things are not identical then they could not have been identical and as a result it is 
possible  to  construct  two  tables,  simultaneously  from  distinct  hunks  of  wood 
(Salmon, 1979, 709). Using P1 and the necessity of distinctness, however, Kripke does 
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C2:   □[T (D,C) ➙ D ≠ B]; 
  C2 states that necessarily even if a new table, D, was made from hunk of 
matter C and no table were made from A, D would not be B. Even if hunk of matter 
A did not exist, it still would not be the case that D would be identical to B. To 
complete his proof it must be possible to derive;  
C1:  ~◊ (B,C) 
or  
C3  □ (x) [T (x, C) ➙ x≠B] 
since C3, the claim that in any possible world in which a table is constructed from 
hunks C, the table constructed from hunk C is still not table B, is trivially equivalent 
to C1. Salmon maintains that in order to reach the required conclusion Kripke is 
forced to make use of a hidden premise, P2; 
P2  If  it  is  possible  for  a  table  x  to  originate  from  a  hunk  of  matter  y  then 
necessarily, any table originating from hunk y is the very same table x and no 
other (Salmon, 1979, 711). 
P1,  P2  and the  necessity  of  distinctness  yield the  conclusion that  if  it  is 
possible  for  a  given  table  to  originate  from  a certain hunk  of  matter then  it  is 
necessary that the given table does not originate from any non-overlapping hunk of 
matter. For instance; 
1.  Let W1 be a possible world in which an arbitrary table B originates from some 
hunk of matter A 
2.  Let C be any hunk of matter that does not overlap with A in W1 
3.  By P1 there is a possible world in which table B originates from A and a second 
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4.  By the necessity of identity and distinctness tables B and D are distinct in 
every possible world, (if is the case that they are distinct in W2 they must be 
distinct in the actual world otherwise they would be identical in every possible 
world) 
5.  In an arbitrary possible world in which some table is constructed form hunk 
C, given P2, this could not be table B from W1. (This is because, according to 
P2 the table in question in W3 is table D, and B and D are distinct in every 
possible world including world 3). 
6.   Therefore there is no possible world in which table B originates from hunk C. 
  P2 is crucial to the argument however using P2 begs the question since it is 
an essentialist principle. It asserts that if a given table x is such that it might have 
originated from a certain hunk of matter y then the table has as an essential property, 
the  feature  that  no  other  table  distinct  from  it  originates  from  y.  According  to 
Salmon, Kripke’s derivation of essentialism from the causal theory of reference works 
only in virtue of containing essentialism amongst its premises. Consequently Kripke’s 
derivation does not go through. (Salmon, 1979, 712). 
  Thus far it’s been established that essentialism cannot be non-trivially derived 
from rigid designation, however Kripke employs a second strategy that motivates 
essentialism by appealing to our modal intuitions. He asks us to consider a situation 
in which it is revealed that the stuff we have, up until now, referred to as gold is in 
fact blue and only appears gold as a result of an optical illusion. Kripke suggests our 
intuitive response would be to assert that the stuff we call gold is still gold and to 
state in addition, that gold is not always yellow (Kripke, 1972, 118). He supports this 
claim by referring to the distinction between those properties that fix reference for 
a  given  linguistic  community  and  those  properties  that  constitute  the  essential 
nature of the kind.  
  Kripke  then  extends  the  scope  of  the  intuition  by  appealing  to  a 
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exact same location as true gold is found in the actual world. Consequently, the only 
difference between the two substances is that one lacks the property of having 
atomic number 79 (Kripke, 1972, 119). Nonetheless, Kripke maintains that this new 
substance is still not gold on the grounds that it lacks the appropriate microstructure. 
Kripke concludes that it is necessary and not contingent that gold be an element with 
atomic number 79 such that the possession of this property is an essential property 
of gold. 
  One  of  the  reasons  that  these  modal  intuitions  are  appealing  for  the 
essentialist has to do with explanatory priority. In the case of gold, gold’s atomic 
number functions in explanations of its density and reactivity while the reverse does 
not hold, thus it is intuitive to consider atomic number to be more significant than 
other properties. 
  Mellor has argued that this strategy for motivating essentialism is flawed 
(Mellor, 1977, 307). Consider Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment; ‘A first-
order sentence carries commitment to Fs just in case Fs must be counted amongst 
the values of the variables in order for the sentence to be true’ (Quine, 1948, 32). 
Quine requires that we should only be committed to things that we must refer to in 
order to state what is true. However, if this is combined with the micro reductive 
trend that advocates the explanation of things in terms of their smallest possible 
parts then it seems that we can replace reference to the thing in question with 
reference to their parts. In other words we can replace a reference to water with a 
reference to H2O and so it follows that being H2O is essential to water. 
  However if we are to replace reference to water with reference to H2O then 
it must be the case that all properties of water are deducible from H2O with the 
consequence that in any possible world in which H2O is present the other properties 
associated with water must also be present. But were this to be the case then all the 
properties of water would be deemed essential to it and the essentialist cause isn’t 
furthered. Alternatively if macro properties of water cannot be deduced from H2O 
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fails again.3 Thus attempts to motivate essentialism on the basis of considerations 
stemming from rigid designation or scientific explanation are spurious.  
1:4:3: Semantic Essentialism and Classifying Reactions  
My aim in this section has been to outline the dialectic between semantic 
essentialists and their opponents. This is to allow for an analysis in chapter 2 of 
whether essentialist intuitions are shared by chemists investigating the classification 
of reactions in practice. Initially it seems that to the extent that the arguments above 
provide  motivation  for  essentialism  about  entities  they  might  also  indicate 
essentialism about reactions.  
I suggest that the essentialist intuitions of Putnam and Kripke can be applied 
to chemical reactions. Consider Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment. Rather 
than asking us to consider an entity with a certain microstructure on Twin Earth we 
might instead consider a combustion reaction such as the burning of methane to give 
carbon dioxide and water. On earth the reaction has the following chemical equation: 
CH4 + 2O2 -> CO2 + H2O  
The reaction occurs because heat energy is input into the system. The carbon atom 
is oxidised and loses electrons to form carbon dioxide and the oxygen is reduced i.e. 
it gains electrons to form water.  
We  can  recreate  a  semantic  essentialist  argument  about  reactions  by 
appealing to a thought experiment inspired by Handfield (Handfield, 2010, 1). We 
can imagine a situation in which the reaction appeals to take place on Twin Earth 
except the atoms involved in the reaction on Twin Earth have an invisible protective 
layer with absorbs the heat and protects this input energy from breaking down their 
bonds. Instead the bond between the atoms are broken down by ‘nano-machines’ 
which separate the atoms and rearrange them to produce carbon dioxide and water. 
                                                           
3 This objection applies to those who reach essentialist conclusions on either the Kripke or Putnam’s 
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In this case it seems that the start and termination conditions of the reaction are the 
same but the way in which the termination conditions were achieved were very 
different to the combustion of methane on earth. It’s not clear that this is an instance 
of combustion and this may add weight to the notion that reactions have an essential 
structure.4  
The thought experiment raises a number of questions for the classification of 
reactions; firstly is it the case that reactions are classified on the basis of the structure 
of reaction; if so how do chemists use structure to specify necessary and sufficient 
conditions for kind membership? What is a sufficient degree of structural similarity 
for two reactions to be of the same kind? In chapter 2 I will attempt to answer these 
questions and assess whether this essentialist intuition applies to the classification 
of more complex reactions. 
1:5: Metaphysical Essentialism 
In the previous section I examined the variety of essentialism that results 
from semantic considerations and whether such arguments are viable. In this section 
I will address metaphysical essentialism which differs from semantic essentialism in 
that it takes it as an assumption that the essentialist position is correct. In particular 
I will focus on Brian Ellis’ metaphysical framework known as scientific essentialism 
(Ellis 2001, 2002). His thesis is that natural kinds are the prior and fundamental 
element  of  ontology,  he  also  takes  the  essential  properties  of  natural  kinds  to 
necessitate laws of nature with the implication that for Ellis laws of nature are 
metaphysically necessary (Ellis 2001, 2002). 
1:5:1: Motivation 
Ellis’s scientific essentialism is developed in response to the metaphysical 
frameworks  of  Lewis  and  Armstrong.  As  I  will  discuss  in  this  section  Lewis  and 
                                                           
4 This thought experiment has been adapted from Handfield 2010 that applied to the case of 
dissolution of salt in water Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
39 
 
Armstrong argue in different ways that laws of nature are contingent and natural 
kinds  are  supervenient  on  natural  properties  and  so  do  not  require  a  distinct 
ontological category. 
Central to Lewis’s account of laws of nature is his commitment to modal 
realism i.e. realism about possible worlds construed as concrete entities such that 
the notion of the actual world is indexical and relative to the speaker. This allows him 
to  draw  a  distinction  between  metaphysical  necessity  which  is  achieved  by 
quantifying over all possible worlds and nomological necessity which quantifies over 
worlds with laws of nature like the actual world. Thus P is metaphysically necessary 
if P is true in all possible worlds while P is nomologically necessary if it is true in all 
possible worlds that are nomically accessible from the actual world. 
Lewis’s  anti-realism  about  necessity  and  laws  of  nature  follows  from  his 
Humean supervenience which states that  
‘all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just 
one little thing and then another. [. . . ]For short: we have an arrangement of 
qualities. And that is all. There is no difference without difference in the 
arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on that’ (Lewis, 1986b, ix f). 
Lewis reads this as the claim that all we need to be ontologically committed to is 
qualities and all else supervenes on them and there are no necessary connections 
between the various qualities. Consequently, he asserts that laws of nature are the 
regularities that hold between the qualities in the actual world, there are other 
possible worlds in which such regularities do not hold and so laws of nature are 
contingent. Lewis illustrates with the law like generalization that if I eat bread then I 
will avoid starving and asserts that there are worlds in which this regularity fails to 
hold such that I continue to eat bread but still starve (Lewis, 1986a, 91). This idea is 
captured in Lewis’s principle of recombination; ‘Roughly speaking, the principle is 
that anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct 
spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything else’ 
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With this in mind Lewis proposes the best systems approach to laws of nature 
on which he identifies collections or systems of truths and argues that laws of nature 
are provided by the system that best combines simplicity and strength.  Strong truths 
are those that tell us a lot about the world. What it is to be a simple truth, however, 
is fleshed out by drawing a distinction between sparse and abundant properties. He 
takes the simplicity of a claim to be indicated by how easily it can be stated in a 
language where all predicates denote sparse properties as discussed below. 
Lewis takes a property to be the set of all of its instances over all possible 
worlds and a relation to consist of an ordered pair of related things where its relation 
is considered to be the set of all of its instances across all possible worlds (Lewis, 
1986a,  91).  With  this  in  mind  he  distinguishes  between  sparse  and  abundant 
properties. Abundant properties are those that provide the semantic value to the 
terms we use in everyday language, they are disjunctive, gerrymandered and give no 
indication  of  the  qualitative  similarity  of  those  things  who  have  the  particular 
property in common. A small minority of all properties qualify as sparse properties, 
they are intrinsic, specific rather than gerrymandered and on Lewis’s view they cut 
nature at its joints, such that the sharing of sparse properties is responsible for the 
qualitative similarities that exist between individuals. This last claim is fleshed out by 
construing properties as universals such that sharing a common property requires 
instantiating the same universal.  While all natural properties are intrinsic on Lewis 
account it is not the case that all intrinsic properties are natural since a disjunctive 
property may be intrinsic if its disjuncts are also intrinsic.  
For Lewis naturalness comes in degrees. He takes sparse properties to be 
perfectly  natural properties  and  states  that  these  are those  properties  that  are 
revealed to us by fundamental physics. All other properties fall along the naturalness 
continuum depending on how directly they can be related to fundamental properties 
along chains of definability. Lewis states; ‘Among all the countless things and classes 
that there are, most are miscellaneous, gerrymandered, ill demarcated. Only an elite 
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Thus it is sparse properties that carve nature at its joints. The account of 
properties just outlined allows Lewis to flesh out what it is to be a simple truth as is 
required by his account of laws of nature. His account of fundamental properties also 
provides the basis on which he rejects ontological commitment to kinds.  
Lewis suggests a reductive analysis of kinds in terms of natural properties 
such that two objects are members of the same kind if they possess the same 
perfectly natural properties. Kinds which are formed from conjunctions of properties 
derive their naturalness from the naturalness of their constitutive properties. As a 
result Lewis argues that any commitment to kinds over and above natural properties 
is redundant; the perfectly natural kinds are just the perfectly natural properties 
(Lewis,  1986b).  Importantly,  Lewis  takes  properties  to  be  causally  inert  where 
regularities  that  hold  between  give  rise  to  dispositional  properties.  Thus 
supervenient kinds do not have dispositional properties essentially. 
Ellis’  Scientific  Essentialism  also  rejects  the  contingency  of  laws  and 
supervenience of kinds that is postulated by Armstrong.  In A World of States of 
Affairs (1997) Armstrong argues that the world is the totality of all states of affairs 
where a state of affairs exists if and only if a property holds of a particular, or a 
relation holds between two particulars, where properties and relations are taken to 
be  universals  (Armstrong,  1997,  20).  Armstrong  adds  that  states  of  affairs  are 
ontologically  prior  to  their  constituents  since  neither  properties,  relations,  nor 
particulars can exist independently of states of affairs.  
For Armstrong nomological possibilities arise from combinations of universals 
and bare particulars into states of affairs. Consequently he identifies laws of nature 
with second order universals that hold between universals, that is, Fs are Gs is a law 
iff N(F, G) (Armstrong, 1983, 85). Nonetheless this relation is a contingent one; if it is 
a law that the heating of a metal is followed by the metal expanding it is possible that 
the N universal that relates them fails to hold and so the law might not hold.  
Armstrong  differs  from  Lewis  in  the  sense  that  he  has  a  more  liberal 
conception  of  natural  properties.  He  is  committed  to  complex  properties  and Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
42 
 
relations, arguing against the claim that all universals are simple. Complex property 
universals are formed from conjunctions of simpler properties. For example, given 
that F and G are distinct universals then (F&G) qualifies as a universal provided there 
is always some particular that instantiates both F and G (Armstrong, 1997, 31). 
Armstrong rejects the claim that complex properties supervene on their conjuncts 
and amount to no addition of being on the basis of the distinction he draws between 
basic co-instantiation and synergistic co-instantiation. In the latter case the power of 
the conjunction is either more or less than the sum of the power of the conjuncts. 
Complex properties involve the second type of instantiation, on this basis we must 
commit  to  conjunctive  universals;  they  have  non  reductive  causal  powers 
(Armstrong, 1997, 34). 
Similarly to Lewis, Armstrong rejects any commitment to natural kinds as 
universals. He argues that kinds supervene on complex properties and so do not 
require a distinct ontological category; two objects are members of the same kind if 
they supervene on the same conjunctive universals. He takes properties and relations 
rather than natural kinds to mark out the fundamental joints of nature for two 
reasons. 
Firstly he questions whether there exist appropriate candidates for universals 
for higher level kinds, for example, is there a universal ‘humanity’ which every human 
instantiates? Since Armstrong wants to be naturalist, the property responsible for 
humanness  must  be  biological.    Potentially  human  DNA  structure  might  be 
sufficiently abstract to serve as a sufficient and necessary condition for humanity but 
this causes another problem to arise. We may only treat this structure as a universal 
if it plays a non-reducible causal role. It must not be the case that the work required 
in maintaining a human being is actually performed by the constituent molecules in 
virtue of their determinate properties rather than the specified universal. It is not 
clear that this condition is met (Armstrong, 1997, 66). 
Secondly Armstrong argues that even the most promising candidates for 
kinds can be given a reductive analysis suggesting that the  electron can be reduced 
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kinds like the electron mark out true (non-fundamental) joints in nature but claims 
this is insufficient to warrant a distinct ontological category. If kinds supervene on 
properties then whether or not they cut nature at its joints they are no addition in 
being (Armstrong, 1997, 67). 
1:5:2: Ellis’ Scientific Essentialism 
Ellis rejects Lewis’ and Armstrong’s categorical monism according to which all 
fundamental  sparse  properties  are  categorical.  However  Ellis  also  rejects 
dispositional  monism  in  favour  of  dispositional  essentialism.  Dispositional 
essentialism is the view that at least some properties have dispositional essences. 
Dispositional monism is the view that at least all sparse properties are essentially 
dispositional. A dispositional property is characterized by the fact that it is essential 
to the property that it manifests itself appropriately in the presence of a certain 
stimulus. A categorical property lacks this modal character; ‘it does not confer of 
necessity any power or disposition… it has no necessary connections with any other 
entities’ (Bird, 2007, 67).  As I shall explore, Ellis prefers a mixed view which is equally 
committed to dispositional and categorical properties.  
Contrary to Lewis and Armstrong, Ellis takes kinds to be more fundamental 
than particulars. He also argues that laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. He 
distinguishes between individual essences and kind essences. The individual essence 
of a thing is the set of the characteristics in virtue of which it is the individual it is, 
while the kind essence of a thing is the set of properties in virtue of which it is a thing 
of a kind it is (Ellis, 2002, 5). He argues for the existence of three hierarchies of natural 
kinds; substantive kinds instanced by kinds of object, dynamic kinds instanced by 
kinds of events or processes and finally property kinds instanced by tropes. Ellis takes 
kinds to be universals in the Aristotelian sense requiring instantiation in a particular 
for existence.   
Interestingly for the purposes of my thesis, Ellis motivates his metaphysical 
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claims are the paradigmatic examples of natural kinds and notes that they are each 
real and absolute; they constitute genuine categories in nature and as such do not 
depend on human interests.  Each element is categorically distinct from every other 
– there are no non-arbitrary boundaries between different kinds and so there is 
always a fact of the matter whether a particular is a member of any given kind. In 
addition, it is in virtue of the possession of essential properties that an object is a 
member of a natural kind where essential properties are always intrinsic and are 
either  categorical  or  dispositional.  He  states  that  if  a  particular  belongs  to  two 
different natural kinds then the two kinds must be species of one common genus, i.e. 
two distinct natural kinds cannot overlap, rather one kind must include the other; 
this is referred to as the speciation requirement. Similarly, kinds form hierarchies 
such that the kind electron falls under the kind lepton which in turn falls under the 
kind fundamental property. Taken together these features constitute the conditions 
for natural kind hood for all three types of natural kind, according to Ellis. 
Ellis  also  proposes  a  mixed  view  which  retains  the  distinction  between 
categorical and dispositional properties and takes them to be equally fundamental 
(Ellis,  2001,  127).  Categorical  properties  are  those  that  are  had  by  things 
independently of how they are disposed to behave; shape and size are common 
examples.  Dispositional properties on the other hand are those properties whose 
manifestation produces a kind of behaviour such as toxicity or fragility. As a result 
their identity <C, E> depends on the circumstances in which they would be displayed 
(C) and the form this manifestation would take (E), (Ellis, 2002, 117). Dispositional 
properties are crucial to Ellis’s account since they do crucial work in unifying the three 
distinct hierarchies.  
Ellis  gives  two  reasons  why  categorical  properties  cannot  be  reduced  to 
dispositional properties. In the first place he discusses block structural properties; 
these  are  properties  that  consist  of  relations  between  things  which  have 
independent identities. A molecule CO2 is an example of a block structure since it 
exists if and only if the relevant constituent parts exist and are related in the correct 
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dispositional distinction, on the grounds that ‘block structural properties are clearly 
not just dispositional’ (Ellis, 2002, 69). Even if we learn about its structural properties 
via its dispositional properties, Ellis claims its essence is structural (categorical) and 
not dispositional (Ellis, 2002, 70). 
Ellis also refers to the existence of intrinsic structures in order to support the 
distinction. Intrinsic structures are those in which the constituent parts cannot exist 
independently of the structure, so for instance the electric and magnetic potentials 
cannot exist independently of an electromagnetic field. Ellis maintains that these are 
structural properties; they might be dispositional structures but their essence is 
structural rather than dispositional (Ellis, 2002, 71). 
Dispositional properties are central to Ellis’s account since they do the work 
of unifying the three hierarchies. Firstly they constitute a generic category in the 
property kind hierarchy so Ellis is committed to the dispositional property kind as a 
kind in its own right.  Secondly, dispositional properties constitute the essential 
properties of substantive kinds alongside categorical properties. Thirdly, Ellis takes a 
particular process kind to be the manifestation of a certain dispositional property; 
therefore  processes  that  are  members  of  the  same  process  natural  kind  are 
instantiations of the same dispositional property (Ellis, 2001, 77). Ellis describes the 
essential nature of a process by referring to ‘a structure that distinguishes it from all 
other kinds of process and in virtue of which it is a process of the kind it is. This is 
usually indicated by the chemical reaction that is used to describe the reaction’ (Ellis, 
2002, 33). 
Ellis describes the relationship between dispositions, dispositional properties 
and causal processes as follows. Salt has the dispositional property ‘solubility,’ the 
manifestation of this property is the natural kind process, dissolution. The essence of 
the process can be given a description in terms of its structure i.e. the breakdown of 
the crystalline structure of salt due to interaction with a polar solvent. Any process 
that exhibited this essential structure would qualify as member of the natural kind 
dissolution. Any object that is capable of undergoing dissolution must possess the 
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He argues that the laws of nature that hold over a particular kind hold in 
virtue of the dispositional properties that are essential to that kind. In this sense 
natural kinds are more fundamental than laws of nature and in disciplines in which 
there are no natural kinds, there can be no laws of nature. To take an example, an 
essential property  of  the  electron  is the disposition to  repel  negatively  charged 
things, consequently it is a law of nature that electrons repel negatively charged 
things (Ellis, 2002, 82). 
A  consequence  of  this  account  of  laws  is  that  laws  are  metaphysically 
necessary. This doesn’t mean that in every possible world there exists the same laws 
of nature rather any two worlds that contain the same natural kinds will contain the 
same laws of nature. Since laws follow from essential properties it is metaphysically 
impossible, for instance, for an electron to not repel other electrons. It is an essential 
property of an electron that it is disposed to repel negatively charged objects; if it did 
not do so then it would fail to qualify as a member of the natural kind electron. 
Since laws of nature hold in virtue of kinds there must be a natural laws 
structure that parallels the natural kind structure already in place and we should 
expect three hierarchies of laws of nature where more specific laws supervene on 
more general laws (Ellis, 2002, 85). This can be illustrated with reference to the 
dynamic kind hierarchy; at the highest level of generality are those laws that cover 
all kinds that fall within the hierarchy, these laws follow from the essence of the 
global process kind which is found at the top of the hierarchy. Further down the 
hierarchy we find laws of medium generality, these govern ‘ubiquitous but not all 
natural kinds of process’ and are entailed by the essential properties of generic kinds. 
Finally there exist laws that govern specific kinds of process only (Ellis, 2002, 86). The 
same model applies to substantive natural kinds but not to the property natural kind 
hierarchy - in this case Ellis admits that there is no global law that governs all kinds 
of properties; he takes this to be a potential argument for splitting the property 
hierarchy into two distinct categories; dispositional and structural properties (Ellis, 
2002, 87). Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
47 
 
1:5:3: Scientific Essentialism and Classifying Reactions 
Ellis’s account stays true to the naturalistic spirit in the sense that he notes 
that laws of nature refer to processes and on this basis builds a place for them in his 
ontology. However his response of committing to natural kinds of entities, properties 
and processes results in a significantly inflated ontology. Part of my task in the 
following chapters will be to examine whether this move made by Ellis is necessary 
to capture the classification of reactions. Alternatively, can this be achieved at a 
lower ontological price?    
A further question for his account concerns how to flesh out his notion of a 
natural kind hierarchy. He equates the manifestation of a dispositional property with 
a kind of process where this process can be identified with a particular structure. In 
The Metaphysics for Scientific Realism Ellis expands on his discussion of the structure 
of processes and describes how this could be specified in the case of simple processes 
that fall at the bottom of the process hierarchy such as radioactive decay, particle 
emissions, absorptions or annihilations. He describes an 'elementary causal process' 
as an emission event, followed by a Schrödinger wave transmission process, followed 
by an absorption event (Ellis, 2010, 83-7).  
As Chakravartty has pointed out this suggests an acceptance of the Salmon- 
Dowe model of a causal process in which processes are defined in terms of the 
transmission of conserved quantity where the details of what this quantity amounts 
to are provided by physics. Salmon tells us we have reason to believe that mass, 
energy  and  charge  are  conserved  quantities.  Chakravartty  has  suggested  that 
thinking about processes in terms of fundamental physical properties is insufficient 
to capture higher level processes (Chakravartty, 2007, 158).   In the case of the 
classification of reactions it is not clear that such an approach could capture the 
appropriate similarity relations between higher level reactions. For example, could 
the transfer of conserved quantities capture what is similar between two oxidation 
reactions and why this is different to a hydrolysis reaction? Even if we were to find 
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by appealing to the structure of the reaction mechanism, again, it is unclear how 
much structural similarity is required for two reactions to be of the same kind.    
Ellis’ use of energy transfer to identify a process marks a different approach 
to that specified in the previous section in which reactions are identified in terms of 
a mechanism. My project in the forthcoming chapters will be to examine how we 
determine which of these is most appropriate to chemical practice. I’ll show that both 
an appeal to causal structure as well as conserved quantities referred to by Salmon 
are relevant to this task.  
1.6: Quine’s Weak Realism 
1:6:1: Thesis and Motivation  
Quine is realist about natural kinds in the sense that he equates them with 
sets of entities and takes the concept of kindhood to be intimately related to the 
notion of projectability (Quine, 1969). He introduces kinds in order to account for 
two paradoxes of confirmation; Hempel’s Raven Paradox and Goodman’s New Riddle 
of Induction.  
The ravens’ paradox arises when we accept two plausible claims;  
a.  Positive instances of a generalisation provide confirming support for that 
generalisation 
b.  Something which confirms a generalisation also confirms any statement that 
is logically equivalent to that generalisation 
By the first claim a black raven confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black. The 
statement all ravens are black is logically equivalent to the statement that all non-
black things are non-ravens which in turn is confirmed by a white shoe. However 
anything that confirms the latter statement must confirm the former since they are 
logically equivalent and thus we get the paradoxical conclusion that the statement 
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Goodman’s new riddle of induction also gives counter intuitive conclusions 
with regards to confirmation. The predicate ‘grue’ is assigned to anything that is 
green and observed before now or blue and unobserved. If it’s the case that all 
emeralds that have been observed so far have been green then they must also have 
been grue and so provide confirmation for the statement that ‘all emeralds are grue’. 
In addition, if we combine this with the assumption that some emeralds are as yet 
unobserved then we get the paradoxical conclusion that some emeralds are blue 
(Goodman, 1983). 
Quine attempts to dissolve the paradox by claiming that only natural kind 
terms are projectable. It follows from this that it is illegitimate to make projections 
based  on  the  terms  ‘non  raven’  and  ‘grue’  since  they  are  not  natural  kinds. 
Consequently, whilst we might accept a black raven as a confirming instance of all 
ravens are black we cannot do the same for white shoe, nor can be make projectable 
judgements about ‘grue’ (Quine 1969, 116) 
For Quine, kinds are sets whose members bear a similarity relation to each 
other (Quine 1969, 135). He admits that kindhood and similarity amount to the same 
notion but doesn’t give an account of one in terms of the other. Instead, he denies 
that it is the job of the philosopher to define what is meant by kindhood rather he 
outsources the job to the particular branch of science to which the kind term is 
relevant. He suggests that different branches of science require different notions of 
similarity which are more or less fine grained and that it is a mark of a mature science 
that it has a well fleshed out notion of similarity. In addition, once a given branch of 
science  has  reached  full  maturity  then  it  must  be  integrated  into  our  current 
systematisation of nature such that the similarity notions advocated by different 
branches are compatible with each other. He argues that once this is achieved then 
the notion of kindhood and similarity are dissolved.  
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1:6:2: Quine and Classifying Reactions  
Quine doesn’t explicitly discuss the possibility of natural kinds of change 
however his arguments can be extended. If kinds are sets who members bear a 
similarity relation to each other then there is no reason why we can’t have sets 
containing instances of chemical reactions each of whom proceeds in the same way, 
perhaps by the same mechanism.  
Quine maintains that kinds are sets where members share at least one natural 
property. For example, Quine takes the set of positively charged objects to form a 
natural kind where this contains a hydrogen ion, an up quark and a charged water 
droplet.  In  the  case  of  the  classification  of  reactions  sets  containing  chemical 
reactions would take a variety of different forms. For example, there is the set of all 
chemical reactions containing a carbon atoms or the set of all reactions containing 
an alcohol. Alternatively, if we return to the types chemical reactions outlined in 
section  1.2.  we  might  identify  the  set  of  all  chemical  reactions  involving  the 
decomposition of a chemical entity into two or more substances via the breaking of 
the bond. If Quine's account of natural kinds is to apply to chemical reactions in a 
chemically accurate way then we may need to address whether particular commonly 
instanced rearrangements of atoms of bonds fall within his notion of having a natural 
property in common? Alternatively do we need to extend this discussion to natural 
properties and relations? 
1:7: Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Account 
1:7:1: Thesis and Motivation  
Boyd advocates the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) account. He is realist 
about natural kinds and takes them to be co-occurring clusters of properties that 
repeatedly co-occur due to the presence of an underlying causal mechanism or by 
homeostasis i.e. the presence of a property which favours the presence of other 
properties. Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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Boyd’s realism about natural kinds is motivated by the role they play in our 
epistemic practice. He highlights this in his accommodation thesis which states that 
‘the theory of natural kinds is about how schemes of classification contribute to the 
formulation  and  identification  of  projectable  hypotheses’  (Boyd  1991,  147).  He 
argues that scientists are typically successful in making inductive inferences and the 
best explanation of this success is that they have uncovered those taxonomical 
divisions  that  genuinely  latch  on  to  the  causal  structure  of  the  world.  Those 
homeostatic  property  clusters  that  continually  co-occur  and  support  inductive 
inferences give us reason to believe that they latch on to this causal structure. This 
allows us to make sense of the metaphor that ‘kinds cut nature at its joints.’ ‘Kinds 
useful for induction or explanation must always “cut the world at its joints” in this 
sense: successful induction and explanation always require that we accommodate 
our categories to the causal structure of the world’ (Boyd 1991, 139). 
The accommodation thesis has been proposed as a potential line of attack in 
response to the inductive sceptic. If certain clusters of properties continually co-
occur then we can infer from the presence of one property to the potential existence 
of another. Consequently, if it is the case that every F we have ever observed has 
been a G then it might be argued that the best explanation of our observations of 
only Gs and Fs is that all Fs are Gs. This thought is that if a term is to have significant 
projectability then it should latch on to a cluster of properties that are correlated for 
good reason and not by accident. As a result we should want to identify a condition 
C that explains why all F’s are G’s. Boyd’s account attempts to provide this. 
On the HPC account properties co-occur as a result of homeostasis or a causal 
mechanism. In the first case the presence of some of the properties in F tends, under 
appropriate conditions, to favour the presence of the others. In the second case, 
there are underlying mechanisms or processes that tend to maintain the presence of 
the properties in F, or both (Boyd, 1999) Figure 1 illustrates some of the relations 
that might hold between a property cluster (P1…P5) and a mechanism x.  
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Figure 1 Co-occurring clusters of properties resulting from homeostasis or a causal 
mechanism (Craver, 2006, 583) 
In examples a. and d. the clusters are self-sustaining; the presence of certain 
properties  causes  the  presence  of  others.  In  case  b.  it  is  the  presence  of  the 
mechanism x that causes the properties to co-occur, whilst in the example c. the 
cluster of properties gives rise to the mechanism. 
Since not every property (P1…P5) must be instanced in order for the cluster 
to qualify as of a certain kind, in each instantiation of the mechanism there are no 
sufficient and necessary conditions on kind membership.  Instead Boyd admits that 
cluster kind terms are often vague and there is no matter of fact about whether an 
individual falls within the extension of a term. The cluster of properties is assumed 
to have causal import; the co-occurrence of a number of the properties results in 
some significant effect and as a result any attempt to further refine the cluster in 
order to remove the vagueness of the extension of the kind term obscures this effect. 
Nonetheless, Boyd argues that we should be guided by the success of our inductive 
practice and as a result the properties which constitute any kind as well as their 
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1:7:2: Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds and Classifying Reactions 
The HPC account of classification is of particular interest when investigating 
the classification of reactions. This is because my discussion at the start of this 
chapter indicates that the notion of a mechanism is central to the way reactions are 
classified. One option would be to equate the reaction mechanisms of the sort 
described in section 1.2 with the co-occurrence of chemical properties. In this sense 
reaction mechanisms might be thought to permit inductive inferences. Consider the 
hydrolysis reaction. The reaction can be described in terms of a reaction mechanism; 
it involves the decomposition of a substance as a result of a polar charge on a H2O 
molecule. Additional chemical groups involved in the reaction are labelled as R and 
R1, the identity of these groups in not relevant to the overall reaction mechanism.  
 
Figure 2: Generalised mechanism for a hydrolysis reaction 
Hydrolysis reactions which act on similar types of entities will result in similar 
product entities where these products also have similar properties. In this sense, 
reactions acting as causal mechanisms might be thought to produce co-occurring 
clusters of properties.  
One option for developing the HPC account is to reconcile Boyd’s use of the 
term  ‘mechanism’  with  the  recent  literature  on  mechanisms.  Craver  (2009) 
investigated  this  approach  and  uncovered  difficulties  for  the  HPC  account.  He 
concluded that the HPC account is not the middle way between conventionalism and 
essentialism that Boyd hopes.  
Craver’s argument is that conventional elements are involved ‘partly but 
ineliminably’ in deciding when two mechanisms are of the same type and secondly, 
when identifying when one mechanism ends and the other begins (Craver, 2009, 
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mechanism  and  therefore  Craver  argues  that  these  considerations  affect  which 
properties constitute any given cluster. 
Craver’s  arguments  rest  on  the  claim  that  there  are  many  different  and 
contradictory  ways  in  which  we  might  choose  classify  mechanisms  together 
depending on our pragmatic interests. Craver states; ‘if the HPC account were to 
suggest that we should split kinds whenever the mechanisms differ in any of the 
myriad ways that any two mechanisms might differ then there would be as many 
kinds of mechanisms as instances of mechanisms‘ (Craver, 2009, 579).  He suggests 
that Boyd would want to avoid this conclusion yet, at the same time there appears 
to be no fact of the matter when a sufficient degree of similarity holds between two 
mechanisms for them to be of the same kind, thus according to Craver, Boyd’s 
account edges towards constructivism (Craver, 2009, 579). 
However,  Craver’s  objection  fails  to  acknowledge  the  central  role  in 
identifying stability in Boyd’s account. Consequently, rather than trying to isolate a 
particular mechanism and then reading off the properties that would form a natural 
kind as a result as Craver suggests, Boyd’s account employs the reverse approach. 
Boyd first isolates co-occurring properties and then seeks to uncover the homeostatic 
mechanism responsible. Boyd also accepts that HPC kinds are discipline relative and 
admits that ‘natural kinds for psychology may turn out to not be natural kinds in the 
same sense for physiology’ (Boyd, 1999 145). As a result, Boyd would not accept that 
the tension which Craver is alluding to is problematic.  
It  is  also  worth  noting  that  Boyd  says  very  little  about  the  nature  of  a 
mechanism. This is in spite of the fact that in at least some cases, it is the homeostasis 
or a causal mechanism that has ontological priority in that it produces the clusters of 
properties  required  for  projectability.  In  addition,  Boyd  does  not  discuss  the 
possibility of kinds of process. I suggest Boyd’s account might be a fruitful avenue of 
inquiry for the classification of reactions. I will return to this point in chapter 3 and 
again in chapter 6.  Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
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1:8: Dupré’s Promiscuous Realism 
1:8:1: Thesis and Motivation  
Dupré’s promiscuous realism advocates a pluralist and weakly realist conception 
of natural kinds in which a best or correct classificatory system exists only with 
respect to  a  specific  scientific  interest.  The  motivation  for Dupré’s  promiscuous 
realism is classificatory practice in biology. One of the questions he is interested in 
concerns what criteria should be used when determining species membership. He 
argues that this question has no definite answer and instead identifies three plausible 
candidates for the essential property of a species. (Dupré, 1981, 80 – 90)  
1.  The phylogenetic conception of species states that a genetic description could 
function as the essential property of a species such that members of a species 
share  some  genetic  blue  print  where  physiological  and  morphological 
differences  result  from  the  interaction  between  the  organism’s  genetic 
makeup  and  the  environment.  The  problem  with  this  approach  is  that 
members of the same species tend to exhibit a high level of genetic variability, 
and for good reason since this trait is favoured by evolution on the grounds 
that it increases the ability to adapt to a changing environment (Dupré, 1981, 
87). 
2.  The  second  potential  criterion  for  species  membership  is  reproductive 
isolation. On this account a species is defined as a group of interbreeding 
individuals. This criterion is also inappropriate to some cases as a result of 
hybridization which frequently occurs in the natural world. In the case in 
which the hybrid is infertile we are left with an individual that is not assigned 
to any species. In the cases in which reproduction is possible the ‘alien’ genes 
are not competitive enough to survive further rounds of reproduction and we 
are still left with reproductive links between distinct species, discrediting the 
criteria (Dupré, 1981, 85). 
3.  The third criterion is concerned with evolutionary history. It is assumed that 
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could state that something is a member of a species if it has the correct 
ancestry. This option is problematic because a completed ancestry tree is 
impossible to produce; evidence left by organisms in the very distant past is 
no longer available (Dupré, 1981, 87). 
  Dupré argues that because of the difficulties with each of the definitions we 
should concede that there is no single definition of a species rather biologists choose 
to use one of the above depending on what they are interested in.  It is this ability to 
read  off  different  philosophical  conclusions  directly  from  scientific  practice  that 
convinces  him  that  essentialism  is  false  and  that  inspires  promiscuous  realism 
(Dupré, 2002, 38). 
  Dupré denies that there is a unique set of natural kinds that results from an 
ultimate classificatory system. However, he insists that the different classificatory 
systems which arise out of different research interests are equally real. He considers 
kinds to be a useful methodological tool on the grounds that it is the application of 
theoretical concepts that divides nature into groups (Dupré, 2002, 39). Dupré states 
explicitly that the process of sorting nature into kinds and deciding which concepts 
are relevant for classificatory purposes are two sides of the same coin (Dupré, 2002, 
45).  
  Nonetheless Dupré does take classification to be constrained by nature. The 
aims of a particular inquiry are a matter of historical contingency which means that 
the outcome of scientific inquiry is not necessarily determined in advance even if we 
are realist about modes of classification.  He is however, open to the possibility that 
‘all  paths  lead  to  Rome’  and  that  certain  scientific  doctrines  are  inescapable 
regardless of our specific goals of inquiry (Dupré, 2002, 47). 
  Dupré is a weak realist about kinds and he rejects any metaphysical account 
of kinds. He does not distinguish between knowing the essence of an individual and 
knowing the natural kind to which it belongs, rather, once we know what the natural 
kind is we know what the essence is, this is what Dupré calls a ‘bare essence’ (Dupré, Chapter 1: Classifying Reactions and the Natural Kind Literature 
57 
 
2002, 44). On this conception of natural kinds it makes no sense to ask what the 
essential property of a particular is.  
1:8:2 Promiscuous Realism and Classifying Reactions 
In his most recent book The Processes of Life 2012 Dupré extends these 
themes.  He  advocates  Promiscuous  Individualism  the  idea  that  organisms  are 
constituted by processes rather than entities; ‘Key concepts in biology, I suggested, 
are  static  abstractions  from  life  processes,  and  different  abstractions  provide 
different perspectives on these processes’ (Dupré, 2012, 86).  
This view provides the metaphysical accompaniment to promiscuous realism. 
Dupré defines a process as ‘anything that must continually undergo change in order 
to survive,’ and describes how scientists abstract entities away from processes in 
those places where processes give the illusion of stability (Dupré, 2012, 86). Scientists 
working at different levels will identify different instances of stability according to 
their research interests and so will identify different particulars each of which has the 
potential to contradict each other.  
The priority of processes over entities has the implication that there is no 
unique answer to questions regarding how many organisms are present in a given 
system.  Dupré states that ‘what an organism is, and whether something is part of an 
organism or not, are not questions that necessarily admit of definitive answers’ 
(Dupré, 2012, 153). This can be fleshed out using the biological example of lichens 
which  are  composite  organisms  consisting  of  a  symbiotic  relationships  between 
a fungus and a photosynthetic partner which is usually a green algae. (Dupré, 2012, 
158). 
Dupré challenges the view that there is one organism present, the lichen, or 
two organisms present, the fungus and algae. Rather, he claims there are three 
organisms; the lichen, the fungus and the algae and we prioritize one answer over 
the others depending on our interests. In addition, the fungi that jointly constitute 
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we can draw the boundaries between an individual fungus of a given species, with 
the  consequences  that  individuating  particulars  gives  rise  to  high  levels  of 
promiscuity (Dupré, 2012, 158).   
By reversing the traditional priority relation between entities and processes 
Dupré has outlined a metaphysical framework for his promiscuous realism. Different 
and  contradictory  classificatory  schemes  arise  when  the  illusion  of  stability  is 
identified from different perspectives. Whilst Dupré is concerned with classification 
in general and also with the status of entities he does not address the classification 
of processes or commit to natural kinds of processes. He has not addressed the 
classification of chemical reactions.    
I suggest that his definition of a process is vague; he states only that a process 
is something that must continue to change in order to continue to exist. This isn’t 
useful for my purposes since it provides little clue about how we should distinguish 
one kind of process from another, e.g. a hydrolysis reaction from a substitution 
reaction.  Perhaps, however, his definition of a process can be extended in such a 
way that might shed light on the nature of a chemical reaction. I will return to this 
point in chapter 4.4 and offer my own definition of a process.  
1:9: Chemistry in Context: Microstructuralism  
So far in this chapter I have addressed general debates about classification in 
the philosophy of science. Chemistry has always been central to debates about 
classification. However, as I discussed at the start of my thesis, the past 20 years has 
seen the birth of the philosophy of chemistry in its own right and this has implications 
for our understanding of classification. In particular philosophers have attempted to 
produce a chemically informed understanding of classification that is compatible 
with more advanced chemical knowledge. In the following section I will outline a 
specific  debate  within  the  context  of  the  philosophy  of  chemistry  between 
microstructuralists about chemical classification on the one hand and those that 
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1.9.1: Thesis and Motivation 
Microstructuralism about chemical kinds is advocated by Hendry (2006) and 
is the thesis that membership of a kind is conferred by microstructural properties. 
The paradigmatic examples are provided by the chemical elements in which the 
relevant microstructural properties are the number of electrons in the outer shell, or 
in the case of isotopes, the number of neutrons present in the nucleus. On Hendry’s 
view microstructural properties determine the extension of the kind but he stops 
short  of  full  essentialism  and  doesn’t  commit  to  the  idea  that  kinds  have 
microstructural essences.  
  Hendry’s motivations are twofold. In the first place, he appeals to the kind of 
modal intuitions advanced by Kripke. Hendry asks us to imagine a possible world in 
which water has different macroscopic properties such as a different boiling point or 
density and argues that this is conceivable. He then asks us to imagine another 
possible world in which water exists but is not formed from H2O molecules, he argues 
that this is impossible and that as a result being H2O is a necessary if not sufficient 
condition on being water (Hendry, forthcoming). 
Secondly, Hendry is motivated by the idea that structure plays an important 
regulatory role with respect to the non-structural properties of the entity. In the case 
of the molecule ethene which consists of two carbon atoms joined by a double bond, 
Hendry argues that the presence of the double bond between the carbon atoms is a 
structural property (Hendry, forthcoming). As a result the presence of a high electron 
density  and  the  ability  to  undergo  certain  types  of  reactions  supervenes  on  a 
structural property in his view.  
Hendry  doesn’t  commit  to  microstructural  essence  for  good  chemical 
reasons. Once the level of complexity is increased microstructuralism becomes more 
complicated  and  vagueness  enters  the  picture.  At  the  level  of  the  compound 
specifying,  only  the  constituent  parts  of  the  entity  becomes  insufficient  for 
distinguishing the extensions of what we intuitively consider different kinds. Consider 
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isomers; consisting of the same components in the same proportions, 2 carbon 
atoms,  7  hydrogen  atoms  and  an  oxygen  atom.  The  difference  between  the 
hydrocarbons is due to the differing arrangements of the atoms in the compounds 
which are captured by the formulas CH3OCH3 for methoxymethane and CH3CHOH for 
ethanol. As Hendry points out ‘the distinctness of ethanol and methoxymethane 
must lie in their molecular structures’ (Hendry, 2006, 871). Therefore the different 
properties possessed by the two entities must, according to Hendry, supervene on 
spatial arrangement. 
A consequence of  extending the notion of microstructural properties to 
include a reference to spatial arrangement is that molecular structure is defined in 
terms of factors such as inter nuclear distances and angles between bonds, both of 
which  are  continuous  variables.  Consequently  the  similarity  of  one  molecular 
arrangement to another is not a binary matter but a matter of degree. This means 
that chemical kinds cannot be divided into ‘mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
extensions’ (Hendry, 2006, 871) Instead, they will form overlapping clusters of similar 
entities that are identified by the equilibrium point of the cluster but have no definite 
boundaries between the extension of one kind and another. However, since Hendry 
is  not  committed  to  the  stronger  essentialist  claim  that  chemical  kinds  have  a 
microstructural  essence  he  can  embrace  this  vagueness  and  accept  that  the 
extensions of complex chemical kinds do not have definite boundaries (Hendry, 2008, 
115). 
1.9.2: Microstructuralism and Classifying Reactions  
Hendry does not explicitly discuss the classification of reactions. He states 
only that entities provide the ingredients of reactions and provides an analogy with 
baking a cake and suggests the atoms and bonds which undergo a reaction are used 
up in the reaction process just as ingredients are used up in a cake (Hendry & 
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A  further  way  to  address  whether  microstructuralism  can  capture  the 
classification of chemical reactions is to examine the position in light of the criticisms 
levelled  against  it.  Much  of  the  discussion  between  microstructuralism  and  its 
opponents takes place within the context of the question, ‘is water H2O’?  Needham 
and van Brakel suggest that an account of a complex substance like water requires 
reference to macroscopic as well as microstructural properties (Needham, 2000) (van 
Brakel, 2000). They claim that it is misleading to assert that ‘water = H2O’ on the 
grounds that water cannot be equated with a single H2O molecule since this molecule 
would  lack the  stereotypical  features  associated  with  water.  It  wouldn’t have  a 
boiling  point,  temperature  or  thirst  quenching  ability.  Even  if  we  employed  a 
modified reading of the identity statement so that it read ‘water is a collection of H2O 
molecules’ it would still not do the job of accounting for the behavioural properties 
of water according to Needham (Needham, 2011). These properties are accounted 
for not by the structure of a H2O molecule but by the higher level thermodynamic 
properties of water. 
Needham and van Brakel draw our attention to the fact that paradigmatic 
samples of water contain significant amounts of impurities but the H2O molecules 
themselves present in solution are constantly disassociating and then re-associating 
according to the following equilibrium  2 H2O ↔ H3O+ + OH- (van Brakel, 1986) 
(Needham, 2010.) In addition those H2O molecules that are not disassociated at any 
one time possess a polar charge which causes them to undergo intra molecular 
bonding and form oligomolecular species or long chains of H2O. These chains are 
constantly  breaking  and  reforming  as  H2O  molecules  continue  to  dissociate. 
Needham  and  van  Brakel  assert  that  it  is  this  thermodynamic  picture  that  is 
responsible for the stereotypical properties of water rather than an individual H2O 
molecule.  
In  order  to  assess  whether  microstructuralism  adequately  captures  the 
classification of chemical reactions I must assess whether the same worries about 
the need to capture the thermodynamic properties of entities also apply to reactions. 
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captured by a microstructuralist account? I will address this debate in section 2.3.2 
where I argue that when classifying chemical reactions, chemists attempt to explain 
macroscopic differences at the microstructural level. Therefore it is the unification of 
microstructural and macroscopic properties that is important to chemical practice.  I 
will further discuss thermodynamic understanding of reactions in section 4.4. 
1:10: Conclusion  
In this chapter I have introduced the notion of a chemical reaction and the 
intuition that reactions can be classified into types. I introduced key accounts of 
classification  from  social  constructivism,  semantic  essentialism,  metaphysical 
essentialism and the weaker realist positions about classification. 
I suggested that many of the traditional accounts of classification do not 
address the classification of non-entities like things such as reactions. Expanding any 
of  these  accounts  to  accommodate  the  classification  of  reactions  will  require 
answering  some  key  questions.  The  first  concerns  the  status  of  reaction 
classifications; are they of the same status as classifications of entities? In other 
words  do  classifications  of  reactions  cut  nature  at  its  joints  or  support  law  like 
generalisations in the way that some philosophers argue that entity classifications 
do? 
A further question concerns the way in which reactions are classified. In 
chemical  practice  are  sufficient  and  necessary  conditions  for  kind  membership 
specified and if so on what basis? One option is to individuate reactions using the 
causal  structure  of  reactions  and  another  is  to  appeal  to  a  conserved  quantity 
approach. In both cases the classification must be able to capture fine and coarse 
grained similarities between the different reactions. For example, the kind ‘oxidation 
reaction’ contains coarse grained similarities as it permits a high degree of lower level 
variation. The kind ‘photosynthesis’ captures more fine grained similarities as there 
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It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  different  accounts  appeal  to  different 
ontological resources. Ellis commits to a natural kind category of processes, whilst 
Dupré offers a very different account in which processes are treated as prior to 
entities.  
Boyd on the other hand commits to mechanisms to sustain his account, which 
is in contrast to Hendry who commits only to microstructural properties. A key part 
of my project of deciding which, if any, of the accounts of natural kind classification 
is  most  appropriate  to  reactions,  will  involve  evaluating  which  ontological 
components are necessary for classifying reactions. In chapter 2 I will discuss the 
classification of reactions in practice and outline a framework of criteria by which to 
evaluate  which ontological  components  are  required.  I  will  argue  at the  end  of 
chapter 2 that there is good reason when assessing the classification of reactions in 
practice to begin by looking to the mechanisms literature in chapter 3. The results of 
this discussion will point me towards and assessment of the entities – dispositions 
ontology in chapter 4 and causal dispositionalism in chapter 5. In chapter 6 I will 
outline  a  positive  proposal  for  a  metaphysics  of  the  classification  of  chemical 
reactions in practice.  
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Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in 
Practice 
2.1: Introduction 
My aim in chapter 1 was to give an overview of the debate on the status of 
the classification of scientific entities. I provided an introduction to the notion of a 
chemical  reaction  and  showed  that  a  brief  survey  into  chemistry  reveals  that 
chemists classify reactions into types and tokens in addition to the more familiar 
classification of entities into types and tokens. I outlined different philosophical 
approaches to classification from constructivism to essentialism about natural kinds 
and the weaker realist positions that fall in between.  I concluded that none of the 
positions outlined in chapter 1 can straightforwardly accommodate the classification 
of  chemical  reactions  without  further  development.  This  is  because  with  the 
exception of Ellis’s Scientific Essentialism the different philosophical accounts are 
primarily concerned with the classification of entities and further work is done to 
show how they might accommodate reaction classification, if this is indeed possible. 
With  respect  to  Brian  Ellis’s  Scientific  Essentialism,  while  he  does  discuss  the 
classification  of  reactions  and  make  room  for  natural  kinds  of  reactions  in  his 
ontology, he does not argue for this conclusion using a detailed consideration of 
scientific practice. My methodology, in contrast to Ellis’, is to give an account of the 
classification of reactions that is purposely led by scientific practice, I shall discuss 
this in detail in sections 2.3 and 2.5 of this chapter. 
In order to establish which philosophical account of classification is most 
appropriate  for  chemical  reactions  it  is  necessary  to  further  explore  how  the 
classification of chemical reactions is achieved in chemical practice. My aim in this 
chapter is to build a picture of the classification procedure, including the aims and 
objectives of the classification, the details of how the classification takes place and Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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how the output classification is received and absorbed into chemical knowledge. I 
will then draw together this discussion to provide a list of criteria and requirements 
that any metaphysics of classification must adhere to if it is to accommodate the 
classification of chemical reactions in practice. 
One of the implications of this chapter is that the discussion will enable me to 
answer  some  of  the questions raised  in  chapter  1.  For  example,  we  know  that 
reactions are classified into types but does this always happen on the basis of the 
underlying  reaction  mechanisms  such  as  addition,  elimination,  substitution  and 
combination? Is it the case that the structure of the reaction mechanism provides 
the essential properties on which reaction classification is based? If this is the case 
then how do chemists manage the role played by structure and the potential for 
vagueness that is described by Craver and discussed in chapter 1?  If it is not the 
structure of the reaction mechanism then what provides the conditions for kind 
membership? 
I’m also interested in the aims and interests of chemists when they produce 
classifications. For instance, are they used to support predictions and the fruitful 
development of science? Alternatively, are they employed for the purpose of storage 
or to effectively convey information to students of chemistry? Addressing these 
questions will provide a preliminary basis for adjudicating which general account of 
classification, if any, is most appropriate, whether this be constructivism, realism or 
essentialism.  
I  will  begin  in  section  1  by  outlining  the  chemical  context  in  which  my 
discussion will take place, focusing specifically on the domain of chemoinformatics. 
In section 2, I’ll discuss a new approach to classifying reactions and its first application 
on a test case of common organic reactions which were classified to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the new methodology. In section 3, I use this methodology to draw 
out three initial requirements that a metaphysics for the classification of reactions 
must be compatible with. These initial requirements are related to the details of the 
three stage classificatory process; the use of reactions as a heuristic device to guide 
classification, the application of QSAR and the application of neural networking.  Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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In  section  4  I  describe  a  more  recent  case  study  in  which  this  same 
methodology is applied to the classification of reactions with the aim of enhancing 
predictability and advancing chemical knowledge. This discussion allows me to draw 
out  three  more  general  constraints  on  a  metaphysics  for  the  classification  of 
reactions, by meeting these criteria an ontology is descriptively fit for purpose. In 
order to be descriptively fit for purpose it must be descriptively accurate enough, 
capture objective similarities and drive explanatory unification. These criteria will 
provide  a  way  of  adjudicating  between  the  different  metaphysical  accounts  of 
classification that are discussed through the course of my thesis. 
My  discussion  of  chemical  practice  will  focus  on  the  field  of 
chemoinformatics, a relatively new sub-discipline within the field of chemistry that 
began to emerge in the 1980s. The remit of chemoinformatics is the ‘application of 
informatics methods to solve chemical problems’ and the field covers three areas; 
data management, learning and representation (Gasteiger, 2001, 1)5. My thesis will 
focus  on  the  application  of  informatics  techniques to  achieve  chemical  learning 
although  questions  of  data  management  will  be  relevant  at  times.  The  aim  of 
chemoinformatics with respect to my case studies is to use empirical data to solve 
chemical problems by employing different learning techniques.  
The two main types of learning employed in chemoinformatics are deductive 
learning  and  inductive  learning.  In  order  to  proceed  by  deductive  learning  you 
chemists require a fundamental theory from which you can base inferences and 
predictions.  Quantum  mechanics  is  the  best  fundamental  theory  available  for 
chemistry.  The  Schrödinger  equation  can  for  example,  be  used  to  establish  the 
                                                           
5 Data management involves the storage of  huge and increasing amounts of data in chemical 
databases which are accessed electronically. Basic database theory has been developed to aid the 
tagging of data and to develop search and retrieval methods to ensure databases queries are dealt 
with as efficiently as possible (Gasteiger, 2003, 274) 
Representation involves the representation of chemical compounds in their molecular structure and 
the representation of chemical reactions. My thesis will not focus on the role of representation of 
distinct entities however I will address the representation of similarity relations holding between the 
objects of investigation, in section 2.2.2 Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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dependence  of  the  properties  of  simple  molecules  on  their  three  dimensional 
structure thus allowing for the calculation of their properties.  
However, for complex molecules the application of the Schrödinger equation 
is not possible due to either gaps in the underlying theory or the large amounts of 
computation time that is  required  (Gasteiger, 2003, 7).  In  the  case of  chemical 
reactions the situation is worse still; only simple reactions can be analysed using the 
Schrödinger equations as more complex reactions require a series of approximations 
that affect the accuracy of results. In addition chemists are currently unable to give 
a quantum mechanical account that takes into account reaction conditions such as 
solvents, temperature, pressure or catalysts (Gasteiger, 2003, 2). 
Since many of the properties and activities that chemists need to predict are 
beyond  the  capabilities  of  deductive  learning  at  this  time,  inductive  learning 
techniques have been embraced.  Inductive learning involves identifying correlations 
between chemical structures and their properties on the basis of empirical data. This 
information is then organised in a scheme that allows the features that the entities 
or reactions have in common to be recognised. A classification scheme is built on the 
basis of this and is used to make further predictions (Gasteiger, 2003, 9). As I shall go 
on to discuss, these predictions concern which entities will undergo which type of 
reactions, which enzymes will act as catalysts for which reactions and how much 
activation energy is required in each case. 
This  approach  to  classification  was  pioneered  by  Johann  Gasteiger,  the 
founding  father  of  the  chemoinformatics  movement  who  received  the  Gmelin 
Beilstein medal from the German Chemical Society in recognition of his contribution 
to the field.  My thesis will focus on the work of the Gasteiger research group based 
in Erlangen Nuremburg and their development and application of inductive learning 
techniques  in  order  to  further  our  understanding  of  chemical  reactions.  ‘The 
automatic perception of chemical similarities between chemical reactions is required 
for a variety of applications in chemistry’ (Latino and Aires de Sousa, 2011, 325). The 
techniques outlined in this chapter are now utilized worldwide in major industrial 
and academic research and discovery laboratories to design and optimize chemical Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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products and processes. In particular it supports the prediction of chemical, physical 
and biological properties of chemical compounds including their chemical reactivity 
and metabolic or environmental fate. This innovative approach has now become 
wide spread and is worthy of philosophical consideration. It is has become common 
place in domains such as Biochemistry for the Life Sciences (P, Atkins and de Paula. 
J)  Molecular Informatics (Baumann, K. Ecker, G. Mestres, J. Schneider. G, 2014) Drug 
Design  (Xu  and  Hagler,  2012)  and  Environmental  Research  (Devillers,  2014). 
Therefore there is reason to believe that the conclusions of my investigation will have 
a broader scope and be applicable to the philosophy of science more generally. 
In this chapter I will discuss the application of inductive learning techniques 
to chemical reactions in the fields of organic chemistry and biochemistry. Each case 
study uses the same technique, the case study involving organic reactions is the first 
application of the technique in 1997 (Gasteiger and Chen, 1997). The second case 
study is a more recent application of the methodology from 2009 (Sacher, Reitz and 
Gasteiger, 2009). Both proceed by using inductive learning techniques to produce a 
classification of reactions that identify the similarity relations that hold between 
distinct reactions. In the first case these similarity relations are used to establish the 
reliability of  the  classification  methodology by comparing the  results to  existing 
classifications. In the second case the classification was used to make predictions and 
support  the  fruitful  development  of  science.  The  list  of  requirements  that  a 
metaphysics  of  classification  must  be  compatible  with  if  it  is  to  accommodate 
chemical practice will be drawn directly from these case studies.  
2:2: A New Methodology for the Classification of Organic 
Reactions 
In  the  pioneering  paper  Knowledge  Discovery  in  Reaction  Databases: 
Landscaping Organic Reactions by a Self-Organizing Neural Network (Gasteiger and 
Chen,  1997),  a  new  methodology  for  the  classification  of  chemical  reactions  is 
outlined. Gasteiger explains that the approach is motivated by the way in which Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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chemists conceptualise chemical problems when faced with a small set of data and 
need to make predictions about reaction viability, products and yield.  
‘In  most  cases  [chemists]  solve  these  problems  using  something  like  a 
reaction map in their brain. Such a reaction map organizes reactions on the 
basis of chemical knowledge they have learned from textbooks and their 
experiments.  So each chemist has her own reaction map’ (Leach and Gillett, 
2003, 1). 
Gasteiger and Chen attempt to recreate the notion of a reaction map but on a scale 
beyond  that  of  a  single  chemist  thus  requiring  the  application  of  informatics 
techniques. They described how they began their investigation by identifying the 
steps by which chemists build their own individual reaction maps; 
1.  Isolate and observe a phenomenon of interest 
2.  Analyse  the  factors  that  produce  the  phenomena  using  theoretical 
knowledge 
3.  Accumulate data on the factors that affect the phenomena of interest 
4.  Organise data systematically  
5.  Use statistical techniques to identify similarities between the phenomena of 
interest 
6.   Construct theories and laws governing the phenomena on the basis of these 
similarities  
7.  Use these theories to produce inductive inferences (Chen and Gasteiger, 
2007, 4033). 
  Gasteiger and Chen’s methodology mirrors this approach on a larger scale. 
The application of computational methods to the classification of chemical reactions 
means that an analysis of large volumes of data is now possible. They identified that;  
‘the number of observed reactions is extremely large and is increasing day by 
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computer.   The number of the published and stored reactions goes into the 
millions. A reaction map in a brain of a chemist is constructed from only a part 
of  these  reactions,  because  anyone  cannot  see  all  of  these  reactions’ 
(Gasteiger and Chen, 1998, 4033). 
I will focus on two distinct methodological components that are required for the large 
scale classification of chemical reactions. 
1.   Application of QSAR (Quantitative Structure Activity Relations): the approach 
by which the relevant data for the classification of a particular phenomenon 
is identified  
2.  Application  of  neural  networking:  the  process  by  which  the  data  is 
manipulated to produce a two dimensional representation of the similarities 
that hold between reactions.  
These two methodological components are applied together in order to produce a 
classification of reactions. 
2:2:1: Part 1 and 2: Activities as Heuristics and QSAR 
  The aim of the search for Quantitative Structure Activity Relations or QSAR is 
to relate the observed chemical phenomena of interest to the underlying structural 
properties that correlate with the instantiation of that phenomenon. In discussion of 
chemical reactions, the term activity or A in QSAR refers to the instantiation of the 
reaction of interest.  
‘QSAR  takes  a  series  of  chemicals  and  attempts  to  form  a  quantitative 
relationship between the biological or chemical effects (i.e. the activity) and 
the chemistry (i.e. the structure) of each of the chemicals, then we are able 
to form a quantitative structure–activity relationship or QSAR’ (Gasteiger and 
Engel, 2008, 10). 
The underlying belief or assumption is that lower level structural similarities give rise 
to  similarities  in  higher  level  activities.  Therefore  once  a  relationship  has  been 
identified  it  provides  the  basis  on  which  to  make  predictions  about  future 
occurrences of that activity, this assumption is that ‘untested compounds possessing Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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similar molecular features as compounds used in the development of QSAR/QSPR 
models are likewise assumed to also possess similar activities’ (Gasteige and Engel, 
2008, 10). 
The birth of QSAR can be traced back to France in the late 19th century. A 
paper entitled 'Action de l'acool amylique sur l'organisms by A. Cros described an 
empirical relationship between the toxicity of alcohols and the number of carbon 
atoms (Cros, 1863). This was followed in 1875 by Dujardin - Beaumetz and Audige 
who established the mathematical character of the relationship between the toxicity 
of alcohols and chain length and molecular structure (Dujardin - Beaumetz, and 
Audige, 1875, 192 – 194). In 1899 Hans Horst Meyer showed that narcosis or hypnotic 
activity has linked to the affinity of substances to water and lipid sites within the 
organism (Mayer, 1899, 109 – 118). 
The birth of QSAR proper came in 1930 when Lazarev, a Russian chemist 
demonstrated  that  physiological  and  toxicological  effects  of  molecules  were 
correlated with the property of oil - water partition coefficient and that this could be 
demonstrated through a formal mathematical equation.  
Log C = a log K Oil - water + b 
where a and b are empirically derived constants and C is the molar concentration of 
the  chemical.  This  physiological  behaviour  of  the  chemical  was  expressed  as  a 
function of its chemical constitution therefore any change in chemical constitution 
would  be  reflected  in  a  corresponding  effect  on  its  biological  properties.  This 
equation can be considered the first general formulation of a quantitative structure 
– activity relationship (Consonni and R. Todeschini, 2010, 33). Since then QSAR has 
been a staple feature of chemoinformatics and has played a critical role in assessing 
the potential of new molecules for use in industry. More recently the application of 
QSAR to drug discovery has become increasingly important; 
‘The  ability  to  predict  a  biological  activity  is  valuable  in  any  number  of 
industries.  Whilst  some  QSARs  appear  to  be  little  more  than  academic 
studies, there are a large number of applications of these models within Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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industry, academia and governmental (regulatory) agencies. A small number 
of potential uses are listed below; 
·  The prediction of a variety of physicochemical properties of molecules 
(whether they be pharmaceuticals, pesticides, personal products, fine 
chemicals, etc.) 
·  The  prediction  of  the  fate  of  molecules  which  are  released  into  the 
environment 
·  The rationalization and prediction of the combined effects of molecules 
·  The prediction of toxicity to environmental species 
·  The rational identification of new leads with pharmacological, biocidal or 
pesticidal activity’ (Consonni and R. Todeschini, 2010, 4). 
It is worth noting that in some of the chemoinformatics literature, reference is made 
to Quantitative Structural Property Relations (QSAP) alongside QSAR as discussed 
above. This suggests that a distinction may exist in the chemical literature between 
properties on the one hand and activities on the other. Such a distinction could have 
important implications for the metaphysics of classification, particularly if it turned 
out that an ontological distinction between properties and activities already exists in 
practice. It is asserted that ‘QSPR methods are based on the hypothesis that changes 
in molecular structure are reflected in changes in observed macroscopic properties.’ 
Examples of macroscopic properties are described as 'mechanical, thermal, electric 
etc.’ (Consonni and R. Todeschini, 2010, 18). 
  This hints at a difference between the two domains such that QSPR allows 
chemists to predict that an entity has a certain property while QSAR allows chemists 
to predict that an entity will engage in certain activities. Nonetheless, there is no a 
discussion in the chemical literature on the difference between an activity and a 
macroscopic property and typically the terms QSPR and QSAR are equated. Part of 
the reason for this is that QSAR and QSPR tend to be used to refer to the methodology 
behind an investigation and this methodology is the same regardless of whether it is 
directed towards the study of activities or properties. For instance it is claimed that 
‘the first fundamental task in chemistry is to make inferences about which structure 
might  have  the  desired  property.  This  is  the  domain  of  establishing  structure  - 
property or structure activity - relations’   (Gasteiger and Engel, 2008, 3). Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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The aim of my thesis is to give a metaphysics for the classification of reactions 
in practice. The case studies I discuss involving the classification of reactions refer 
only to QSAR and as result I will not make further reference to QSPR. This decision is 
not relevant to the arguments that follow in later chapters. In addition, in section 3.4 
and  3.5,  I  discuss  in  detail  whether  the  activities  referred  to  in  QSAR  are 
philosophically speaking as, best construed properties or activities. 
I  shall  now  return  to  my  first  case  study;  the  investigation  into  the 
classification of chemical reactions by Gasteiger and Chen (1997). QSAR was used to 
identify the structural properties that correlate with the instantiation of certain types 
of chemical reactions. The set of reactions to be classified and the corresponding data 
were taken from the ChemInform RX reaction database. This contains empirically 
derived information on 1.5 million reactions retrieved from publications appearing in 
the top 100 related journals from 1990 onwards (Gasteiger, 1994). 
Gasteiger and Chen then narrowed down their test set of reactions to 120 
reactions that involved the addition of a C-H bond to a C=C bond where this set was 
known prior to investigation to comprise a variety of distinct types of reactions 
(Gasteiger & Chen, 1998). This particular data set was chosen as it provided an 
appropriate test case. Gasteiger and Chen note that the sample size was manageable 
and there was a clear prior agreement on how the reactions should be classified so 
the success of the classificatory procedure was dependent on its ability to pick out 
these particular reaction types.  
Gasteiger and Chen take the activity in question to be the instantiation of a 
particular known type of reaction, in this case the reaction is designated by the 
making and breaking of certain types of bonds. The structural properties specified by 
the ‘S’ in QSAR refer to properties of the reaction centre i.e. the properties of those 
atoms and bonds that undergo change during the reaction. It is thought that these 
features will be indicative of the type of change that will occur during the reaction. 
In  later  case  studies  chemists  referred  to  reactions  as  being  ‘encoded  by  their 
structural properties’ (Sacher, Reitz and Gasteiger, 2009, 1534). Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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The structural properties do not refer to the molecular geometry of the atoms 
and bonds specifically but are rather the physicochemical properties that affect 
molecular geometry such as charge distribution, inductive effect, resonance effect, 
polarizability effect etc. These properties are used because they provide the best 
indication of the mechanism by which each reaction will proceed. As previously 
mentioned this method is employed because quantum mechanical treatments of 
complex reactions are currently beyond our theoretical capabilities.  
The exact physicochemical properties that best determine the course of any 
given reaction will vary case by case as identifying the correct properties is a matter 
of determining the structure-activity relation governing a particular reaction. In this 
case the six properties listed below were used. It was thought that reaction centres 
possessing similar values for the following variables were likely to undergo the same 
kind of organic reaction. Each reaction was assigned a value for each of the properties 
and these six values were taken as encoding each reaction. 
1.   Difference in partial atomic charges which describes the polarity of the bond 
2.  Difference in sigma electronegativities which describes the ability of an atom 
to attract electrons in a sigma bond6  
3.  Difference in pi electronegativities which describes the ability of an atom to 
attract electrons in a pi bond 7 
4.  Effective  bond  polarizability  which  describes  the  tendency  of  the  bond 
electrons to be distorted by an external electrical field 
                                                           
6 A Sigma bond is the strongest type of covalent bond formed by a head on overlapping of atomic 
orbitals 
7 A Pi bond is a weaker form of covalent bind due to a reduced overlapping between the atomic 
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5.  Delocalization stabilization of a negative charge on reaction centre which 
describes the stabilization of a negative charge generated by the heterolysis 
of the bond8 
6.  Delocalization  stabilization of  a positive  charge  on  reaction  centre  which 
describes the stabilization of a positive charge generated by the heterolysis 
of the bond  
Once a set of properties have been identified that are known to correlate with the 
particular activity of interest then the QSAR aspect of the classification procedure is 
complete. 
2:2:2: Part 3: Neural Networking 
The  third  part  of  the  classification  methodology  involves  organising  the 
properties in a neural network in such a way to produce a representation of the 
similarities that hold between the reactions. Each reaction is encoded by values for 
each of these properties. The values for each reaction constitute a reaction vector 
that exists in a multi-dimensional space. In this case study, values for six properties 
were used for classification so the resultant vector exists in a six – dimensional space.  
Gasteiger and Chen then employ a Kohonen network or a self-organising map 
that organises the vectors according to the similarity relations that hold between 
them thus  resulting  in a   representation  of this  six  dimensional  space  in  a  two 
dimensional plane. In this case all six values are weighted equally. The advantage of 
using a neural network is that the results are not skewed, if for example, the values 
of some properties contain low information or information of high redundancy with 
respect to other structural properties that are also included in the reaction vector. 
This  is  because  in  contrast  to  other  methods  of  analysis,  such  as  multi-linear 
regression analysis, neural networks are not sensitive to linear dependencies in the 
input variables. Gasteiger has described how ‘this means that one can use all of the 
                                                           
8 A heterolysis bond is one in which the process of breaking a covalent bind in which the shared 
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available physicochemical factors as input to the neural network; this both is simple 
and can avoid losing information’ (Gasteiger, 1997, 4034). 
Nonetheless using more input variables may require a significantly increased 
amount of time and resources but not produce any extra payoff in terms of the 
accuracy of the output classification. An offshoot of work into classification via neural 
networking are investigations into determining the optimum number of variables to 
be employed in a neural network.  
The neural network works by preserving the topology of the original multi-
dimensional  space,  therefore  points  that  are  close  to  each  other  in  the  six 
dimensional  space  will  also  be  close  to  each  other  in  the  two  dimensional 
representations The neural network consists of a cubic structure where the neurons 
are columns arranged in a two - dimensional system, e.g. in a square of n x 1 neurons. 
This is illustrated below in figure 3. The number of weights had by each neuron 
corresponds to the number of dimensions of the input data. In this case each neuron 
has six weights and in total there are 74 neurons corresponding to the number of 
reactions  undergoing  classification.  Because  of  the  relatively  small  number  of 
reactions undergoing classification, chemists choose to operate with more neurons 
than required to allow for the relations between the reactions to be more apparent. 
They opt for 144 neurons arranged in a 12 by 12 grid. The architecture of the grid is 
therefore 12 x 12 x 6.  
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Figure 3: Architecture of a neural network. Input vector X consists of m elements. Each neuron of the network is 
represented by a column with m weights (Gasteiger and Chen, 1997, 4034). 
The advantage of Kohonen network is that it is self-learning and doesn’t 
require the target output of the system to be specified beforehand; the network 
adapts according to the original input values and so describes the original objects of 
investigation.  
The training of the network begins by the initialisation of the neurons, in 
which the weights had by each neuron are assigned random numerical values. The 
next step is to feed an input vector into the network and identify the neuron which 
has weights most similar to the numerical values of the input vector. This is done by 
calculating the Euclidean distance between the input data vector xs and the weight 
vectors wj for all neurons. The neuron for which this distance is the smallest is called 
the winning neuron and is assigned that vector (i.e. that reaction). The process of 
calculating the Euclidean distances between reactions is achieved using the equation; 
{∑ (xui – wji)2 →outc }  
The weights of the winning neuron are further adapted to the input data and 
the  neurons  within  a  certain  distance  surrounding  the  winning  neuron  are  also 
adapted. The weight adaptation is performed so that the closer a neuron is to a 
winning neuron then the more its weights will be adapted.  Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
78 
 
The result of the neural network is a two dimensional representation of the 
reaction landscape. Each reaction is assigned a neuron, and in the case of very similar 
reactions, a neuron is occupied by more than one reaction. The respective positions 
of the neurons in the network (or reactions in the reaction landscape) represent the 
similarity relations that hold between the different reactions. The resulting visual 
representation  of  the  reaction  landscape  allows  complex  data  to  be  easily 
conceptualized and the similarity relations to be easily deciphered.  
 
 
Figure 4 Kohonen map obtained for the classification of 74 reactions (Gasteiger and Chen, 1997, 4036) 
For instance, the two dimensionality allows different types of similarities to 
be represented via neurons that exhibit a closeness in different directions on the 
landscape  (up/down/left/right).  The  reaction  landscape  also  reveals  degrees  of 
similarity; those reactions that are very similar appear very close together, those that 
are less similar are found further apart (Gasteiger, 2005, 192 - 196). Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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Finally a cluster analysis is performed to identify types of reactions as well as 
the similarities that hold between the individual reactions. This is again achieved by 
calculating the weight distances between neighbouring neurons using the Euclidean 
equation. This is represented in the diagram below  via the height of the walls 
designating the different clusters. 
The  74  different  reactions  are  then  interlectually  assigned  to  groups 
according to theoretical knowledge to allow a comparison to be made. In both the 
reaction landscape and the theoretical groupings  it was found that three general 
reaction types were present. These can be seen on the right hand side, centre and 
on the left hand side of the diagrams below. 
 
 
Figure 5:Kohonen map for 74 reactions showing information on clusters detected using weight distance 
information. The wall indicated where the weight distance between adjacent neurons is larger than 0.85 
(Gasteiger, 1997, 4039). 
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A two dimensional representation is then produced in which the differnet 
cluster are represented in a different grey-scale. 
 
Figure 6: Indication of the weight distance between adjacent neurons by the thickness of lines separating them. 
The occupied neurons are marked in different grey levels: dark grey indicates nucleophilic aliphatic substitution 
of acyl chlorides, medium grey stands for acylation of CdC bonds, and light grey stands for acylation of arenes 
(Gasteiger, 1997, 4036). 
In the reaction landscape resulting from the classification of the 74 organics 
reactions the dark gray colouring indicates the nucleopholic apliphatic sybstitution 
of acyl chlorides, the medium gray stands for the acylation of C=C bonds and the light 
gray  stands  for  acylation  of  arenes.  The  intellectual  classification  was  found  to 
'corrrespond quite nicely' to the automatic classification and it was concluded that 
using the weight - distance technique was an effective method for the automatic 
classification of reactions into 'chemically significant types‘ (Gasteiger, 1997, 4036). 
The application of QSAR and neural networking to the classification of the 
initial 74 reactions successfully established that the procedure can obtain accurate 
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120 reactions in order to establish the amount of information that can be retrieved 
from the classification methodology. This second set of 120 reactions each involved 
an addition of an H-C bond to a C=C bond to form a C-C bond.  
The reaction data was taken from the 1992 ChemInform RX database and the 
reactions were classified according to the following physicochemical variables;  
1. Total charge 
2. Sigma electronegativity  
3. Pi electronegativity 
4. Effective atom polarizability  
These are the same properties as in the previous study however this time they did 
not take into account the values of the variables on all atoms of the reaction site 
instead  they  selected  which  properties  of  which  atoms  were  most  likely  to  be 
significant. The reason for this is that they wanted to show that a small set of 
variables  deemed  to  be  chemically  significant  can  do  the  job  of  chemical 
classification.  
‘Rather than considering these four electronic properties on all atoms the full 
set of variables on all atoms of the reaction site can be used, or a subset of 
variables can be automatically selected by statistical methods. However, we 
have intentionally chosen the variables on the basis of chemical intuition in 
order to show how a small set of variables deemed chemically significant can 
do the job of reaction classification’ (Gasteiger, 1997, 4038). 
Figure 7 shows which properties were calculated for which atom. This was decided 
using theoretical insight from QSAR.  
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  C  =  C  +  H  -  C  ->  H    -   C   -  C  -  C 
Total charge      x        x                 
Sigma 
electronegativity 
x            x                 
Pi 
electronegativity 
x            x                 
Effective atom 
polarizability 
            x                 
Figure 7 Table showing the properties of the reaction centre that are relevant to classification (Gasteiger, 1997, 
4038). 
This  data  was  transported  into  a  neural  network  following  the  process 
described previously and with the same sized grid of 12 x 12 neurons. This follows 
the general rule that the number of neurons should be between 1 and 3 times the 
number of reactions undergoing classification. 
Once cluster analysis had been applied ten different reaction type clusters 
were  correctly  identified  as  corresponding  to  the  standard  classification  model. 
These  are  shaded  on  the  reaction  landscape  below.  Among  the  reaction  types 
identified were reactions of high importance in chemical synthesis including Michael 
additions and Fridel - Crafts alkylations in addition to more uncommon reactions like 
the hydride abstraction reaction. The resulting reaction landscape is shown below: 
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Figure 8: Kohonen map obtained for the classification of 120 reactions that correspond to the key shown in 
figure 9 (Gasteiger, 1997, 4039). 
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Figure 9: Intellectually assigned reaction types, associated symbols, and the corresponding number of reaction 
instances in the classification of 120 reactions as shown in Figure 8, (Gasteiger, 1997, 4039). 
The large amount of chemical information that is stored within a reaction 
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type as identified in figure 7 and 8. These 75 reactions were mapped into 43 neurons 
which is indicative of the chemical variety within the group. Further sub-clusters can 
be identified within the Michael addition group that correspond to types of electron 
withdrawing  group  and  the  number  of  electron  withdrawing  groups;  figure  9 
represents variation of  electron withdrawing groups within the cluster.  The neural 
network also reveals special cases of Michael additions; these are found at the 
borders of the cluster as demonstrated by figure 10 (Gasteiger, 1998, 218). 
 
Figure 10: A representation of Michael addition reactions where z corresponds to the number of electron 
withdrawing group in each Michael addition. 2Z = Two electron with drawing groups at H-C. 3Z= three electron 
with drawing groups at H-C *= Two electron withdrawing groups at C=C (Gasteiger, 2007, 4040).  Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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Figure 11: representation of special cases of Michael addition reactions (S) found at the boundaries of the cluster 
(Gasteiger, 2007, 4040). 
It is interesting to note that in the method just described no attention is paid 
to  the  functional  groups  at  the  reaction  centre  and  in  the  immediate  reaction 
environment. This approach can be compared to another method of classification 
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Attribute and Condition Education, also known as HORACE (Rose and Gasteiger, 
1994). 
HORACE had a multi-tier approach to classification in which reactions were 
classified according to physicochemical variables as above and then according to 
functional  groups  with  this  process  repeating  until  only  the  individual  reactions 
remained. Initially reactions were classified on the basis of their physicochemical 
features such as charge distribution as well as inductive and resonance effects at the 
reaction centre. The classes of reactions that were identified were then further sub-
classified according to topological features such as the presence of simple functional 
groups (alcohol, carbonyl etc.). The resultant groups were then fed back into the 
system and further sub sub classified on the basis of physicochemical and then 
topological features.  
When the HORACE system of classification was applied to the same set of 
reactions from the ChemInform RX database described in the previous case study, it 
was  found  to  perform  less  well  than  a  classification  just  on  the  basis  of 
physicochemical variables. The Horace system grouped the reactions into a larger 
number of reaction classes and so was not able to recognise more coarse grained 
similarities between the kinds. It was constrained by the need to accommodate 
topological  similarities. In  other  words  to  recognise  similarities  in  the  structural 
arrangement of molecules as well as similarities in the physicochemical variables 
associated with reaction centres. This problem can be most clearly demonstrated by 
the treatment of the Michael addition reactions. Horace would have classified these 
into 20 distinct reaction classes whereas chemical intuition and the methodology 
described above would have identified them as falling into one group. The advantage 
of the neural network approach to classification is that it is able to recognise both 
coarse and fine grained similarities, grouping reactions into fewer classes but also 
representing lower level variation by identifying the locations of reactions within the 
cluster (Gasteiger, 2005, 191). Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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2:3: Initial Requirements on a Metaphysics of Classification 
The  aim  of  the  previous  section  was  to  outline  an  approach  to  the 
classification  of  chemical  reactions  focusing  on  the  use  of  QSAR  and  neural 
networking to produce a representation of the similarity relations that hold between 
reactions. In this section, I will use this discussion to draw out initial constraints on a 
metaphysics  for  the  classification  of  reactions  concerning,  the  three  stage 
classification process, activities as heuristics and the role of representation. Any 
metaphysical account of classification must be compatible with these criteria if it is 
to accommodate the classification of chemical reactions in practice. 
2.3.1: Three stage classification 
The classification of chemical reactions takes place in three stages. Firstly, a 
rough classification is used to identify a set of reactions that on the basis of prior 
theoretical knowledge are known to be similar to each other. Typically, this involves 
identifying reactions with similar reaction centres. The term ‘reaction centre' refers 
to parts of the molecules that are involved in the making and breaking of bonds 
during the reaction. I refer to the identification of reactions with similar reaction 
centres as the first stage of classification. The motivation for this step is that reactions 
involving the same atoms and bonds must share some basic higher level similarities. 
The second stage of classification is the application of QSAR and the third stage of 
classification is the application of neural networking which provides a more refined 
classification of this set of reactions. This whole process identifies more fine grained 
similarities between the reactions that are initially identified as similar. 
The first stage of classification is a crucial component of the classification 
process since it enables the successful application of QSAR. The QSAR relation should 
apply to all reactions under investigation, in virtue of all reactions being the same 
type of activity. If the reactions are already similar then a more in depth QSAR 
analysis  can  be  provided.  In  the  case  studies  described  above  it  was  already 
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oxygen, this meant that chemists could appeal to their own theoretical knowledge to 
isolate the factors that determine how the reaction centres of that kind are likely to 
change under different conditions.  
If  the  reactions  under  investigation  are  not  closely  related  then  the 
application of QSAR will be less effective for it will be different underlying structural 
properties that are responsible for the instantiation of the different reactions. In this 
sense the activity referred to in QSAR acts as a heuristic device, guiding the second 
stage of classification. The properties that encode the reaction and on which the 
classification is based are chosen because they best describe that activity of interest 
(i.e. the reaction), if chemists were interested in a different activity then different 
properties  would  be  used.  A  metaphysics  of  classification  must  be  able  to 
accommodate  this  multi  stage  classification  process,  this  means  a  successful 
metaphysics must be compatible with other methods of classification that provide a 
more general grouping that can be then further refined. 
2.3.2: Unification and Activities as Heuristics 
In  chapter  1  I  discussed  a  debate  specific  to  classification  in  chemistry 
concerning the types of properties we should use for classification. On the one hand 
Hendry’s microstructuralism maintains that classification should take place at the 
level of micro properties, whilst Needham and van Brakel argue that classification 
must  take  place  at  the  macro  level  in  order  to  accommodate  thermodynamic 
properties of substances.  
I outlined this debate in the context of how to specify the identity conditions 
of water and described the standoff that results. Microstructuralism defines the 
extension of the term ‘water’ in terms of the substance’s microstructural properties. 
The view trades on the modal intuition that if two substances have the same manifest 
properties but different microstructures we would consider them to be different 
substances.  Hendry  accepts  that  more  complex  substances  such  as  water  are 
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properties  to  be  relevant  to  classification.  Melting  point,  boiling  point,  thirst 
quenching ability etc. are all used to identify water but these properties do not make 
substances  such  as  water  what  they  are.  Instead,  Hendry  asserts  that  water  is 
produced by bringing together H2O molecules so on his view it is H2O molecules that 
determine the extension of the term. 
Needham rejects this thought experiment on the grounds of its implausibility; 
current scientific knowledge indicates that it is not possible for two substances to be 
indistinguishable at the macro level and different at the micro level and so the modal 
argument for microstructuralism bears no weight. Needham is driven by the intuition 
that the properties on which the classification are based should play an explanatory 
role. For example complex substances such as water cannot be given microstructural 
definitions such as ‘water = H2O’ because a single H2O molecule will not have the 
manifest  properties  associated  with  water.  Rather  melting,  boiling  and  thirst 
quenching are all properties that are explained by the complex interaction between 
H2O molecules and its environment. In addition, the structure of this interaction 
depends on the state water is in; water in the form of liquid has a very different 
microstructure to water in the form of gas or ice. Therefore whilst ‘water = H2O’ is an 
incomplete  microstructural  account,  it  is  unclear  whether  a  more  specific 
characterisation that applies to ice, liquid water and steam can be given.  
In chapter 1 I also described Needham’s claim that for complex substances 
thermodynamics  should  be  used  to  determine  the  extensions  of  kind  terms.  I 
concluded in chapter 1 that we are left with a standoff between microstructuralists 
who are persuaded by the modal argument that microstructural properties have 
priority when classifying and their macro opponents who argue that thermodynamic 
properties have explanatory priority and that this is more important in classification. 
Having analysed the way in which classification takes place in practice I argue that 
the first part of the classification methodology has important implications for the 
microstructural  classification  versus  thermodynamic  classification  debate  in  the 
philosophy of chemistry.  Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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In  an  ideal  world  chemical  reactions  would  be  classified  according  to 
similarities in their individual reaction mechanisms, however as I explained at the 
start of this chapter this information about reaction mechanisms is beyond the scope 
of  current  science.  Instead  reactions  are  classified  according  to physicochemical 
variables which are thought to be the best possible indicators of what these reactions 
mechanisms would be like.   The application of QSAR stems from the belief that 
similarities in structural properties result in a similarity in higher level phenomena. 
This  means  that  in  practice  chemists  treat  a  difference  in  macro  level  or 
thermodynamic properties such as an instance of a chemical reaction as indicative of 
a difference in the lower level properties underlying that reaction. The idea is that 
once the relevant structural properties have been identified they can be used to 
better classify the macro level activities or in this case reactions.  
This claim might be thought to favour microstructuralism and the notion that 
it is structural properties that are central to classifying higher level types. However I 
suggest  that  classification  using  QSAR  is  more  complicated.  Rather  than 
automatically seeking to classification on the basis of structural properties, the aim 
of QSAR is instead to provide a unification of microstructural and higher level (macro, 
manifest or observable) properties. The classification must take place at the level 
that best reveals the similarities that hold between the phenomena of interest. In 
some  cases  this  will  involve  a  classification  in  terms  of  the  microstructural 
arrangement of atoms and bonds but sometimes the structural properties referred 
to by QSAR will be at the thermodynamic higher level. In all cases the level at which 
the classificatory properties are found should be the level that best captures the 
similarities that the chemist is interested in. Rather than prefer micro or macro 
approaches to classification as advocated by Hendry or Needham we should look at 
which properties best capture and explain these similarities.  
  We can also conclude that higher level or manifest phenomena are always 
relevant to the classificatory process in the sense that they provide a heuristic device 
for identifying lower level variation. The job of scientists is to identify the level at 
which we find the properties responsible for these higher level differences. In the Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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case of chemical reactions it is physicochemical variables that best describe the 
behaviour  of  reactions  but  in  the  case  of  water  perhaps  a  thermodynamic 
specification would be most appropriate when employing QSAR. If we wanted to 
predict  the  manifest  properties  of  water  then  a  structural  account  of  the 
arrangement of H2O molecules in long chains that continually disassociate and then 
re-associate would be most appropriate. It is this process that is responsible for the 
observable properties of liquid water. 
2.3.3: Role of Representation  
In addition a metaphysics of classification must be compatible with the role 
of  representation  in  chemical  practice.  Assigning  a  role  to  representation  in 
classificatory procedures is common place when considering the classification of 
entities. For example, when classifying chemical entities it is the representation of 
individual  entities  that  is  important;  consider  the  case  of  microstructuralism  as 
discussed in chapter 1. The microstructuralist individuates chemical entities solely in 
terms of their chemical microstructure. I described how this approach is sufficient for 
elements that are individuated in terms of their atomic number but for more complex 
molecules an additional appeal to molecular arrangement is also required. Therefore 
the representation of the molecular structure, including features such as bond angles 
and bond length are also required. 
  Providing a structural representation of entities allows chemists to distinguish 
between isomers that contain the same constituent parts in different arrangements 
thus forming chemically distinct molecules with different behavioural properties. In 
addition, in the case of more complex molecules features such as bond angles and 
charge  are  continuous  variables  and  this  leads  to  vague  boundaries  between 
different kinds. 
  My case study sees the role of representation in classification expanded by 
representing not the individual entities or reactions, themselves but the relations 
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network. I suggest this has at implications for how we think about the philosophy of 
classification, and introduce the notion of a the 2-dimentionality of the classification 
scheme.  
  Typically chemical classification proceeds by the identification of a type and 
then  the  accumulation  of  a  list  of  tokens  that  instantiate  that  type.  I  call  the 
classification  of  tokens  into  types  a  1-dimensional  classification  scheme.  It  is  1-
dimensional  because  the  output  of  the  classification  amounts  to  a  list  of 
instantiations  of  that  kind.  Consider  the  classification  of  acids,  all  acids  have  in 
common the property molecule or other species which can donate a proton or accept 
an electron pair in reactions. We know that examples of acids include Perchloric acid, 
Chloric acid, Chlorous acid, Hypochlorous acid and Hydrochloric acid, however no 
further details can straightforwardly be given on how the different tokens listed as a 
member of the kind relate to one another. What similarities hold between the token 
instances  that  constitute  members  of  that  kind?  A  1-  dimensional  classification 
scheme is unable to answer these questions.  
  The  representation  of  reactions  in  the  case  study  described  above  is,  in 
contrast  a  2-dimensional  classification  scheme. Whilst  this  reaction  landscape  is 
divided  into  clusters  corresponding  to  preassigned  types,  on  a  2-  dimensional 
account the information conveyed on the reaction landscape is not reduced to types 
and a list of corresponding tokens. Instead the chemist is able to assess the broader 
classificatory picture by analysing the representation, in particular; 
a.  The degrees of similarity that hold between any two token reactions. For 
example  consider the  bottom  row  of  the  reaction  landscape  in figure 3. 
Reaction 7 is more similar to reaction 13 than reaction 12 because reaction 7 
is closer to reaction 13. 
b.  The  types  of  similarity  that  hold  between  any  two  token  reactions.  For 
example, consider the top row of the reaction landscape in figure 3. Reaction 
73 is similar to reaction 42 but is also equally similar to reaction 54, though 
this similarity is in a different respect. This is illustrated by a closeness in 
different directions on the reaction landscape. Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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c.  The relative similarity of one type of reaction to other types appearing on the 
reaction landscape. 
In so far as the aim of classification in chemistry is to further scientific knowledge by 
making  accurate  predictions  then  a  2-dimensional  classification  scheme  is  an 
advantage. A better understanding of the similarity relations that hold between 
reactions paves the way for better predictions. A 1 - dimensional scheme fails in this 
regard  due  to  a  lack  of  information  content.  In  some  cases,  in  a  1-dimensional 
reaction scheme the option is available to divide the members of a type into subtypes 
and produce a hierarchy of kinds however it is still not clear how the different 
subtypes relate to one another or indeed relate to the overall type. Additionally we 
have no further information on how members of each subtype are similar to each 
other than in virtue of sharing a common property. A 1- dimensional classificatory 
scheme amounts to a list of qualifying entities. This is helpful for organising scientific 
knowledge but it is not as useful for making predictions.   
  To  conclude  this  section,  I  have  so  far  outlined  a  methodology  for  the 
classification of chemical reactions used in practice and shown the results of its 
pioneering application to the classification of organic reactions. From this I have 
drawn a number of implications for a metaphysics for the classification of chemical 
reactions. Such a metaphysics must be compatible with a multistage classificatory 
procedure in which chemists appeal to rough classifications of reactions in order to 
identify those reactions that could fruitfully be classified further using QSAR and 
neural networking.  
  I also showed that the application of QSAR has implications for the debate 
between microstructuralists and their macro opponents. The aim of chemists is to 
provide a unified account of lower level structural properties and a higher level 
activity such as a particular sort of reaction. In this sense activities have a vital role in 
acting as heuristic devices. A difference in a higher level activity is thought to be 
indicative of a difference in the lower level structural properties responsible for 
producing that activity. In addition, whilst chemists speak of structural properties, it 
is  not  the  structural  arrangement  itself  that  is  used  to  classify  reactions  as Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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microstructuralism  asserts,  but  rather  the  physicochemical  properties  that  are 
indicative of structure. The resulting classifications are used to make predictions and 
are therefore thought to latch on to real reactions in nature. 
  I  also  showed  the  importance  of  representations  of  2-dimensional 
classificatory schemes and suggested that it is the 2-dimensional representation that 
has predictive priority as it is able to reveal degrees and types of similarities in each 
case. 
2:4: Recent Applications: the Classification of Enzymatic 
Reactions 
The  previous  case  study  involved  the  classification  of  organic  reactions 
primarily in order to test the classification procedure. However, the following more 
recent case study shows how the same methodology can be used to produce a more 
refined classification of reactions in order to achieve an certain practical end.  
The aim of the investigation is to use QSAR and neural networking to classify 
enzymatic  reactions,  producing  for  enhanced  predictive  ability  and  the  fruitful 
development of science. The output of the classification scheme is the identification 
of similarity relations between the enzymatic reactions undergoing classification and 
the grouping of similar reactions together into clusters. This is important in light of 
the additional assumption that similar reactions will react in the same way to changes 
in  environmental  conditions  such  as  temperature,  pressure  and  substrate 
concentration. The resulting chemical knowledge is then fed back into chemical 
theory allowing for greater explanatory unification. Improved knowledge about the 
similarity relations between reactions allows chemists to build up a picture of why 
these  reactions  have  certain  optimum  conditions  and  the  ways  these  can  be 
manipulated. This in turn leads to greater predictability.  
This case study has an additional element since a better classification of 
enzymatic  reactions  allows  for  a  refined  classification  of  enzymes  themselves. Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
96 
 
Enzymes are proteins and they are classified into types and sub-types using the EC 
system of classification. Each unique enzyme is identified using four digits in the form 
a.b.c.d. The first number, a, gives the main class to which the enzyme belongs of 
which there are six options, 1. transferases 2. hydrolases 3. lyases 4. isomerases 5. 
ligases 6. oxidoreductases. Each class is then further divided into subclasses (b) which 
are then subdivided twice more (c,d) (Sacher, Reitz, Gasteiger, 2009, 1525). 
The classification system is designed so that enzymes are classified according 
to their functional ability to catalyse reactions, therefore a classification of enzymes, 
is dependent on a classification of enzymatic reactions. A more refined classification 
of enzymatic reactions will in turn lead to a more refined classification of enzymes. 
The motivation is that the application of the classification procedure would reveal 
unknown  similarities  between  enzymes  and  thus  reveal  new  uses  for  existing 
enzymes.  
The  investigation  is  described  in  a  2009  paper  entitled  Investigations  of 
Enzymes  Catalyzed  Reactions  based  on  Physicochemical  Descriptors  applied  to 
Hydrolases. It involved a data set taken from the Biopath database (Sacher, Reitz, 
Gasteiger, 2009). Before discussing the classification procedure and output it is useful 
to understand where the data on which the classification is based originates from.  
2:4:1: Creation of the Biopath Database 
Over the past four decades huge amounts of information have been collected 
concerning the chemicals that exist within each animal cell and the ways in which 
these  chemicals  interact  with  each  other.  This  information  was  collected  and 
assembled by G Michal and displayed in the Biopath wall chart in 1965. This went on 
to become a staple reference resource found in biochemical laboratories around the 
world. Its success is due to its ability to represent large amounts of data. Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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Figure 12: the Biopath Wall chart (Reitz, Sacher, Tarkhov, Trumbach, and Gasteiger, 2004, 3226) 
The Biopath wall chart has the disadvantage that information retrieval is difficult, 
particularly  if  chemicals  are  located  at  more  than  one  place  on  the  map. 
'Relationships between many compounds through a large number of relations have 
to  be  stored  in  a  two-dimensional  place.  This  can  only  be  achieved  by  large 
distortions and an awkward arrangement of reaction arrows, ostensibly for reasons 
of clarity’ (Reitz & Sacher, 2004, 2226)  
In 2004 a project to transfer the information contained within the Biopath 
wall  chart  to  a  database  was  completed  to  better  meet  the  practical  needs  of 
chemists.  All  information  contained  within  the  Biopath  database  is  obtained 
empirically. Chemical structures are represented by connection tables which contain 
lists of all atoms and all bonds involved in each reaction. Chemical reactions are 
specified by the start and end products of a reaction as well as the enzymes involved. 
All bonds broken and made in the reaction are identified with every atom found in 
the starting materials and those atoms found in the products mapped against each 
other. All reaction equations are balanced with the involvement of protons in the 
starting materials specified in the reaction equation to ensure accuracy. 
In addition, for each reaction, information is given on whether it is a general 
pathway or whether it occurs in animals, plants, yeasts etc. The location of where the Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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reaction typically occurs is specified alongside details concerning whether it is a 
reversible or irreversible or catabolic or anabolic reaction.   
2:4:2: Application of QSAR and Neural Networking to Enzymatic Reactions 
The  classification  of  hydrolysis  enzymatic  reactions  (and  the  resulting 
classification of hydrolase enzymes) was produced using a combination of QSAR and 
neural networking. The project began by isolating the structural properties of the 
reaction centres of the constituent entities that best indicate the type of reaction 
that will be instantiated in each case. These properties ensure all major electronic 
effects of reaction mechanisms such as charge distribution, inductive, resonance and 
polarizability effects are taken into account. Each reacting bond is assigned a value 
for each property with this data imported from the Biopath database. 
As in the previous case study, each reacting bond is characterized by six 
properties however in some of the reactions two bonds were broken and therefore 
each reaction was encoded by a vector of length twelve. Those reactions that only 
broke one bond were assigned a value of zero for the gaps in the vector. This twelve 
dimensional space was then projected into a two dimensional space using a neural 
network following the process described in section 2.2. These properties are similar 
to those identified in the previous case study: 
1.   Difference in partial atomic charges which describes the polarity of 
the bond 
2.  Difference in sigma electronegativities which describes the ability of 
an atom to attract electrons in a sigma bond9  
3.  Difference in pi electronegativities which describes the ability of an 
atom to attract electrons in a pi bond 10 
                                                           
9 A Sigma bond is the strongest type of covalent bond formed by a head on overlapping of atomic 
orbitals 
10 A Pi bond is a weaker form of covalent bind due to a reduced overlapping between the atomic 
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4.  Effective bond polarizability which describes the tendency of the bond 
electrons to be distorted by an external electrical field 
5.  Delocalization stabilization of a negative charge on reaction centre 
which describes the stabilization of a negative charge generated by 
the heterolysis of the bond11 
6.  Delocalization stabilization of a positive charge on reaction centre 
which describes the stabilization of a positive charge generated by the 
heterolysis of the bond  
Clusters of similar enzyme catalysed reactions were identified on the basis of 
the  Euclidean  distances  of  the  weight  values  of  the  adjacent  neuron  pairs. 
Neighbouring neurons that show small weight distances are quite similar and may 
belong  to  the  same  cluster  whilst  large  weight  distances  between  neurons  are 
indicative of separate clusters of reactions. 
Once the reaction landscape had been produced the neurons representing 
each reaction were then matched with the enzyme responsible for catalysing them 
and  they  were  coloured  appropriately.  Neurons  which  contain  reactions  that 
correspond to more than one EC class were identified as conflicting neurons and 
were given multiple colours (Sacher, Reitz, Gasteiger, 2009, 1529). 
The investigation began by producing an overall classification of all reactions 
involving enzymes in the category EC.3.b.c.d. Then in those cases where enough 
token instances of reactions were available then individual subclasses were analysed, 
these were subclasses EC 3.1.c.d, EC. 3.2.c.d and EC 3.5.c.d. 
 
 
 
                                                           
11 A heterolysis bond is one in which the process of breaking a covalent bind in which the shared 
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EC 3.b.c.d 
In the classification of the class EC 3.b.c.d all 135 reactions involving hydrolase 
were assessed. The resulting reaction landscape shown in figure 13 shows a clear 
separation of reactions into two groups which are indicated by a dashed line. On the 
right hand side of the landscape is a cluster of reactions belonging to subclasses EC 
3.5.c.d and 3.1.c.d. All of these reactions have in common that they break two bonds 
during the reaction. On the other side of the dashed line are reactions in which one 
bond is broken.  In addition, it is noted that the reaction landscape reveals clusters 
where all members undergo a change in bond order, with cases in which a double 
bond is converted into a single bond are indicated. It is stated that ‘by and large, the 
similarity analysis of reactions based on physicochemical descriptors reproduces the 
classification of enzymes by the EC number’ (Sacher, Reitz, Gasteiger, 2009, 1529). 
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Figure 13: Projection of reactions in class EC 3.b.c.d into a neural network (Sacher, Reitz and Gasteiger, 2009, 
1529) 
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EC 3.1.c.d. 
Secondly a classification is produced for the subclasses of hydrolase reactions 
beginning with the group EC 3.1.c.d. The resulting classification scheme can be seen 
below and is clearly divided into four clusters.  
 
Figure 14: Projection of reactions in class type EC 3.1.c.d in to a neural network (Sacher, Reitz and Gasteiger, 
2009, 1531) 
The  cluster  in  the  centre  of  the  landscape  coloured  red  consists  of  the 
reactions catalysed by enzymes from the sub-subclass EC 3.1.1.d known as carboxylic 
ester hydrolases.  The second area coloured orange contains reactions catalyzed by 
enzymes from EC 3.1.2.d known as thioester hydrolases. The third cluster in the top 
right hand corner consists of three subclasses of reactions; those enzymes classified 
as EC 3.1.3d marked in yellow, enzymes classified as EC 3.1.4.d marked in green and 
EC 3.1.6.d marked in grey. Finally, the fourth area is located on neuron F1 which 
contains only one reaction. 
The classification was also able to reveal a coding error in the Biopath. The 
reaction catalysed by enzyme EC 3.1.3.36 appeared a long way from other reactions 
that are catalysed by members of the class EC 3.1.b.c. This is because the enzymes Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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originally catalysed as EC 3.1.3.36 in fact belonged to the group EC 2.7.1.137. Overall 
the classification of reactions of this subtype was deemed to be successful.  
EC 3.2.c.d 
Nineteen  reactions  of  this  subclass  were  classified  resulting  in  a  clear 
separation of the reactions into the two subclasses EC 3.2.1.d and EC 3.2.2.d. This 
was as expected and was without any conflicts. There is also a clear separation with 
the type of bonds broken. Reactions catalysed by enzymes from the EC 3.2.1.d class 
involve the breaking of the O -glycosidic bond; a type of covalent bond that joins a 
carbohydrate molecule to an oxygen.  Reactions catalysed by enzymes from the EC 
3.2.2.d  group  involve  the  breaking  of  an  N-  glycosidic  bond  which  joins  a 
carbohydrate molecule to a nitrogen atom. 
 
Figure 15: the projection of reactions in the class EC 3.2.c.d into a neural network (Sacher, Reitz and Gasteiger, 
2009, 1532) 
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EC 3.5.c.d  
In this final classification 44 reactions of subclass EC 3.5.c.d were classified 
using a neural network with the results shown in figure 16. The enzymes involved are 
known  to  involve  hydrolase  acting  on  a  carbon-  hydrogen  bond.  Firstly  the 
classification shows a clear separation between those reactions where two bonds are 
broken and those where one bond is broken. 
Reactions are also clustered according to the kind of molecules involved in 
the reactions, for instance, there is a clear separation between reactions that involve 
purines and reactions that involve pyrimidines. There is a further separation between 
those reactions that occur at different positions on the purine rings.  
Finally, the classification reveals reactions that are clustered according to 
similarities in the substructures of reactions including reactions that involve the 
breaking  of  the  primary  aminde  and  release  of  ammonia,  the  hydrolysis  of  the 
primary amide and the hydrolysis of the formyl residue. The resulting classification 
confirmed the original EC classification scheme but also advanced our knowledge of 
enzymatic classification through the identification of new reactions within clusters 
that are linked to certain enzymes.  Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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Figure 16: projection of reactions from the class EC 3.5.c.d into a neural network (Sacher, Reitz and Gasteiger, 
2009, 1532) 
The aim of the investigation has been to apply a classificatory procedure to a 
set of reactions that are known to be similar to each other. This allows a more refined 
classification of the types which reveals additional subtypes and ensures a greater 
level of predictability. Knowledge of the way in which one reaction behaves under 
certain environmental conditions can inform predictions about the way in which 
other reactions will behave under the same conditions. These predictions will be 
more accurate the more refined the classification scheme is. It is claimed that; ‘this 
similarity  analysis  reveals  finer  details  of  the  enzymatic  reactions  and  thus  can 
provide a better basis for the comparison of enzymes’ (Sacher, Reitz, Gasteiger, 2009, 
1534). Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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2:5: General Requirements on a Metaphysics of Classification 
In  section  3  of  this  chapter  I  outlined  some  initial  requirements  that  a 
metaphysics of the classification of chemical reactions must be compatible with. This 
involved  activities  (or  reactions)  acting  as  heuristic  devices,  the  three  stage 
classification process and the role of representation in the production of the reaction 
landscape. Having outlined the classification of enzymatic reactions in section 4 I will 
now broaden this discussion and will argue that a metaphysics for the classification 
of reactions must also be descriptively fit for purpose. To be descriptively fit for 
purpose an account of classification must adhere to three general criteria; descriptive 
accuracy, capture similarity relations and promote explanatory unification. 
The aim of my project is to provide a metaphysics for the classification of 
reactions as this occurs in everyday life of the chemists. This is a particular brand of 
naturalised metaphysics that I have termed descriptively fit for purpose. It is led by 
the aims and interests of scientific inquiry and should facilitate scientists meeting the 
end goal of their investigation. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that this approach to 
addressing  metaphysical  questions  is  controversial  and  that  appropriate 
methodology within metaphysics is hotly contested. This is with regards to balancing 
ontological strength with the principle of parsimony as well as the relation between 
science  and  metaphysics  (Quine,  1948,  1969)  (Lewis,  1973)  (Schaffer,  2004) 
(Ladyman  and  Ross,  2007)  (L.A.  Paul,  2012).  I  follow  the  approach  of  Illari  and 
Williamson (2013) in making the requirements on a metaphysical framework explicit 
from the outset and analysing each metaphysical candidate with respect to these 
criteria.  
2:5:1: Descriptive Accuracy 
My  project  is  to  produce  a  metaphysics  of  classification  of  reactions  in 
practice and in order to accommodate practice it is essential that such an account is 
descriptively accurate or rather descriptively accurate enough to meet the aims of 
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and Ross in their Everything Must Go. They advocate the claim that certain types of 
contemporary  analytic  metaphysics  fails  to  contribute  towards  the  enlightened 
pursuit of knowledge, suggest that it has lost sight of its raison d’etre, employs a 
misguided methodology and should be discontinued. They argue that this is due to 
contemporary  analytic  metaphysics  being  preoccupied  with  domestication;  the 
desire  to  render  science  compatible  with  our  folk  intuitions  on  issues  such  as 
structural composition and causation.  More often than not domestication involves 
preserving what is referred to as the containment metaphor, the view that the world 
is structurally composed of tiny building blocks of matter, where causation is to be 
explained in terms of the collisions between such particles. It is argued that such 
domestication is destructive to the enterprise of metaphysics, since it is based on 
outdated and refuted scientific theories. Insofar as the aim of metaphysics is to 
provide  an  objective  account of the  structure of  reality  and  the best source  of 
evidence available to metaphysicians about the nature of this reality is provided by 
natural science, the best metaphysics will be one that takes into account natural 
science. Consequently metaphysics should not contain claims that are inconsistent 
with theoretical knowledge for example claims that are known to be empirically 
inaccurate. 
It is worth noting however that the criterion of descriptive accuracy is always 
relative to the aims and interests of chemists. Earlier in this chapter I discussed how 
it is the chemists’ interest in a particular activity that drives QSAR and determines the 
direction of their investigation. Chemists investigating two different phenomena may 
choose to ignore or abstract away from or focus in on different chemical details 
accordingly.  Those  descriptive  inaccuracies  that  do  not  affect  the  classification 
process are permissible. To capture this point I will at times discuss whether an 
ontology is descriptively accurate enough. There is a further question whether the 
classifications themselves and the notion of descriptive accuracy at play are interest 
dependent such that they will change as interests change. I will address this point in 
chapter 6. Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
108 
 
2:5:2: Identification of Similarity Relations 
I previously described how the aim of the investigation in case study two is a 
growth in the knowledge of different enzymes and an understanding of how this 
scientific knowledge can be manipulated to produce greater predictive accuracy.  The 
output  of  the  classification  schemes  is  the  identification  of  similarity  relations 
between  the  enzymatic  reactions  undergoing  classification  and  the  grouping  of 
similar reactions together into more refined clusters or subclasses.  
  This leads to the second criteria on a metaphysics of classification of chemical 
reactions. In order to be descriptively fit for purpose a metaphysics must permit the 
identification of relevant similarity relations since it is these similarity relations on 
which  the  classification  of  reactions  is  built.  It  must  provide  a  framework  for 
classification that is able to support predictions about the behaviour of reactions on 
the basis of the similarity relations identified in the classification. This criterion is 
crucial since it enables the formulation of predictions regarding the behaviour of 
chemical reactions and thus makes the classifications useful for the sort of industrial 
and medical applications discussed in section 2.1. The kind of similarities that need 
to be accommodated by our metaphysics when making predictions are as follows; 
1.  Reactions falling in cluster A are disposed to increase in speed in the presence 
of enzyme X 
2.  Reactions  falling  within  cluster  B  are  disposed  to  begin  reacting  in  the 
presence of activation energy Y 
3.  Reactions in cluster C are all disposed to speed up in the presence of certain 
environmental  conditions  concerning  temperature,  pressure  and 
concentration.  
  In  addition  to  these  common  statements  regarding  how  a  reaction  will 
proceed there is another variety of similarities that need to be accommodated in our 
metaphysics.  These  are  those  are  revealed  by  the  classification  of  enzymatic 
reactions and are shared by the members of a particular subclass or cluster; Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
109 
 
1.  Number of bonds broken during the reaction  
2.  The change in bond order i.e. single bond converted to double bond 
3.  The consecutive Vs simultaneous breaking of bonds 
4.  Substructure of the reaction i.e. 
a.  Part of the entity of which the reaction is centred 
b.  Substances released during the reaction in addition to the desired 
product 
A metaphysics for the classification of chemical reactions must have the resources to 
capture all the similarities listed above. This is essential for a metaphysics that is 
descriptively fit for purpose because predictive statements are made on the basis of 
these similarity relations. Reactions appearing close to each other on the reaction 
landscape will exhibit a strong similarity relation which chemists have learnt through 
experience that these are capable of supporting predictions. For example, which 
enzymes will catalyse which reactions and under what amount of activation energy. 
If a particular metaphysical framework is unable to capture these similarity relations 
then chemist’s ability to make successful predictions will be reduced. 
The criterion of similarity is linked to a further debate within the metaphysics 
of science.  I previously discussed the issue of capturing similarities in chapter 1, 
when  I  addressed  the  debate  surrounding  whether  ontological  commitment  to 
natural kinds is required in addition to commitment to properties. Those who reject 
commitment to natural kinds commonly argue that kinds are redundant because the 
sorts of similarity they are introduced to ground can be adequately captured by 
properties. Armstrong, for instance, argued that the job of capturing similarities is 
done by sparse properties. 
‘Sharing of [the sparse properties] makes for qualitative similarity, [the sparse 
properties] carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the 
sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely miscellaneous, and there are 
only  just  enough  of  them  to  characterize  things  completely  and  without 
redundancy' (Armstrong, 1986, 60). 
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More recently in his paper Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties Schaffer (2004) 
adjudicates a dispute between a scientific conception of sparse properties in which 
they are found at all levels of scientific discourse and the fundamental conception in 
which sparse properties equate with fundamental properties. His preference for the 
scientific conception of sparse properties stems from the need to ground objective 
similarities  appearing  at  higher  levels  of  inquiry  such  as  at  the  psychological, 
neurobiological, and chemical levels. 
This  debate  between  kinds  and  properties  will  play  an  important  role 
throughout the rest of my thesis as I examine whether ontological commitment to 
reaction is required to capture the similarities revealed in classification or whether 
they can be accommodated through a commitment to properties alone. I will discuss 
this issue extensively in chapter 4.  
2:5:3: Explanatory Unification  
Thirdly I argue that a metaphysics is descriptively fit for purpose if it is able to 
capture the similarity relations between reactions that result from classification and 
incorporate them into the broader framework of chemical knowledge. This promotes 
a better understanding of reactions and furthers the fruitful development of science. 
This leads to the third general requirement on our metaphysics; that it promotes 
explanatory unification.12 
The  idea  is  that  by  incorporating  the  similarities  revealed  by  the  classification 
schemes into existing chemical knowledge, chemists are better able to understand 
and explain the behaviour of reactions and to better manipulate this knowledge in 
the  future.  Thus  explanatory  unification  supports  and  promotes  the  fruitful 
development of chemistry. 
 
Explanatory unification is a theme that runs throughout the classification 
process.  Consider  again  the  methodology  behind  the  use  of  QSAR  discussed  in 
                                                           
12 I note that this is a controversial requirement that stems from my approach of identifying a 
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section 2.4. The aim was to achieve a more refined classification of reactions by 
unifying the relevant structural properties with the macro level activities they are 
responsible for producing. The importance of unification can also be seen in the 
resulting  2  -dimensional  reaction  landscape.  At  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  I 
discussed the idea that chemists employ neural networking in order to mirror the 
concept of a reaction map had by chemists in which they mentally store and organise 
reaction information. The 2-dimensional scheme is adopted because chemists want 
a better, more unified understanding of the way in which the different types and sub 
types of reactions relate to one another rather than a specification of types and a list 
of corresponding tokens. This promotes the fruitful development of science and 
allows for the formulation of further more accurate predictions as discussed in the 
previous section.  
  Gasteiger states that the ‘classification of enzymatic reactions is a field of 
great  interest  as  data  on  proteins  with  unknown  function  grows  fast  and  the 
modelling of biochemical reaction networks depends on the knowledge of protein 
functions’ (Gasteiger, 2007, 1526). Thus even if the classification systems previously 
described  reveal  similarities  that  do  not  necessarily  lead  directly  to  greater 
predictability it is still important that our metaphysics provides a framework in which 
they can be incorporated into our body of scientific knowledge. If a metaphysics is to 
be  compatible  with  the  classification  of  chemical  reactions  it  must  provide  the 
resources for explanatory unification and in particular, be able to explain why these 
objective similarities hold and why they are successful in supporting predictions. 
2:5:4: Minimalism  
The final requirement on our metaphysics is that it is minimal, i.e. it provides 
the smallest, most basic account of all the things in the world whilst still meeting the 
basic  criteria  for  adequacy.  In  debates  over  the  metaphysics  of  classification 
minimalism  has  traditionally  been  balanced  against  strength  and  the  desire  to 
capture similarity. For example, as I discussed in chapter 1, Lewis and Armstrong cite 
concerns over minimalism when rejecting commitment to natural kinds whilst Ellis Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
112 
 
sacrifices concerns over minimalism by postulating his three hierarchies of natural 
kinds. Schaffer outlines the role of the minimalist requirement as follows; 
'The project of providing a minimal ontological base is part of the project of 
providing  an  ontological  assay.  The  goal  of  an  ontological  assay  is  to 
characterize the contingent basis for all contingent truths. Suppose that there 
are fundamental properties on which the macroproperties supervene. Then 
these  fundamental  properties  are  perfectly  suited  to  serve  as  a  minimal 
ontological base. Specify which fundamental properties are where, and the 
arrangement of the macro-properties is thereby fixed’ (Schaffer, 2004, 94). 
Schaffer's point is that if higher level properties supervene on lower level properties 
then commitment to higher level properties is not required since, their existence is 
already fixed by lower level properties. This supervenience relation is asymmetrical, 
i.e.  if  we  are  ontologically  committed  to  higher  level  properties  this  does  not 
necessarily fix the existence of lower level properties. 
  My  project  is  to  provide  the  most  appropriate  metaphysics  for  the 
classification of reactions in practice. This metaphysics will best meet the criteria of 
descriptively  fit  for  purpose  by  being  descriptively  accurate  enough,  capture 
similarity relations and enhance explanatory unification. I suggest that the criterion 
of minimalism is relevant to my project in two scenarios, if  
a.  Two ontological accounts of classification were equally successful in which 
case we should prefer the one that has the more minimal resources 
b.  An ontology becomes so inflated that this inhibits its ability to successfully 
meet the other criteria 
Since neither of these eventualities occur in my thesis, discussion of the criterion of 
minimalism will be limited.  
I take these criteria on a metaphysics for classification of reactions to be 
intimately related. Descriptively fit for purpose provides a general criterion in which 
the other criteria fall. For instance, descriptive accuracy in the relevant respect is 
required  to  capture  the  similarity  relations  that  hold  between  the  reactions 
undergoing  classification.  In  addition,  a  metaphysics  is  only  descriptively  fit  for Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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purpose  if  chemists  are  able to use the reaction  landscape  in order  to  capture 
similarities. This is required for formulating successful predictions and therefore 
advancing the fruitful development of science. Finally the criteria of explanatory 
unification also falls within the scope of descriptively fit for purpose. Placing the 
knowledge regarding similarity relations that results from the reaction landscape 
within the context of existing chemical knowledge will enhance chemists’ ability to 
produce  additional  classificatory  schemes  using  QSAR  and  make  successful 
predictions on this basis. 
2:6: Conclusion: Initial Implications for a Metaphysics of 
Classification 
The aim of my thesis is to provide an appropriate metaphysical account for 
the classification of reactions in practice. In chapter 1 I outlined different approaches 
to the philosophy of classification and the status attributed to natural kinds in each 
case. I showed that these accounts were focused on the classification of entities and 
their application to the classification of ‘non-entity like things’ had not been explored 
in detail.  
The aim of this chapter has been to examine a new methodology for the 
classification of reactions in practice and to draw from this a set of criteria that will 
be used throughout the rest of my thesis to adjudicate between different ontological 
frameworks. A metaphysics of classification must adhere to these criteria if it is to be 
compatible with classification in practice. 
I began in section 2.1 by discussing the context of my case studies and the 
development of chemoinformatics as a new discipline, emphasising its importance in 
industrial applications of chemistry. In section 2.2 I outlined a new methodology for 
the classification of reactions focusing on the use of QSAR and neural networking. I 
showed how it was applied as a test case to the classification of organic reactions 
with a high degree of success with classification schemes having large information 
content. In section 2.3 I focused specifically on the methodology of classification and Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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drew  out  some  initial  requirements  on  a  metaphysics  for  the  classification  of 
reactions. Firstly, I argued the methodology is primarily used for refining existing 
classifications and so must be compatible with other methods that produce the initial 
classification scheme. Secondly, I argued that we must treat activities as heuristics 
for  classification  and  outlined  the  implications  of  this  for  the  debate  between 
whether classification should take place at the micro or macro level in chemistry.  
Thirdly,  I  discussed  the  implications  of  representation  in  classification  and  the 
advantages of a 2-dimensional classificatory scheme. 
In section 2.4 I discussed a more recent application of the methodology to the 
classification of enzymatic reactions and in section 2.5 I related this to three more 
general requirements on a metaphysics of classification; it must be descriptively fit 
for purpose. This amounts to being descriptively accurate ‘enough’ to meet the aims 
of  inquiry,  being  able  to  capture  the  similarity  relations  between  reactions  and 
promoting explanatory unification.  
On the basis of the discussion so far in this chapter I can makes some initial 
comments on which accounts of classification outlined in chapter 1, best describe 
the status of the types of reactions that result from this classification. Firstly I suggest 
that we can rule out social constructivism as appropriate to accommodate the kind 
of classification going on in my case study. QSAR and neural networking came to 
prominence  due  to  demands  from  industry  for  greater  predictability  and 
manipulability of chemical information. QSAR and neural networking are employed 
because they provide a methodology for systematising and organising large volumes 
of data in such a way that permits successful inductive inferences. For example, in 
the case of enzymatic reactions discussed in section 2.4 the resulting classification 
scheme was used to better predict which enzymes would catalyse which reactions 
and under what conditions.  
This allows us to rule out social constructivism by appealing to the no miracles 
argument; the best explanation of the success of predictions is that the similarity 
relations revealed by QSAR and neural networking are real and capture the real 
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for the sake of classification itself but to gain a better understanding of a particular 
chemical  phenomenon  and  to  make  successful  predictions.  In  so  far  as  the 
investigation is non-objective and lead by human interests, this is because is directed 
specifically towards a better understanding of this phenomenon. This suggests that 
a realist account of classification is most appropriate but we still must adjudicate 
between  the  varieties  of  weak  realism  and  the  stronger  essentialist  positions 
discussed in chapter 1.  
I suggest there is reason to reject the stronger versions of essentialism on 
which natural kinds have essences. The classification process is led by the scientific 
aims and interests of the chemists conducting the investigation and is therefore 
subject to perspectivalism. It is conceivable that chemists investigating a different 
chemical problem would have classified the reactions differently. For example, the 
similarity relations revealed on the reaction landscape are relative to the reactions 
undergoing classification. If more reactions are input into the system then this will 
alter the extent to which any two reactions are deemed to be similar to each other. 
In addition, when classifying in practice chemists do not take reactions to have 
essential properties but take their instantiation to correlate with the presence of 
certain physicochemical properties of the reactions centres of entities. 
Instead we are left with weak realist accounts of natural kinds, such as Boyd’s 
homeostatic  property  cluster  kinds,  Dupré’s  promiscuous  realism  and  Hendry’s 
microstructuralism.  Each  of  these  positions  appeals  to  a  range  of  different 
ontological components such as entities, properties, mechanisms and processes. In 
order to establish which account should be adopted for the classification of reactions 
I need to establish which of these components we must be ontologically committed 
to in order to capture the classification of reactions. I will be primarily concerned with 
this question through the course of the next three chapters. I will then assess the 
implication of this discussion for the natural kind debate in chapter 6.  
Since  the  classification  of  reactions  takes  place  on  the  basis  of 
physicochemical variables that best describe how a given reaction mechanism will 
proceed,  a  sensible  place  to  start  is  with  the  literature  on  mechanisms  in  the Chapter 2: Classifying Reactions in Practice 
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philosophy of science.  I will focus on the account of mechanisms given by Machamer, 
Darden,  and  Craver  and  assess  whether  their  entities  and  activities  ontology  is 
sufficient for capturing the classification of chemical reactions in practice.                                                                                           Chapter 3: Entities and Activities Ontology 
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Chapter 3: Can the Entities and 
Activities Ontology capture the 
Classification of Reactions in Practice? 
3:1: Introduction 
The aim of my thesis is to identify the most appropriate metaphysics to 
accommodate the classification of chemical reactions in practice. I began in chapter 
1 by outlining the literature on natural kind classification and arguing that it cannot 
straightforwardly  accommodate  the  classification  of  reactions.  In  chapter  2  I 
discussed the classification of chemical reactions in practice and used this to draw 
out a number of requirements that any metaphysical framework must be compatible 
with if it is to accommodate the classification of reactions in practice. I argued that 
this discussion of practice revealed that constructivist and strong essentialist theses 
were unable to capture the metaphysical status of types of reaction. I also suggested 
that to adjudicate between other varieties of weak realism we needed to investigate 
which ontological components are required to accommodate the classification of 
reactions. The remaining accounts of natural kind classification refer to components 
such as entities dispositional properties, mechanisms or processes. 
My  discussion  of  chemical  practice  revealed  the  concept  of  a  reaction 
mechanism to be  central  to understanding the  nature of  chemical  reactions.  In 
chapter 2 I showed how reactions were classified on the basis of properties that were 
thought  to  reveal  similarities  in  these  reaction  mechanisms.  As  a  result,  in  this 
chapter I will address the metaphysics of mechanisms. I will address whether this 
ontology is sufficient to capture the classification of reactions in practice.                                                                                            Chapter 3: Entities and Activities Ontology 
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I will focus on the account of mechanisms provided by Machamer, Darden 
and Craver (MDC) in their 2000 paper Thinking about Mechanisms. Whilst other 
related accounts of mechanism have been provided by Glennan 2002 and Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen 2005, I will focus only on the account provided by MDC since it is 
only they who introduce the notion of activities alongside entities and as I have 
shown  in  chapter  2  activities  are  central  to  chemical  practice  when  classifying 
reactions. 
The aims of this chapter are two-fold, firstly I will engage in an interpretive 
project drawing out and developing key ideas proposed in their paper Thinking about 
Mechanisms (2000). Whilst the paper motivated a productive literature on the notion 
of mechanisms in science, very little has been said on the metaphysics of activities. 
This is with the exception of Illari and Williamson (2013). The project of fleshing out 
what is meant by an activity will proceed throughout the course of this chapter as 
questions arise with respect to activities and modality, actuality and the relation of 
activities to properties.  
On the basis of this interpretive work, I will address whether the entities – 
activities  ontology  is  sufficient  to  accommodate  the  classification  of  chemical 
processes in practice. This discussion will take place within the context of the criteria 
outlined in chapter 2 which required that our metaphysics be descriptively fit for 
purpose; i.e. descriptively accurate, capable of capturing similarity relations and 
promoting explanatory unification.  
I will begin in section 3.1 by providing an account of MDC’s entities – activities 
ontology and placing it within the context of the wider literature on mechanisms. In 
section  3.2  I  will  discuss  the  use  and  meaning  of  the  term  ‘activity’  within  the 
chemical literature. This will allow for a comparison of the use of the term ‘activity’ 
by chemists and philosophers. In section 3.3 I will refer back to the case specific 
requirements outlined in section 2.3 and raise some initial concerns regarding MDC’s 
account. In section 3.4 I will discuss whether the entities – activities ontology is 
capable of meeting both case specific and general sets of requirements.                                                                                            Chapter 3: Entities and Activities Ontology 
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I will conclude that the entities – activities ontology fails to meet the criteria 
of capturing similarity relations because it lacks the modality required to capture 
predictive statements. I argue that one option is to give a modal reading of activities 
however I suggest that activities lack the required sort of potentiality for this to be a 
viable  option.  The  other  option  is  that  MDC  implicitly  commit  to  dispositional 
properties. Even if they choose this second option I argue that to play down the role 
of dispositional properties by referring to their account as a two category ontology 
of  activities  and  entities  violates  the  criteria  of  explanatory  unification  and 
descriptive accuracy. Since the entities – activities ontology does not meet the three 
criteria  of  capturing  similarity  relations,  descriptive  accuracy  and  promoting 
explanatory unification, it is therefore not descriptively fit for purpose with respect 
to my case study. 
3:2: Activities in the Mechanism Literature 
In  this  section  I  will  focus  on  the  account  of  mechanisms  provided  by 
Machamer,  Darden  and  Craver  (MDC)  in  their  2000  paper  Thinking  about 
mechanisms. More specifically, I will provide an examination of the term ‘activity’ as 
it is used in the mechanisms literature. I will then discuss the work of Illari and 
Williamson who have offered an analysis and defence of MDC’s activities, they also 
flesh out discussion by (Machamer 2004) who addresses but doesn’t not further 
develop discussion of activities in (MDC, 2000) . Little else has been said about 
activities, so there is significant work to be done if I’m to assess whether entities and 
activities are able to accommodate classificatory practice. 
Along with acquiring a better grasp of the notion of an activity, the  second 
purpose of this exegesis is to allow for a comparison between the way the term 
‘activity’ is used by philosophers and the way it is used by chemists engaged in the 
classification of chemical reactions. If they are using the term in a consistent way, 
then it is legitimate for me to use the latter as a test case for the former.                                                                                            Chapter 3: Entities and Activities Ontology 
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MDC’s aim is for their account to be descriptive of actual scientific practice. 
Whilst their examples are taken from molecular biology and neurobiology it is hoped 
their account will be applicable to other scientific domains such as chemistry. MDC 
claim  that  ‘mechanisms  are  entities  and  activities  organized  such  that  they  are 
productive  of  regular  changes  from  start  or  set-  up  to  finish  or  termination 
conditions’ (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 3). 
The  mechanism  runs  from  start  to  end  such  that  the  product  of  the 
mechanism  arises  as  a  result  of  the  start  conditions  and  intermediate  phases. 
Mechanisms are composed of entities and activities and when these components of 
the mechanism are ordered correctly it will be productive of regular change. For MDC 
examples of entities include ‘cell membrane , vesicles, microtubules, molecules and 
ions,’ whereas examples of activities include ‘biosynthesis, transport, depolarization, 
insertion, storage, recycling, priming, diffusion, and modulation’ (Machamer, Darden 
and Craver, 2000, 8). 
MDC's  paper  focuses  on  entities  and  activities  and  takes  these  to  be 
independent  components  that  work  together  to  bring  about  change  via  a 
mechanism. Nonetheless, they hint at a place for properties within their ontology. 
They state for instance that 'mechanisms are composed of both entities (with their 
properties) and activities’ (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 3). However they 
do not provide significant elaboration on the nature of these properties or their 
status  within  their  ontology.  They  do  state  that;  ‘activities  usually  require  that 
entities have specific types of properties. The neurotransmitter and receptor, two 
entities,  bind,  an  activity,  by  virtue  of  their  structural  properties  and  charge 
distributions’ (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 3). 
This suggests at the least their ontology should contain structural properties. 
They do not pass comment on whether ontological commitment to dispositional 
properties or capacities is required in addition. Throughout the course of this chapter 
I will suggest that MDC ought to commit to dispositional properties, in addition to 
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outlined in my case study. I will return to MDC’s discussion of properties in section 
3.6.5. 
MDC’s account is dualistic since they ascribe equal ontological significance to 
the activities and entities that constitute the mechanism. MDC intend is to capture 
the best of substantival ontologies that reserve ontological commitment to entities 
and properties and the best of process ontologies that reserve commitment only for 
processes. On the MDC view entities are taken to be the things that engage in 
activities and activities are types of change. They must both be correctly positioned 
within the mechanism in order for the mechanism to function correctly (Machamer, 
Darden and Craver, 2000, 2). 
On the substantivalist view to which MDC refer, typically change occurs as a 
result of entities manifesting their capacities. For instance, DNA bases are entities 
that undergo change by manifesting their capacities such as their weak polarities or 
their  charge  configurations.  However  it  is  argued  by  MDC  that  an  entity  based 
ontology such as this is insufficient. They outline at least two reasons for this.  
Firstly, according to MDC activities are conceptually prior to capacities, since 
one must have an idea of the activities that are possible before one can ascribe the 
capacity to engage in that activity to a relevant entity. MDC give the example of 
aspirin’s ability to cure a headache, they state; ‘one does not know that aspirin has 
the capacity to relieve a headache unless one knows that aspirin produces headache 
relief’  (Machamer,  Darden  and  Craver,  2000,  5).  Secondly,  MDC  argue  that  by 
focusing  only  on  entities  and  capacities  such  ontologies  neglect  the  fact  that 
mechanisms are ‘active’ and are subject to scientific investigation in their own right. 
MDC prefer to characterise change in terms of mechanisms rather than asserting that 
change is just a change in the properties of an entity (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 
2000, 6). 
In  contrast  to  substantivalist  approaches,  MDC  describe  activities  as  the 
‘producers of change’, they bring about changes in the relevant entity and in this 
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122 
 
an activity is characterised as a type of cause, MDC buy into an Anscombean account 
of causation whereby they prefer to treat ‘cause’ as an abstract term that can be 
filled in by the relevant activity as it is specified in scientific theory (Machamer, 
Darden and Craver, 2000, 6). They do not flesh out the notion of activities as causes 
any further, they do however, give more details on the characteristics of activities. 
Firstly they assert that activities are temporally extended and dynamic rather 
than static, they are ‘active kinds of changing’ (Machamer Darden and Craver, 2000, 
5). MDC’s discussion of how activities can be identified reveals that they can be exist 
at different levels and can described in various levels of detail depending on the 
contextual requirement. It’s claimed that;   
‘activities,  likewise,  may  be  identified  and  individuated  by  their 
spatiotemporal  location.  They  also  may  be  individuated  by  their  rate, 
duration,  types  of  entities  and  types  of  properties  that  engage  in  them’ 
(Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 5). 
‘More specific individuation conditions may include their mode of operation 
(e.g., contact action versus attraction at a distance), directionality (e.g., linear 
versus at right angles), polarity (attraction versus attraction and repulsion), 
energy requirements (e.g. how much energy is required to form or break a 
chemical bond), and the range of activity (e.g., electro-magnetic forces have 
a  wider  influence  than  do  the  strong  and  weak  forces  in  the  nucleus)’ 
(Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 5). 
Activities  may  be  given  a  lower  level  mechanistic  description  in  terms  of  other 
entities and activities whilst being correctly considered activities in their own right 
and themselves functioning in higher level mechanisms.  
Whilst  it  is  argued  that  activities  possess  the  same  ontological  status  as 
entities, they should not replace entities altogether. This is because, according to 
MDC, activities are always ‘of entities.’ At least within the domains of molecular 
biology and neurobiology that are discussed, MDC know of no activities that exist 
independently of entities. Entities and activities are ontological components that are 
interdependent in practice. The nature of the activity determines what kinds of 
properties are able to take part in that activity whilst the properties of entities 
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MDC  do  not  offer  any  further  insight  into  the  nature  of  an  activity  and 
activities have received little attention in the wider mechanism literature. This is with 
the exception of the discussion by Illari and Williamson in their paper In Defence of 
Activities (2013). Illari and Williamson further explore the notion of activities as 
described by MDC and offer a comparison of the entities - activities ontology with 
the entities – capacities ontology which they deem to be its closest rival. The aim of 
their discussion is to begin a debate regarding the status of activities; they do not 
comment on whether an activities – entities ontology is itself sufficient without 
additional commitment to capacities.  
Illari and Williamson argue that activities are prior to capacities epistemically 
and conceptually. To take the epistemic point first, it is argued that we cannot know 
that an entity has the capacity to engage in a given activity until we have observed it 
engage in that activity. I referred to this point earlier when discussing MDC’s claims 
that we cannot know that aspirin has the capacity to offer pain relief until we have 
seen it do so. This epistemic consideration is given more force with the addition of a 
conceptual  argument  offered  by  Machamer  stating  that  ‘activity  must  precede 
potentiality,’ (Machamer, 2004 30). Illari and Williamson agree with his point is that 
we must have the concept of an activity prior to the concept of a capacity because to 
say that an entity has a capacity is to say it has a capacity to engage in an activity, 
therefore we must have the concept activity prior to the concept capacity (Illari and 
Williamson, 2013, 16). 
Illari and Williamson also agree with MDC that activities are extended in time 
and constitute types of change. However they point to a further difference between 
activities and capacities concerning arity. They suggest activities can be distinguished 
from capacities because they have unrestricted arity, whilst capacities can only have 
a one to one arity. An activity can be associated with as many entities as necessary 
while capacities can only attach themselves to one entity. It is argued that this 
unrestricted  arity  allows  the  entities  -  activities  ontology  to  promote  scientific 
understanding since it offers a more appropriate description of nature. For instance, 
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understood  when  viewed holistically  as one  activity  rather than  reduced to  the 
capacities of different entities. When the phenomena is described in this way we 
have a more appropriate starting point for scientific investigation allowing for a 
better  understanding  of  the  factors  affecting  the  activity,  how  it  might  behave 
differently with different entities partaking in it and how to manipulate it to produce 
desired effects. I will discuss the issue of arity in more detail in section 4.4. 
Illari and Williamson also refer to the way in which activities and capacities 
are referred to in ordinary discourse. They discuss cases from evolutionary theory, 
biology, chemistry and physics and suggest that in each case activities are referred to 
in a way that is distinct from entities and capacities. In the case of chemistry, Illari 
and  Williamson  describe  how  activities  are  classified  independently  from  the 
molecules that take part in them. They give the example of reaction mechanisms Sn1 
and sn2 where the first refers to substitution nucleophilic unimolecular reactions 
whereas sn2 refers to substitution nucleophilic biomolecular reaction.  Both of these 
reaction  have  a  common  structure  which  means  that  examples  are  identified 
regardless of the type of entities engaged in the reaction.  It seems that science does 
reveal things that are not entities or capacities but which have ‘unrestricted arity in 
their relation to entities’ and which are ‘extended in time’ (Illari and Williamson, 
2013, 8).  Illari and Williamson conclude that a descriptively adequate ontology must 
include a separate ontological category for activities.  
They go on to further develop the account provided by MDC. They state that 
if ontological commitment to activities is required then we must limit what sorts of 
activities should fall in this category. They argue that we should distinguish between 
those activities that are present in everyday life such as the clockwise spinning of 
spinning  tops  and  those  activities  that  appear  in  mechanisms  such  as  the  Sn1 
reactions. Those activities that appear in mechanisms are characterised by a certain 
level of stability and repeatability, such that regardless of the entity that is taking part 
in the activity the activity will exhibit a continuity in its characteristics. Much the same 
idea applies to entities; those entities that appear in mechanisms must be stable 
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they will be productive of a phenomenon in a regular and repeatable manner (Illari 
and Williamson, 2013, 1). It is intuitive to require that activities have a degree of 
stability in order to function in mechanisms however there are many highly stable 
activities such as the tying of shoe laces that do not constitute scientific mechanisms. 
I shall refer to this point in section 3.5.5. 
3:3: Activities in the Classification of Chemical Reactions 
In section 3.2 I discussed the place of activities within the entities - activities 
ontology and drew out their key features. In this section I will discuss those activities 
referred to by chemists working within the domain of chemoinformatics discussed in 
chapter 2. I’m interested in what chemists have in mind when they use the term 
‘activity’. If their definition of activities concurs with MDC, then we can use examples 
from the domain of QSAR to assess the adequacy of the entities – activities ontology. 
If the two definitions do not coincide then we must question the extent to which the 
MDC account is representative of scientific practice and suggest modifications to 
their account.   
In chapter 2, I discussed the classification of reactions in practice and drew 
out various criteria that a metaphysics must adhere to if it is to be compatible with 
this element of scientific practice. I described the importance of identifying a QSAR 
for  reactions  when  producing  a  classification  of  chemical  reactions  where  the 
purpose  of  QSAR  is  to  identify  a  relationship  between  lower  level  structural 
properties and a higher level activity (or reaction)  
Once a relationship has been identified it is used to make predictions about 
future occurrences of that activity since QSAR is based on the assumption that lower 
level structural similarity gives rise to a similarity in higher level activities. We know 
from the discussion of QSAR in chapter 2 that the ‘S’ in QSAR refers to the structural 
properties that describe the reaction centre i.e. the properties of those atoms and 
bonds that undergo change during the reaction, since the properties of the reaction 
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‘activity’ changes depending on what the chemist is interested in. In the classification 
of reactions, the activity is the occurrence or instantiation of a particular type of 
reaction. Chemists identify those structural properties that are associated with the 
instantiation of that particular reaction. We know then, that for chemists, activities 
are types of reactions where reactions are things that can be made to undergo 
instantiate.  
We should also note the aims and interests of chemists investigating the 
things they refer to as activities. These might include; 
·  The prediction of a variety of physicochemical properties of molecules 
(whether they be pharmaceuticals, pesticides, personal products, fine 
chemicals, etc.). 
·  The  prediction  of  the  fate  of  molecules  which  are  released  into  the 
environment. 
·  The rationalization and prediction of the combined effects of molecules, 
whether it be in mixtures or formulations. 
·  The prediction of toxicity to environmental species. 
·  The rational identification of new leads with pharmacological, biocidal or 
pesticidal activity’ (Consonni and Todeschini, 2010, 4). 
This suggests the importance of the need to study activities as distinct beings in their 
own right, in order to better understand the factors that affect them and the ways in 
which they behave when different entities are engaged in them. I suggest this is the 
first similarity between chemists’ approach to activities and the account provided by 
MDC. Both attribute a high status to activities such that they are worth studying in 
their own right and not just reducible to entities.  
Secondly I suggest both chemists working on QSAR and MDC take activities to 
be kinds of change. In the case of chemical reactions this involves some change in 
the entities involved in the reaction whereby the classificatory output groups these 
changes into similar types. We can see this by referring back to the three stage 
classification process outlined in chapter 2. In order for classification by QSAR and 
neural networking to take place, a preliminary classification of reactions into general 
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identify the subtypes of reactions within that type. In the case of the classification 
reactions, the activity of interest was hydrolysis reactions.  
Activities  also  have  the  property  of  being  extended  in  time,  chemical 
reactions are non – instantaneous and so are the other activities described in this 
section. For example, toxic chemicals take a period of time to infect nearby entities 
and systems whilst the dissolution of water in solution takes time to unfold. This is 
supported by the fact that the reaction mechanisms referred to in the discussion of 
enzymatic reactions involve multiple steps in which the first step must take place 
before the second. I will discuss the extension of reactions in time in section 4.1. 
Finally each activity or reaction is associated with at least one entity and tends 
to involve many more. In section 1.2 I made a distinction between a reaction and a 
reaction  mechanism.  A  reaction  mechanism  involves  at  least  two  entities  and 
potential  intermediate  entities.  However  a  reaction  itself  will  involve  many 
instantiations of the reaction mechanism. To take a more familiar example, the 
dissolution of sugar in tea involves many sugar molecules and many molecules of 
water, each of which will undergo the action of dissolution. An explanation of why 
stirring the tea increases the rate of dissolution requires an account of the probability 
for collisions and therefore reference to the many entities involved in the dissolution 
process.  
More generally, proponents of QSAR and MDC agree on their approach of 
working by examples rather than giving a definition of what constitutes an activity. I 
suggest that MDC would be happy to accept chemical reactions as an example of an 
activity; a reaction is an instance of change that is engaged in by entities, the reaction 
is extended in time, and can be given a characterisation in terms of a lower level 
mechanism. Since MDC would accept chemical reactions as a type of activity and 
since QSAR is an example of classifying activities in practice, whether or not an 
entities – activities ontology is sufficient to accommodate this case study constitutes 
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3:4: Initial Cause for Concern 
3:4:1: Preliminary Concerns 
Thus far in this chapter I have explored the entities – activities ontology 
proposed  by  MDC  and  have  reviewed  some  initial  arguments  why  ontological 
commitment to activities should be taken seriously. I went on to evaluate the use of 
the term ‘activities’ in the chemical literature and concluded that MDC would accept 
the  activities  identified  in  QSAR  as  constituting  examples  of  activities  on  their 
account. 
I can now begin to address the question of whether an entities – activities 
ontology is sufficient to capturing the classification of chemical reactions in practice. 
The purpose of this section is to give a reminder of the case specific criteria outlined 
in section 2.3 and indicate some initial reasons to doubt whether these can be met. 
A more conclusive argument will follow in section 3.5 in which I further discuss these 
requirements with respect to the general criteria on our metaphysics outlined in 
section 2.5 that must be met if a metaphysics is to be descriptively fit for purpose i.e. 
descriptive accuracy, capturing similarity relations and explanatory unification. 
In  section  2.3  I  noted  some  initial  features  of  chemical  practice  that  a 
metaphysics of classification must be compatible with.  
a.   The classification of reactions is a three stage process; firstly a type of reaction 
is  identified  using  theoretical  knowledge,  secondly,  a  more  refined 
classification of this type of reaction is produced using QSAR and thirdly a 
representation is constructed using neural networking  
b.  The  output  of  classificatory  schemes  is  represented  on  a  2-dimentional 
reaction  landscape.  Chemists  use  this  representation  when  making 
predictions rather than appealing to traditional 1 -dimensional categories 
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c.    The properties on which the classification of reactions is based take the form 
of physicochemical descriptors of the reaction 
d.   The aim of classification is to provide a unified account of microstructural and 
macro level properties 
The first two criteria are not obviously problematic for the entities – activities 
ontology. For example, I described in section 2.2 how the classification of reactions 
takes  place  through  the  representation  of  a  reaction  landscape  on  which  the 
relations  between  reactions  can  be  identified.  This  is  compatible  with  taking 
reactions to  be activities  whereby  it  is  the  relations  between  activities  that  are 
represented.  It  is  also  compatible  with  criterion  c.  the  three  stage  classification 
process described above. This is because MDC are open to the possibility that a 
particular activity can be divided into sub types of activities which can in turn be given 
a more fine – grained description that reveals more subtle similarities. 
It  is  the final two  constraints  that  may  be  problematic  for the  entities  - 
activities ontology. In what follows I will spell out initial reasons to doubt whether 
such an ontological framework is able to accommodate these criteria and begin to 
hint  at  the  worry  that  an  additional  ontological  category  of  dispositions  is  also 
required.  
The  problem  concerns how  to  accommodate  the use  of physicochemical 
properties with the entities – activities ontology. These properties are required for 
giving a unified account of activities (criterion d) which can then be used as the basis 
for  classification  (criterion  a).  The  difficulty  is  that  these  properties  are  not 
straightforwardly  accommodated  on  the  entities  –  activities  ontology  and  first 
impressions indicate they are better characterised as dispositional properties. As I 
have previously hinted, it is not clear how dispositions are accommodated on the 
entities – activities view. 
Consider the property inductive effect; this property was used to encode 
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interested  in  the  inductive  effect  associated  with  the  atoms  that  make  up  the 
reaction centre.  It is defined as a measure of the transmission of the polarising effect 
of an electronegative atom through a chain of atoms in a molecule. ‘The polarising 
influence of an electronegative atom decreases with the number of intervening 
sigma bonds. This is called the inductive effect. It is generally accepted that the 
inductive effect is attenuated by a factor of 2-3 by each intervening bond’ (Gasteiger, 
2009, 176).  
Now consider the molecule C2H4CL. The chlorine’s electronegativity means its 
electrons are not equally shared between the chlorine and carbon but are dragged 
towards the chlorine. This means that the carbon is left with an electropositive 
charge and so drags the electrons in the next nearby carbon closer towards it in order 
to gain a bigger share of the electrons. This unequal sharing of electrons continues 
along the chain of molecules but to a smaller extent with each degree of separation 
from the original source of the electronegativity. The overall distorted shape of the 
molecule is a result of the inductive effect. 
If inductive effect is a measure of polarizing influence which is in turn a 
measure of electron attracting power then it is not obvious that taking inductive 
effect to be an activity is the most appropriate characterization. In what follows I will 
examine what a characterization of polarity as an activity looks like and then examine 
what  a  characterization  of  polarity  as  a  disposition  looks  like.  This  will  set  up 
discussion in the following section in which I examine which characterization is most 
appropriate. 
3:4:2: Polarity and Inductive Effect as Activities 
There  are  two  ways  in which  we  can  characterize  inductive  effect  as an 
activity according to MDC. The first sense builds on the idea that mechanisms are 
hierarchical. The second treats a mechanism as non-reductive. It’s claimed that; 
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neurobiology and molecular biology are frequently multi-level‘(Machamer, Darden 
and Craver, 2000, 13). 
On the hierarchical view the activities that constitute a given mechanism can 
be specified in terms of a lower level mechanism. For instance when describing the 
mechanism by which chemical signals are transmitted across a synapse, MDC suggest 
that the activities involved such as biosynthesis, depolarization, and transport are 
further specified in terms of a lower level mechanism. 
I described above how inductive effect and polarity result from an unequal 
sharing of electrons. We can describe the activity inductive effect in terms of the 
lower level mechanism illustrated below and described with the following steps. 
 
Figure 17: an illustration of Inductive Effect 
The chlorine atom engages in the activity of attracting the shared pair of electrons 
from the carbon atom next to it leaving the carbon atom with a positive charge. As a 
result the carbon atom engages in the activity of attracting electrons from the next 
carbon along in order to partially neutralize its positive charge. This in turn causes a 
positive charge on the next along carbon molecule which also engages in the activity 
of attracting a carbon atom and the mechanism continues along the chain of atoms. 
Each activity brings about a change in the next atom. 
MDC stop short of implying that all activities can be specified in terms of a 
lower level mechanism and assert that there are some activities for which no lower 
level description can be given.  
‘Higher-level entities and activities are thus essential to the intelligibility of 
those at lower levels, just as much as those at lower levels are essential for 
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into  productive  relations  that  renders  the  phenomenon  intelligible  and 
thereby explains it’ (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 24). 
‘In molecular biology and molecular neurobiology, hierarchies of mechanisms 
bottom  out  in  descriptions  of  the  activities  of  macromolecules,  smaller 
molecules, and ions’ (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 14). 
In addition, there may be activities that are awaiting specification in terms of lower 
level mechanisms, there is no reason to deny that these constitute activities even if 
they are not bottom out activities.  
Within  the  remit  of  molecular  biology  and  molecular  neurobiology  MDC 
isolate  four  categories  of  bottom  out  activities:  geometrico-mechanical  electro-
chemical;  energetic  and  electro-magnetic.  It  is  electrochemical  that  are  most 
relevant to present purposes, these are described as 
‘Attracting, repelling, bonding, and breaking are electro-chemical kinds of 
activity. Chemical bonding, such as the formation of strong covalent bonds 
between amino acids in proteins, is a more specific example. The lock and key 
docking  of  an  enzyme  and  its  substrate  involves  geometrical  shape  and 
mechanical stresses and chemical attractions’ (Machamer Darden and Craver, 
2000, 14). 
Even if we can infer from the discussion above that a specification of inductive effect 
in terms of a lower level mechanism cannot be given either for epistemic reasons or 
because it is a bottom out activity then it must still be a producer of change and be 
engaged in by entities. I previously suggested we should read MDC as implying that 
the 'doings' of activities are extended in time. This reading is further supported by 
the claim that activities can be individuated by their spatiotemporal location as well 
as their rate and duration, again, requiring their extension in time.  
If something meets these criteria then there is good reason to suppose it can 
be characterized as an activity. Inductive effect certainly brings about a change, the 
overall change is a distortion in the shape of the molecule due to the unequal sharing 
of electrons. This change is non instantaneous and is extended in time. Inductive 
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in it. Therefore it satisfies all four points and it seems plausible that inductive effect 
can be characterized as an activity in either of the senses alluded to by MDC.  
3:4:3: Polarity and Inductive Effect as Dispositions 
I have shown above that inductive effect can be reasonably accounted for by 
treating  it  as  an  activity.  I  will  now  show  that  polarity  can  also  be  reasonably 
accounted for in terms of dispositional properties. To flesh this out I will appeal to 
Chakravartty's notion of a causal process and attempt to account for inductive effect 
in terms of the transference of dispositional properties. Chakravartty's approach to 
causal process stems from his desire to give an account of causation. He argues that 
the true relata of causation are not events but causal process in virtue of the causal 
properties that constitute these processes. He defines a causal property as 'one that 
confers dispositions on the particulars that have it to behave in certain ways when in 
the presence or absence of other particulars with causal properties of their own' 
(Chakravartty, 2007, 108). 
He gives the examples such as mass where bodies that possess mass will be 
disposed to accelerate when experiencing a force. Likewise, gases with different 
volumes  will  be  disposed  to  vary  in  temperatures  when  exposed  to  different 
pressures. On Chakravartty’s view we can think of causal processes such as the 
inductive effect as resulting from the continuing manifestation of such dispositional 
properties. The manifestation of one property provides the stimulus conditions for 
the manifestation of many other dispositional properties which in turn stimulate the 
manifestation  of  a  web  of  additional  dispositional  properties  leading  to  the 
‘continuous flux of causal activity’ to which Chakravartty refers (Chakravartty, 2007, 
108).  
In the case of inductive effect we can give an account of the phenomena by 
isolating the relevant dispositional properties involved in bringing about the desired 
effect from the wider causal web that forms its context. 
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b.  The carbon1 atom’s disposition to retain a partial hold of its electrons (and 
neutral charge) 
c.  The carbon1 atoms disposition to re-establish its neural charge by attracting 
electrons from neighbouring carbon2 atoms.  
d.  The carbon2 atom’s disposition to retain a partial hold of its electrons (and 
neutral charge) 
e.  The carbon2 atoms disposition to re-establish its neutral charge by attracting 
electrons from neighbouring carbon2 atoms.  
f.  The carbon1 atom, carbon2 atom and carbon3  atoms dispositions to attract 
and electron from hydrogen  
g.  The Hydrogen1 atom and Hydrogen2 atom and Hydrogen3 atom’s disposition 
to retain their share of the electron.  
Inductive effect is then characterized as the coming together of these overlapping 
dispositional properties. 
   I have described above how the physicochemical property ‘inductive effect’ 
might be characterized in terms of dispositional properties and how it might be 
characterized in terms of an activity. In the next section I will examine which account 
is most descriptively fit for purpose. 
3:5: Problems with the Entities and Activities Ontology 
The aim of this section is to build on the discussion in the previous section 
and examine whether the activities – entities ontology can capture the classification 
of reactions without additional commitment to dispositional properties. Given the 
lack of discussion in the literature on the nature of activities, much of this project is 
interpretive and requires me to outline what we should want activities to be able to 
do if they are to be compatible with chemical practice. I will then address whether 
this is possible given what MDC say about activities. 
It is worth clarifying that the aim of this chapter is not to assess the claim that 
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activities are to be included in our ontology, a commitment to an ontological category 
of dispositions is required in addition. My argument builds up through the course of 
this section as I assess whether activities are descriptively fit for purpose, I discuss 
the criteria of similarity, descriptive accuracy and explanatory unification in turn. 
In my discussion of similarity I will hint at a theoretical problem for MDC that 
may inhibit their ability to capture certain types of similarity statements. I will then 
show how chemists treat these similarity statements in practice and discuss the role 
of dispositional properties in a descriptively accurate metaphysics. Both of these 
discussions  point  to  a  need  for  dispositional  properties.  I’ll  then  show  how 
commitment to dispositional properties as well as a corresponding commitment to 
activities improves explanatory unification.  
3:5:1: Capturing the Similarity Criteria  
The aim of my discussion of the similarity criterion is to hint at a potential 
problem that the entities – activities ontology might succumb to as a result of the 
absence of a commitment to dispositional properties. I’ll begin by discussing the sorts 
of similarities that are revealed by classifications of chemical reactions as discussed 
in chapter 2 and that chemists make predictions on the basis of. I discuss the resulting 
predictive statements and argue that our ontology must contain something modal if 
it is to be able to ground such statements. I then return to MDC’s discussion of 
activities and suggest that MDC intend a modal reading of activities, however they 
do not flesh out the metaphysics that underpins this modality. I look at the way 
modality is accounted for in the related literature and show that these options are 
not suitable to ground the modal nature of activities.  I conclude that activities 
cannot, as yet, be given a modal reading and additional commitment to dispositions 
is required to accommodate possibility statements. 
Earlier  in  this  chapter  I  discussed  the  aims  of  chemists  producing 
classifications of chemical reactions and their desire to achieve enhanced predictive 
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the structures of the reaction centres of molecules with the characteristics of the 
resultant reaction. Those reactions that appear in the same cluster in the reaction 
landscape are likely to share other properties in common. This allows chemists to 
answer  practical  questions  such  as  these  listed  by  Gasteiger  at  the  start  of  his 
investigations in to the classification of organic reactions;  
'What starting materials and reaction conditions could give a molecule having 
a desired structure, will the desired reaction actually occur, will the molecule 
be produced as a major product, will side reactions occur, what is the reaction 
mechanism, etc.?'  (Gasteiger 1997, 210). 
On the basis of this discussion we can identify the kind of predictive statements that 
chemists  make  on  the  basis  of  the  similarity  relations  revealed  by  the  reaction 
landscape. For example, statement A below which indicates that reactions that fall 
close to each other on a reaction landscape might be activated by the same catalyst.  
A   All members of cluster P will exhibit an increase in rate as a result of 
the presence of catalyst X 
Due to the complex chemical environment in which these reactions take place 
we should not take these statements as necessary. We can imagine a situation in 
which a catalyst failed to increase the rate of a reaction of one of the reactions in 
cluster  A  due  to  further  mitigating  factors.  For  instance  the  presence  of 
environmental factors that slow down the rate of reaction or the absence of the 
required conditions for the reaction to take place. As a result we should read the 
above statement as a possibility statement;  
A*   It is possible that reactions in cluster P will increase in rate as a result 
of the presence of catalyst X 
Since we already know that at least one reaction from cluster A will increase in rate 
in the presence of catalyst X we know the possibility statement holds. 
We  can  see  an  example  of  this  in  practice  by  referring  back  to  the 
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Figure 18: A cluster of acylations of alkenes from the classification of organic reactions in neural networker 
(Gasteiger and Chen, 1997, 4037) 
The diagram is a sub section of the reaction landscape containing only the 
cluster of acylations of alkene reactions. The reactions are labelled with a number 
and the products of the reactions are inserted into each box with the bond formed 
during the reaction indicated with a dotted line. We know from prior theoretical 
knowledge that reaction no.41 is an acylation of a double bond which is doubly 
catalysed  by  a  sulphur  and  a  nitrogen  atom.  We  also  know  that  reaction  39  is 
catalysed by a sulphur atom and a carbon atom whilst reaction no 46 is initiated by 
an oxygen atom although a more activating catalyst is needed (Gasteiger, 1997, 
4037).  Since  these  reactions  have  been  grouped  together  in  the  cluster,  it  is 
suggested that knowledge concerning which entities act as catalysts and under what 
conditions can be extrapolated from one reaction to another. This leads to the 
formulation of possibility statements along the lines of; ‘it is possible that reactions 
that are members of the cluster of acylation of alkenes will be initiated by sulphur’ 
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chemical processes in practice must be able to accommodate statements of this 
form. 
3:5:2: a Modal Reading of Activities  
I’ve suggested that the classification of chemical reactions in practice involves 
the formulation of possibility statements regarding how reactions might proceed 
under  a  variety  of  different  contexts.  In  order  to  accommodate  this  we  need 
something modal in our ontology. I suggest that MDC have two options. Firstly, they 
can ground possibility statements by offering a modal reading of activities. Secondly, 
they can add an extra element to their ontology in order to capture possibility. In this 
section I will discuss how MDC might proceed with the first of these options. In the 
next section I will discuss whether a modal reading of activities is feasible. Just as 
MDC do not explicitly discuss commitment to dispositional properties they also do 
not discuss in detail the modal status of activities, thus the following section is 
interpretive.  
The first indication that MDC advocate a modal reading of activities is the 
claim that activities are ‘producers of change’ (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 
3). In this sense activities are contrasted with entities which engage in those activities 
and which may exhibit a change as a result of the activity. They add that activities 
‘are  constitutive  of  the  transformations  that  yield  new  states  of  affairs  or  new 
products’  (Machamer,  Darden  and  Craver,  2000,  4).  In  claiming  that  activities 
produce  change  MDC  indicate  that  activities  are  causally  efficacious  in  and  of 
themselves. 
  MDC  appear  to  object  to  the  idea  that  we  should  ground  interactions 
between entities in terms of entities and their capacities, and suggest instead that 
we should treat activities as doing the causal work; ‘activities produce changes that 
constitute the next stage (in the entity)’ (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 5).  
Again this suggests that MDC treat activities as de re causally powerful with a modal 
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activities is motivated by ontic concerns (such as their preference for a dualistic 
substantivalist -process ontology). Thus we can infer the phrase producers of change 
should be read ontically.   
In addition, they reject the view that the causal work done by activities in 
producing such change is brought about via the action of laws of nature. They state 
‘no philosophical work is done by positing some further thing, a law, that underwrites 
the productivity of activities’ and assert instead that the work of grounding the 
regularities that exist in nature is done by activities (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 
2000, 8). It is stated instead that 'these regularities are non-accidental and support 
counterfactuals to the extent that they describe activities’ (Machamer, Darden and 
Craver, 2000, 8). Crucially they add that 'counterfactual(s) justifies talking about 
mechanisms and their activities with some sort of necessity’ (Machamer, Darden and 
Craver, 2000, 8). 
MDC do not go on to reveal anything further about this necessity and how it 
may be cashed out. Part of my project in the forthcoming sections will push MDC 
further on this point. Thus far I hope to have established the case for reading MDC 
as committed to activities that are causally efficacious.  
3:6:3: Accounting for the Modal Nature of Activities 
For  activities  to  be  modal  they  must  ground  notions  of  possibility  and 
necessity. I will assess strategies for achieving this in the related literature. I will show 
that these options are not available to MDC and that they must provide a viable 
alternative  account  of  the  modal  status  of  activities  or  extend  ontological 
commitment to dispositions.  
I’ve  already  noted  that  MDC  reject  the  claim  that  laws  of  nature  exist. 
Alongside this, MDC are interested in possibility and necessity in the actual world. 
Their view is compatible with weaker forms of natural necessity so long as they are 
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it  is  possibility  rather  than  necessity  that  is  interesting  when  evaluating  MDC’s 
account and so the following discussion will reflect this. 
One option is to look to the powers literature for ideas for how to ground the 
modality of activities. In particular, I will assess the work of dispositionalists such as 
Bird and Mumford differ in their approaches but both take necessity and possibility 
to follow from the causal powers or potencies possessed by individuals.  
Since I’m interested in how we ground necessity and possibility in nature; I 
will put to one side discussions of analytic and logical necessity focusing specifically 
on de re necessity and possibility. It is helpful to appeal to the work of Mumford who 
outlines three sources of de re necessity (Mumford, 2004, 166 – 169).  The first 
involves  necessary  connections  between  distinct  properties  so  for  instance,  the 
property of having shape necessitates the property of having size. The second type 
of necessary connections are necessary exclusions between properties, for instance, 
it is not possible for something to have two determinates for any given determinable. 
(Mumford, 2004, 167).     
The third kind of necessity is the necessity that holds between properties that 
are distinct existences but which are also causally connected. Mumford takes this last 
form of necessity to be responsible for the dynamic nature of the world since it brings 
about change in particulars (Mumford, 2004, 168). An example of properties that are 
linked  by  this  third  type  of  de  re  necessity  (which  Mumford  calls  dispositional 
necessity) is the property of being fragile and the property of being broken. On 
Mumford’s view this de re dispositional necessity is also metaphysical necessity 
because the identities of the properties are fixed by the causal powers associated 
with it. There is no possible world in which something could be that property i.e. be 
fragile and have different causal powers so that it is not disposed to break when hit 
(Mumford, 2004, 171). 
It is the final kind of de re dispositional necessity and dispositional possibility 
that I’m interested in as this captures the kind of statements that results from my 
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A  It is possible that reactions in cluster A will increase in rate as a result of the 
presence of catalyst X  
How might MDC be able to ground this kind of metaphysical possibility within their 
account? My strategy will be to address how possibility is accommodated within the 
dispositionalist account and use this to spell out what is needed to capture the 
scientific claims identified above. I’ll then address whether activities have what is 
needed. 
Dispositionalists  are  able  to  accommodate  possibility  by  appealing  to 
potentiality. Bird is a dispositional essentialist and takes properties to have a causal 
essence where it is this that determines the property’s identity (Bird, 2007, 44). The 
property’s essence is exhausted by the relations it has with other properties such 
that the property wouldn’t be the property it is unless it engages in those relations. 
Bird characterizes these dispositional properties as potencies. To be potent is to be 
a potential but also to be real; potencies are actual even when potentialities are not 
realised, this is in contrast to saying that a property is a potential i.e. not actual. 
According to Bird; 
‘Part  of  the  being  of  a  potency  is  the  existence  of  a  potentiality.  Since 
potencies  are  essentially  dispositional,  every  potency  will  have  potential 
manifestations…We can go further and say that the stimulus – dependent 
potentiality of a potency exhausts its being. There is no more to the essence 
of a potency than its potentiality.  The combination of a potency’s stimulus 
manifestation are sufficient to identify a potency’ (Bird, 2007, 100). 
Bird characterises metaphysical necessity and metaphysical possibility by appealing 
to potencies. Metaphysical necessity is explained in terms of potencies that will 
always  manifest  their  potentials  under  the  appropriate  stimulus  conditions.  For 
instance, if it is metaphysically necessary that a body with mass will attract other 
bodies with mass then;  
all bodies with mass will possess a potency to attract bodies with mass and if there 
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Bird also explains metaphysical possibility by appealing to potencies that are 
not yet manifested (Bird, 2007, 100). To take the standard example, when we state 
that it is metaphysically possible that the vase will break we mean that the vase has 
the potency fragility and may manifest this potency in response to the stimulus 
condition. The presence of the non- actualized potency goes some way to providing 
the non-reductive natural grounding for possibility however Bird further expands on 
this point by maintaining that there can be no possibility out without a possibility in 
(Bird, 2007, 105). He states that in addition to unactualised potencies, it must also be 
possible for the stimulus condition to be activated. In the case of the breaking of the 
vase if we imagine a situation in which a precious vase was kept in a room which also 
contained a fast acting deadly chemical such that it wouldn’t be possible for anyone 
to get close enough to strike the vase then it would not be possible for the vase to 
break (Bird, 2007, 105).  
An objection commonly levelled against the dispositionalist is that whilst the 
account contains potentiality is also is lacking in actuality. It is helpful to raise these 
objections at this point since I will argue in the next section that in ascribing modality 
to activities MDC face the opposite problem. In Molnar’s ‘always packing never 
traveling’ objection it is claimed that an ontology consisting entirely of powers lacks 
the ontological resources to appropriately characterize the actual world (Molnar, 
2003, 174). If the world consists only of powers, then we can give an account of 
change in terms of the passing around of powers, the breaking of the vase is captured 
by the passing of powers from the power to be broken to say, the power to cut your 
hand. The idea is that this leads to a regress since we spell out what is meant by the 
manifesting of one power by positing another power, which then results in another 
power and so on. Molner’s claim is that there is nothing in the dispostionalist’s 
account that captures the coming to be of any of the powers.  Armstrong captures 
Molner’s objection as follows: 
‘Given a purely dispositionalist account of properties, particulars would seem 
to be always re-packing their bags as they change their properties, yet never 
taking a journey from potency to act. For ‘act’, on this view, is no more than 
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Armstrong sees the need to give some actuality to the world and offers his own 
account  where  powers  result  from  the  presence  of  laws  acting  on  categorical 
properties as discussed in chapter 1. I will discuss this objection to the dispositionalist 
in more detail in chapter 6 and offer a possible solution however for the moment the 
discussion provides an interesting perspective on the viability of a modal reading of 
activities. 
I will argue that in contrast to the problems faced by the dispositionalist, MDC 
have not shown us how to incorporate potentiality into their account of activities.  As 
a  result their  account  lacks  the  required  potentiality  to do  justice  to  possibility 
statement A identified earlier in this chapter.  
Consider the statements B and C outlined below. I argue that whether the 
entities – activities ontology can capture statement B is inconclusive at this point 
however additional commitment to  dispositions is required to ground statement C. 
B:   It  is  possible  that  reaction  x  will  increase  in  rate  in  the  presence  of  an 
increased heat supply 
C:  It is possible that entity y will engage in a hydrolysis reaction in the presence 
of water 
Statement B is about the reaction itself.  MDC appear committed to the view that 
activities are extended in time. They state that activities have ‘temporal order, rate, 
and  duration’  (MDC,  2000,  3).  This  reading  of  MDC  is  backed  up  by  Illari  and 
Williamson who state that ‘unlike entities, capacities and properties – and other 
common constituents of ontologies – activities exist only extended in time’ (Illari and 
Williamson, 2013, 5). 
If we construe reactions as activities on MDC’s view then they must be active 
and ongoing but also extended in time. I suggest that it is in virtue of being extended 
in time that reactions may be able to accommodate potentiality. The reaction is 
ongoing or unfolding in time. It therefore has the potential to change i.e. to get faster 
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that a reaction increased in rate as a result of an increase in heat energy.  It is in virtue 
of this incomplete or unfinished nature of reactions that the truth of possibility 
statements may be grounded in them. 
MDC do not attempt to give an account of how potentiality arises from 
activities. The onus is on them to do this if we are to take activities to be modal as 
they suggest. Nonetheless, at least for this sort of possibility statement that ascribe 
potentiality to reactions this looks to be a feasible way to proceed. In chapter 6 I will 
look at the relationship between potentiality and actuality in chemical reactions in 
much greater depth and use this to formulate a positive proposal for a metaphysics 
of types of reactions. For the moment it is necessary to comment only that a modal 
reading of activities may be able to accommodate this kind of example although 
more work is required to flesh out the details of what this amounts to in practice. 
I suggest that the second type of possibility statement is more difficult for 
MDC to accommodate, consider statements D and E; 
D:  It is possible that entity X will engage in a hydrolysis reaction in the presence 
of water 
E:  It is possible that entity Y will catalyse the hydrolysis reaction  
These  are  both  possibility  statements  formulated  on  the  basis  of  the  similarity 
relations identified on the reaction landscapes discussed in section 2.4 and therefore 
need to be accommodated by a metaphysics of classification. The problem is that the 
potentialities  at  work  in  these  cases  look  to  be  associated  with  the  entities 
themselves rather than the reactions. As a result I suggest that the potentialities 
provided by activities will not suffice. We know that activities have spatial temporal 
locations as well as rate and duration and insofar as they are ongoing they may have 
the ability to ground potentials. However in the two statements described above the 
activities in question have not yet come into existence and so cannot ground the 
potentialities. The hydrolysis reaction has not yet begun. Instead the potentialities 
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One response to this is to maintain that the entities have those potentialities 
in virtue of under lying activities, i.e. the physicochemical variables such as polarity 
or inductive effect described in the previous section of this chapter.  Consider again, 
the properties used to classify reactions; 
1.   Difference in partial atomic charges which describes the polarity of the bond 
2.  Difference in sigma electronegativities which describes the ability of an atom 
to attract electrons in a sigma bond13  
3.  Difference in pi electronegativities which describes the ability of an atom to 
attract electrons in a pi bond 14 
4.  Effective  bond  polarizability  which  describes  the  tendency  of  the  bond 
electrons to be distorted by an external electrical field 
Each of these properties can be construed as an activity when they are taking place, 
for instance when an atom is attracting the electrons in a sigma bond. Nonetheless 
the  entity  will  still possess  the  potential  to  engage  in  a  hydrolysis  reaction, for 
instance, even when the lower level activities are not manifesting themselves. This 
suggests that the potentiality is best construed as a dispositional property had by the 
relevant entity.  
So far in this section I have argued that the entities – activities ontology must 
have a modal component if it is to ground the possibility statements revealed by the 
case study. I argued that MDC hint at a modal reading of activities but do not flesh 
out this account. Secondly, I suggested that even if a modal account of activities could 
be given for some statements concerning the unfolding of reactions, this potentiality 
would  be  unable  to  capture  certain  types  of  possibility  statements  where  the 
potentiality is associated with the entities themselves. Rather, this potentiality looks 
                                                           
13 A Sigma bond is the strongest type of covalent bond formed by a head on overlapping of atomic 
orbitals 
14 A Pi bond is a weaker form of covalent bind due to a reduced overlapping between the atomic 
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to take the form of a disposition. I will discuss this claim in detail in the following 
section. 
 I will discuss the option in which MDC assert that something that akin to 
dispositions is included in virtue commitment entities and activities where this does 
the work of capturing potentiality for them. I will argue that this is misleading. I show 
that dispositional properties have an important role in scientific practice and are 
deserving of equal status to entities and activities. To play down their function in 
favour of a two category ontology of entities and activities violates the criteria of 
descriptive accuracy and explanatory unification. 
3:6:4: Descriptive Accuracy  
In the last section I argued that the entities – activities ontology is unable to 
ground  certain  possibility  statements.  The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  argue  that 
potentiality  is  an essential  ontological  apparatus  that  is  required to  ground  the 
possibility statements resulting from the classification of reactions in a descriptively 
accurate manner. I show in practice that potentiality is associated with entities but is 
treated as distinct from the entity in question and the activity-like phenomena that 
it is associated with. 
In section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 I discussed two possible characterisations of the 
property inductive effect firstly as an activity and secondly in terms of dispositions. I 
will now suggest that a concern for descriptive accuracy means we should prefer a 
characterisation  of  physicochemical  properties  such  as  inductive  effect  as 
dispositional properties. I hinted at my argument in the previous section in which I 
suggested that potentiality must be contrasted with the actuality associated with 
activities. 
In the section above I listed four properties used in chemical classification of 
enzymatic reactions as described in case study two in chapter 2. It is the possession 
of  particular  determinate  values  for  these  properties  that  ground  possibility 
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D  It is possible that X will engage in a hydrolysis reaction in the presence of 
water 
The possession of these particular properties makes it possible that X will engage in 
that particular type of reaction. In the example above if X had difference determinate 
values for these properties then it might not be possible that it engage in a hydrolysis 
reaction.  
I  suggest  that  a  characterisation  of  these  physicochemical  variables  as 
activities is misleading and they are better characterized as dispositional properties. 
The definitions of these properties given in section 3.6.3. suggest that in each case 
the property described is an ability. This is clear with properties two, three and four. 
With regards to property one, I suggest that this is also characterised as an ability as 
the property of polarity is itself characterized as the ability of a molecule to attract 
an atom or molecule with the opposite charge.  
In section 3.2 I described how Illari and Williamson state that we learn about 
the features of activities through examples. They refer to the following examples 
‘trigger,  binding,  phosphorylates,  modifying,  wrapping,  folding,  cutting,  catalyse, 
protect, opening, unwinding, supercoiling, breaking, inhibiting, stabilizing’ (Illari and 
Williamson, 2014, 4). However these examples of activities look very different to the 
properties  defined  above.  These  activities  are  described  using  verbs  whilst  the 
physicochemical variables described above are not active doings but potentials for 
activities or active doings. 
I outlined in the discussion above that MDC take activities are extended in 
time and can be individuated by their spatiotemporal location, duration and rate 
(Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000, 3). These features do not straightforwardly 
apply to the properties above. The ‘ability of an atom to attract electrons’ is not 
extended in time at those times in which it is not manifesting itself however it still 
exists at this point. It shares the same spatial temporal location as the property that 
possesses it but it does have an extension in time since it is merely ability. It is the 
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such as extension in time and duration.  Chemists use their theoretical knowledge to 
predict and explain when this ability will be manifested and how strong this ability 
will be. For instance, an atom with a strong positive charge will possess a greater 
electron attracting ability. 
A further thing to note in favour of this view is that the properties described 
above are treated as real existents even when their respective activities are not 
ongoing. A useful analogy concerns the storage of chemical entities when they are 
not in use. Care must be taken to store chemicals in a safe way, since entities possess 
the dispositional property ‘reactivity’ when they are stable, and this property must 
be treated as real for safety reasons. Similarly effective bond polarizability is treated 
as real when it is not enacted, chemists wanting to manipulate the property to a 
certain end must be careful to ensure the property isn’t stimulated by anything else 
prior to this.  
  In  addition,  the  properties  described  above  are  treated  as  independent 
existents by scientific theories. They can be associated with many different entities 
and they are given a description within scientific theories that abstracts away from 
the identity of the entities that they are associated with. This is useful in building up 
a picture of the way in which the property will behave in different situations. They 
are also treated as distinct from their manifestations although of course the two are 
related. This is significant because MDC use a similar argument in order to justify 
commitment to activities in addition to entities. They state that we can abstract away 
the entities that take part in that activity to reveal a common structure held by all 
activities of that type irrespective of the entities that take part in them. MDC use this 
fact to argue for ontological commitment to activities. 
I suggest we should follow chemical practice in distinguishing between having 
the ability to be perturbed by an electric field and the occurrence of being perturbed 
by an electric field. The way the definitions of these properties are formulated in 
chemical practice suggests we should treat these properties as dispositions. The 
manifestation of the disposition may well be better treated as an activity. I will 
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  One way in which MDC might respond to the problem of grounding possibility 
is by implicitly committing to dispositional properties via entities. I suggest that this 
approach would violate the criteria of descriptive accuracy by underplaying the role 
played by such properties in practice as well as their treatment as distinct existents. 
Consequently, I conclude that commitment to a separate and explicit category of 
dispositions is required. 
  Before going on to discuss scientific understanding it is worth mentioning a 
point highlighted earlier in chapter 2 concerning descriptive accuracy. I mentioned 
that the most accurate way to determine the course of a reaction is to give a quantum 
mechanical description of the reaction mechanism, this would give us a complete 
understanding of the reaction.  However, this is currently beyond our theoretical 
ability and the best epistemic access we have to the reaction mechanism is via 
physicochemical properties. I maintain though that even if we were to provide each 
reaction under investigation with a quantum mechanical description, this would not 
necessarily best serve the ends of our investigation. Each description would be so 
fine grained that we would be unable to see the range of similarities that might hold 
between the different reactions and a new methodology would be required to do 
this.  Perhaps  we  would  return  to  the  identifying  similarities  on  the  basis  of 
physicochemical properties of reactions. Consequently, I suggest that on the basis of 
current scientific knowledge, physicochemical properties provide the best way of 
grounding objective similarities in nature and should be treated as dispositions.  
3:5:5: Explanatory Unification 
  I will now address how the entities – activities ontology fares on the criterion 
of explanatory unification. It is helpful to refer back to 3.3 in which I characterized 
the property inductive effect and the hydrolysis reaction in terms of activities and 
then in terms of dispositional properties. I suggest both options are important for 
enhancing explanatory unification. Firstly consider the characterisation in terms of 
activities; this involves the specification of a phenomenon in terms of a lower level 
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phenomenon in terms of a lower level mechanism provides an insight into how the 
activity takes place. MDC state that ‘Descriptions of mechanisms render the end 
stage intelligible by showing how it is produced’ (Machamer, Darden & Craver, 2000, 
22).  
  In the case of the chemical reaction between ethane and hydrogen bromide 
the following reaction mechanism elucidates the various parts of the mechanism 
thus individuating the entities that undergo the change and the activities that bring 
it about. With respect to mechanisms, MDC state: 
‘To explain is not merely to re-describe one regularity as a series of several. 
Rather,  explanation  involves  revealing  the  productive  relation.  It  is  the 
unwinding, bonding, and breaking that explain protein synthesis; it is the 
binding,  bending,  and  opening  that  explain  the  activity  of  Na+  channels’ 
(Machamer, Darden & Craver, 2000, 22)   
The mechanistic description can then be used to identify other phenomena that are 
brought  about  in  the  same  way.  As  previously  mentioned,  this  is  achieved  by 
abstracting away from the individual entities involved to give a specification in terms 
of types of entities and types of activities. For example a hydrolysis reaction diagram 
increases  our  chemical  understanding  by  explaining  the  various  features  of  the 
reaction that remain the same irrespective of the entities undergoing hydrolysis. 
These general specifications then function in scientific theories by giving a unified 
account of how many instances of that mechanism take place.  
  I suggest that whilst appealing to mechanisms gives an account of how a 
reaction proceeds, an account in terms of dispositions explains why the reactions 
took place. To give an explanation of what caused each step of this we need to appeal 
to dispositional properties. To help explore this point I will refer to a possible reaction 
mechanism between hydrogen bromide and ethene illustrated in figure 19 below.  
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  The reaction can proceed in one of two ways depending on whether oxygen 
is  present  and  both  these  options  can  be  given  a  mechanistic  description.  For 
example, if an oxygen is present then a free radical from an oxygen to oxygen bond 
reacts  with  hydrogen  from  hydrogen  bromine  molecule  to  produce  a  bromine 
radical. The bromine radical then joins ethene using one of the electrons in the pi 
bond and this creates a new radical with the single electron on the other carbon 
atom. This radical reacts with another hydrogen bromine molecule and this creates 
another bromine radical to continue the process. Eventually the two free radicals hit 
each other and produce a molecule. The chain then terminates here as no new 
radicals are formed.  
  Whilst specifying this mechanism is useful, we can give a different type of 
explanation which addresses not how but why reaction took place by appealing to 
the dispositional properties had by the entities involved in the reaction.  
1.  Oxygen molecules are disposed to be highly reactive due to the extra pair of 
electrons in the outer shell known as free radicals 
2.  Bromine is disposed to attract hydrogen in order to share its electron 
3.  A hydrogen ion is disposed to be highly reactive as a result of having only one 
electron in its outer shell.  
4.  A bromine ion is disposed to attract electrons in order to become more stable, 
it manifests this disposition by reacting with the covalent pi bond 
5.  Free radical electrons are disposed to be highly reactive due to their having 
only one electron in their outer shell. 
It  is  these  dispositional  properties  that  explain  the  change  in  virtue  of  being 
producers of the change. This relates to my argument in the previous section in which 
commitment  to  dispositional  properties  is  required  to  accommodate  the  causal 
powers had by entities.   
Illari  and  Williamson  suggested  that  activities  improve  understanding  for 
three  reasons;  activities  are  epistemically  prior  to  capacities,  activities  are 
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them as distinct beings rather than reducing them to dispositions. My concern for 
explanatory unification is similar to Illari and Williamson’s drive for better scientific 
understanding, however I am not primarily concerned with debates over whether 
activities  have  priority  over  dispositions  or  vice  versa.  Rather,  I’m  interested  in 
whether activities or dispositions are descriptively fit for purpose with respect to the 
classification of reactions. Part of being descriptively fit for purpose involves giving 
explanations that unify many phenomena in such a way that promotes the fruitful 
development of science. In this respect I suggest that a commitment to dispositions 
is just as important to providing productive scientific explanations as a commitment 
to activities. It is physicochemical properties that are crucial to explaining why the 
reaction proceeded in the way it did and are relevant to meeting the assumption that 
entities with similar physicochemical variables will engage in similar reactions, on 
which classification is based.  
I suggest that this is a particular instance of a more general relationship 
between entities, activities and dispositions and that this relationship is essential to 
the fruitful progression of science via enhancing scientific unification. Dispositions 
serve the function of anchoring activities to entities. Their function is to trigger a 
particular  activity  (in  this  case  a  reaction  mechanism).  This  relationship  is 
symmetrical since the end product of a given activity will be entities with certain 
dispositional properties.  If different dispositions anchor processes to entities, then 
different  activities  will  produce  entities  with  different  dispositional  properties. 
Consequently, I suggest that a unified explanation of chemical reactions and their 
classification requires commitment to dispositions as well as entities and activities.  I 
will return to the relation between entities, dispositions and activities in chapter 6 of 
my thesis, in which I argue for a three category ontology.  
3:6:6: Conclusion 
In this chapter I have assessed whether the entities – activities ontology 
proposed  by  MDC  is  capable  of  accommodating  the  classification  of  chemical 
reactions in practice. I was motivated by the appeal to mechanisms in realist accounts                                                                                           Chapter 3: Entities and Activities Ontology 
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of natural kind classification and the need to address the status of mechanisms as an 
ontological components for a metaphysics for the classification of reactions. 
I began by giving an account of activities as they are outlined by MDC and 
further developed by Illari and Williamson. I showed that the use of the term activity 
by MDC is consistent with its use by chemists in QSAR.  I’ve argued that appealing to 
mechanisms  in  virtue  of  the  entities  –  activities  ontology  is  not  sufficient  to 
accommodate  classificatory  practice.  I  suggested  that  to  meet  the  criteria  of 
capturing  objective  similarities  the  ontology  must  be  able  to  ground  possibility 
statements and outlined an interpretation of MDC’s account on which activities are 
treated as modal. I discussed how MDC might flesh out the modal nature of activities 
in  practice  and  concluded  that  even  if  activities  could  ground  certain  types  of 
potentialities  the  possibility  statements  regarding  entities  and  their  relation  to 
reactions mean a commitment to dispositions is required in addition to activities. This 
claim is supported by the appeal to something resembling dispositional properties in 
chemical practice and the use of dispositional properties in achieving explanatory 
unification.  
In this chapter I have begun the project of addressing which ontological 
components are required for a metaphysics of classification in practice. I argued that 
an entities – activities ontology is not sufficient without additional commitment to 
dispositions. This provides important resources for chapter 6 when I return to the 
question of which realist approach to kind classification, if any, is appropriate for the 
classification of reactions in practice. The successful candidate must include a place 
for dispositional properties. In the next chapter I will examine whether an ontology 
of  entities  and  dispositions  is  sufficient  without  the  additional  commitment  to 
something resembling MDC’s activities.    Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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Chapter 4: Can entities and dispositions 
capture the classification of chemical 
reactions in practice? 
4:1: Introduction 
The aim of my thesis is to provide a metaphysics for the classification of 
chemical reactions in practice. I began in chapter 1 by outlining existing approaches 
to classification in the current natural kind literature and suggesting these accounts 
cannot straightforwardly accommodate the classification of non-entity like things. In 
chapter 2 I assessed two case studies from chemical practice and questioned what a 
metaphysics of classification must be like if it is to accommodate this practice. I drew 
out three criteria that a metaphysics must meet if it is to be descriptively fit for 
purpose. I then related this discussion of practice to the accounts of classification 
outlined in chapter 1. I suggested that strong essentialist constructivist approaches 
to classification are not appropriate.  
This leaves a variety of weak realist positions which each have the potential 
to  be  adapted  to  accommodate  the  classification  of  entities.  Each  account  is 
committed  to  different  ontological  apparatus  such  as  mechanisms,  dispositional 
properties,  and  processes.  In  order  to  adjudicate  which  account  is  the  most 
appropriate  to  classifying  reactions  I’ve  suggested  we  need  to  establish  which 
ontological components are required for a metaphysics of classification.  
In  chapter  3,  I  focused  on  the  commitment  to  mechanisms  where  this 
commitment is via the entities - activities ontology. I concluded that if the entities - 
activities ontology is to accommodate the classification of reactions in practice then 
it must be adjusted to include an additional ontological category of dispositions.     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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In this chapter I will address whether the entities - dispositions ontology is 
sufficient for accommodating the classification of chemical reactions in practice, 
without for instance, additional commitment to MDC’s activities. In section 4.1 I’ll 
examine the difference between the way in which entities and reactions are treated 
in practice, in section 4.2 I’ll examine the difference between the way dispositional 
properties and reactions are treated in practice. In section 4.3, I’ll refer to previous 
discussion to show that the classification of reactions cannot be accommodated 
using collections of entities and dispositions in a way that is descriptively fit for 
purpose.  I  will  conclude  that  a  third  category  is  required  to  accommodate  the 
classification and will highlight some of the features that this category must have if it 
is to be compatible with practice. I will call this third category of ‘processes’. 
4:2: Reactions and Entities: a Comparison  
My aim in this section is to compare the classification of reactions to the way 
in which chemists treat entities in practice. By comparing the treatment of entities 
and reactions I will conclude that for the purposes of a metaphysics of classification 
in practice, they should be considered as distinct types of ontological entity. I show 
that there are two key differences between entities and reactions; the first concerns 
their relation to change and the second concerns the way in which they are extended 
in time. I will conclude this section with an account of the characteristics of reactions 
that  cannot  be  accommodated  by  the  category  of  entities  and  must  be 
accommodated by dispositions or some combination of entities and dispositions if 
the entities - dispositions ontology is to be sufficient.  
The relation of entities and reactions to change is described by Gasteiger and 
Engel in their introduction to chemoinformatics. They state that; ‘chemistry deals 
with compounds and their properties and their transformations, thus, two objects 
have to be considered, compounds and chemical reactions, the static and dynamic 
aspects of chemistry’ (Gasteiger and Engel, 2008, 1).     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
156 
 
This indicates that from the perspective of descriptive accuracy, reactions 
cannot be assimilated into the category of entities but also that they are applicable 
to different areas of practice. Firstly reactions are the dynamic aspect of chemistry 
which are responsible for chemical change; ‘compounds are transformed into each 
other by chemical reactions’ (Gasteiger and Engel, 2008, 1). 
Not  all  instances  of  change  occur  as  a  result  of  reactions,  for  example, 
mixtures and changes of states involve change but not the making and breaking of 
bonds. However the notion of reactions as dynamic happenings is a crucial part of 
chemical practice as reactions are a key means by which entities change.  
Entities on the other hand are considered to be static unless they are in a 
state of undergoing change. Entities can change by gaining or losing properties; for 
instance a hydrogen atom retains its token identity whilst changing when it gains and 
loses kinetic energy. Alternatively entities can change by gaining and loosing parts. 
At the level of atoms or molecules this might happen by gaining or losing electrons. 
Note, however that at the level of molecular chemistry the properties of molecules 
that determine identity tend to be microstructural so it is likely that in some cases 
the gain or loss of electrons would affect token identity.  
I  suggest  that  in  order  to  be  descriptively  accurate  our  ontology  must 
preserve the relation between the thing that changes and the change itself and thus 
not assimilate reactions into the category of entities. This is also important if our 
ontology is to be able to capture the kind of similarities identified in section 3.6.3. 
Consider, again, the following similarity statements;  
B:   It is possible that reaction x will increase in rate in the presence of increased 
heat supply 
C:  It is possible that y will engage in a hydrolysis reaction in the presence of 
water 
Statement B which concerns a reaction and cannot be reduced to a statement about 
entities. It is not the entities themselves that are increasing in speed i.e. moving     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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faster around the container (although this may also occur). Rather, it is the rate at 
which the entities are transformed from one type to another that increases in rate at 
higher  temperatures.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  these  two  situations  for  the 
purpose of meeting the criteria of explanatory unification. An accurate explanation 
of why the reaction increased in rate must be an explanation about the reaction 
itself; such an explanation would accommodate the fact that it is conceivable that 
the speed of the entities in solution increases but the rate of reaction does not, as a 
result of other limiting factors. Therefore in order to be descriptively fit for purpose 
we must treat reactions and entities as distinct.  
We can build on this picture of entities and reactions by thinking about how 
chemical change is enacted. In section 1.2 I made a distinction between an individual 
reaction  mechanism  and  the  reaction  as  a  whole.  The  reaction  mechanism  is 
represented by a reaction diagram and describes how individual atoms react with 
each other. The reaction mechanism specifies the rearrangement of the atoms and 
bonds from the reactants to the end product. However, any single reaction will 
involve many atoms and therefore many individual reaction mechanisms. The exact 
number of reaction mechanisms will depend on the number of moles of starting 
products used. The complete collection of reaction mechanisms is referred is known 
as  the  reaction.  If  we  look  to  chemical  practice  we  can  see  that  both  reaction 
mechanisms  and  reactions  are  treated  as  extended  in  time,  each  with  distinct 
temporal intervals in a way that chemical entities are not. 
Firstly  consider  the  case  of  enzymatic  reaction  mechanisms  discussed  in 
chapter 2. The resultant classification schemes saw reactions clustered into groups 
on the basis of similar features; one of these included a similarity in the number of 
bonds broken during the reaction. In reference to those reactions that broke two 
bonds in the reaction mechanism the following was said; 
‘It  should  be  emphasized  that  two  bonds  are  not  necessarily  broken 
simultaneously in these reactions catalyzed by a single enzyme. Either in the 
breaking of a bond another bond changes its bond order or, after the first 
bond  is  broken,  a  second  consecutive  step  follows  (which  might  be     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
158 
 
spontaneous). However, overall, eventually two bonds are broken or change 
bond order’ (Sacher, Reitz and Gasteiger, 2009, 1529). 
This supports the claim that in at least in some cases, a reaction mechanism is 
extended over time. This concurs with our intuitions about how reactions proceed 
and  indeed  our  understanding  of  reaction  mechanisms  which  provides.  These 
reaction mechanisms provide a step by step account of how a reaction proceeds 
specifying the starting material, the bonds broken, the order in which this occurs, the 
intermediate material formed and the end product. 
The fact that chemists present reaction mechanisms in a step wise fashion 
gives us further reason to consider them to be non-instantaneous. We refer to the 
different parts of the reaction mechanisms as occupying different temporal regions; 
the reaction is never wholly present at any one moment. 
In addition to reaction mechanisms, the overall reaction that the individual 
mechanisms constitutes is also extended in time. We might be inclined to agree with 
this on the basis of our own empirical experience, such as conducting experiments in 
chemistry classrooms and measuring the time it took for the reaction to come to 
completion. Again, this discussion suggests that to be descriptively accurate we must 
treat reactions as consisting of temporal intervals. The extension of reactions in time 
can be demonstrated more conclusively by appealing to the field of chemical kinetics; 
the study of the rates of chemical reactions. I will refer to this discussion of chemical 
kinetics throughout the rest of this chapter.  
The speed at which a chemical reaction proceeds is known as the rate of 
reaction. We know that there is a wide variety in the rates of chemical reactions from 
very slow reactions, such as iron rusting, to extremely fast reactions, such as the 
electron transfer processes involved in biological systems or combustion reactions. 
When chemists refer to the rate of reactions, more specifically, they are appealing to 
the rate at which the products are formed from reactants. Therefore to measure a 
reaction rate, chemists monitor the concentration of one of the reactants or products     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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as a function of time and the resulting value will have units of concentration per unit 
time, mol dm-3 s-1. 
This definition of the rate of reaction requires one further adaptation to 
accommodate the stochiometry of the reaction i.e. the number of moles of each 
reactant and product appearing in the reaction equation. For example, the reaction 
equation for the well-known Haber process used industrially to produce ammonia, 
is: 
N2 + 3H2 -> 2NH3 
where N2 has a stochiometric coefficient of 1, H2 has a coefficient of 3, and NH3 has 
a coefficient of 2.  The rate of this reaction could be determined in any one of three 
ways, by monitoring the changing concentration of N2, H2, or NH3. However because 
of the difference in molarity we will get different values for the rate of reaction 
depending on what we choose to measure. Since the same reaction cannot have two 
different rates the definition of the rate of reaction is defined as the rate of change 
of the concentration of a reactant or product divided by its stoichiometric coefficient. 
A study of chemical kinetics also reveals some of the factors that increase rate 
of  reaction  such  as  concentration,  temperature,  pressure  and  the  presence  of 
enzymes. We also know that when all environmental conditions are kept constant 
the rate of reaction will naturally decrease over time. The reason for this is that each 
reaction  begins  with  a  certain  quantity  of  reactants  and  in  order  to  undergo  a 
reaction mechanism they must collide with a sufficient amount of energy. Over time 
more and more of the reactants manage to collide with enough energy and the yield 
of the reaction increases. As there are fewer and fewer reactants remaining the time 
taken for successful collisions is longer, meaning the frequency of collisions between 
those  reactants  and  therefore  the  rate  of  reaction  slows  down.  The  notion  of 
reactions  as  extended  in  time  is  crucial  for  capturing  the  similarities  between 
reactions. For example, reactions clustering together in the reaction landscape will 
have their rates affected in similar ways by similarities in environmental conditions. 
They are likely to be affected in the same way by, changes in PH, temperature and     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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pressure. To capture these kinds of similarity the notion of reactions with temporal 
intervals is required.  
The  notion  of  reactions  as  extended  in  time  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  the 
treatment  of entities.  I’ve  already  highlighted that  entities  are treated  as  static 
existents. We can now add they are treated as wholly present at all times at which 
that entity exists, this is because an entity does not have temporal parts in the way 
that reactions do. This can be seen from the specification of entities in terms of static 
structural descriptions and this is the case regardless of the level of detail utilised by 
the  chemist.  The  diagram  below  describes  a  hierarchical  scheme  for  the 
representation of a molecule with different amounts of chemical information.  
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Figure 20: The structural representations of entities (Gasteiger and Engel, 2008 17) 
The simplest 2D graphical representations are structure diagrams in which atoms are 
typified  by  their  atomic  symbols  and  the  bonding  electrons  by  illustrated  lines. 
Although  this  is  an  incomplete  and  highly  simplified  representation  it  allows 
emphasis to be placed on the most relevant part of the molecule. It’s claimed that 
‘the 2D graphical representation of chemical structures in structure diagrams can be 
considered the universal ‘natural language of chemists’ (Gasteiger and Engel, 2008, 
170). In chemical practice it is a structural formulation of this kind that describes the 
token identity of the molecule.  
A more complex account of the molecule describes the topology by which 
atoms are connected specifying the type of bonds and the 3D arrangement of the 
atoms in the molecule e.g. the positions of the atoms in space, and the angle and     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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distances between the atoms in the molecule. I discussed this account of chemical 
entities in section 1.9 and mentioned in particular Hendry’s assertion that a 3D 
specification of this sort was needed to differentiate between isomers of the same 
compound. Whilst this account gives rise to vague boundaries between kinds it is still 
a static representation of the compound.  The final, most complex, account of entities 
involves a specification of the electrostatic potential at each point on the entity’s 
surface. These static descriptions of entities concur with the way in which entity 
classification  is  discussed  in  the  natural  kind  literature.  The  entities  involved  in 
classification, whether they be gold, water or tigers, are wholly present at each 
moment at which they exist. As a result I suggest that the best way to capture the 
metaphysical  picture  of  the  way  entities  are  conceived  in  practice  is  on  the  3-
dimensionalist perspective.  
The key tenet of the 3-dimentionalist view is that objects have three spatial 
dimensions and also endure through time. However the sense in which an object 
endures  through  time  is  different  to  the  sense  in  which  it  exists  in  the  spatial 
dimensions. According to the 3-dimensionalist when an object exists in time it wholly 
exists at that time. My computer exists wholly in time at time 12:55 just as it did at 
12:50. In order to accommodate this the 3-dimensionalist must adopt a notion of 
identity that is strong enough to allow us to maintain that it is the same computer at 
12:50 and 12:55 and weak enough to allow that the computer may have undergone 
some change.  This is in contrast to the way in which my computer exists in space via 
a collection of spatial parts that each occupies a distinct spatial region (Rea, 2003). 
We can then apply this view to my case study. Since objects exist wholly at all 
the times through which they endure then it follows on the 3-dimensionalist view 
that objects do not have temporal parts, although of course, there may be spans of 
time that are associated with different periods at which the object exists.  Your 
childhood, for instance, constitutes a temporal part of your life but this temporal 
interval is not a part of the object that is you but is a part of your lifespan which runs 
alongside your you When applied to my chemical case study we can state that     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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entities are wholly present alongside a temporal interval that constitutes the lifespan 
of the entity. This is in contrast to the way in which reactions exist in space and time.  
One might object to the 3-dimensionalist conception of chemical entities by 
appealing to Dupré’s account of processes. Dupré refers to; 
‘conflict between, on the one hand, life itself as a hierarchy of dynamic and 
constantly  changing  processes  and,  on  the  other  hand,  our  scientific 
understanding  of  living  things  as  grounded  on  a  picture  of  mechanistic 
interactions between fixed and statically defined components’  (Dupré, 2012, 
85). 
He attempts to resolve this conflict by arguing that the world is a world of processes 
and processes have ontological priority. We get the illusion of stable entities when 
we abstract away from the processes that maintain these entities. He states that ‘key 
concepts  in  biology…are  static  abstractions  from  life  processes,  and  different 
abstractions provide different perspectives on these processes’ (Dupré, 2012, 85). 
Dupré might assert that the entities involved in chemical reactions look static 
but  if  viewed  from  a  quantum  mechanical  perspective  they  are  maintained  by 
numerous processes such as chemical bonding. It is these processes that together 
maintain the  stability of the  entity by  retaining  its  equilibrium.  Dupré  raises  an 
interesting question regarding whether commitment to entities is required. I suggest 
that there is good reason to reject Dupré’s objection. I will hint at my response in this 
section and return to this point in my positive proposal in chapter 6.  
My aim is to provide the most appropriate metaphysics for the classification 
of reactions in practice. In order to meet the criterion of descriptively fit for purpose 
we need to preserve the relation between change and the thing that is changed. We 
need to be able to capture the way in which change is brought about where this is 
something different to stable entities.  
In addition, it is particularly important that entities are treated as distinct 
from the change itself if chemists are to meet the aims of their inquiry. Entities must 
be treated in the way described above in order to use the similarity relations revealed     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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by  the  classification  scheme  to  make  predictions,  and  promote  explanatory 
unification via the fruitful development of science.  
Firstly, similarity relations are identified using QSAR and as I described in 
section 2.3.1. this involves a three stage process. In stage one, a rough classification 
is used to identify a set of reactions that on the basis of prior theoretical knowledge 
are known to be similar to each other. Typically, this involves identifying reactions 
that involve similar entities. The motivation for this step is that reactions involving 
the same atoms and bonds are more likely to exhibit higher level similarities, such as 
instantiating the same reactions. Therefore the first stage of classification requires 
making a distinction between static entities with the potential to undergo a change 
and reactions as constituting the change itself. The second stage of classification is 
the application of QSAR prior to the application of neural networking in stage three.  
The second stage of classification involves an analysis of the properties had by the 
different entities to determine what sort of changes that particular entity might 
undergo.  Both  of  these  aspects  require  a  commitment  to  entities  as  well  as 
dispositions. I will discuss this further in chapter 6. 
4:3: Reactions and Dispositions: a Comparison  
In chapter 2 I argued that at least some of the physicochemical variables used 
to classify chemical reactions are best characterised as dispositional properties. In 
this section I will compare chemists’ treatment of reactions to their treatment of 
these  physicochemical  properties  (or  dispositional  properties).  I  will  use  this 
discussion  to  show  they  are  sufficiently  different  to  reject  the  possibility  that 
reactions are appropriately characterised as dispositional properties.  
I will begin this section by returning to my discussion of dispositions in chapter 
3. I previously argued that the entities – activities ontology is insufficient to capture 
the classification of chemical reactions on the grounds that activities lacked the 
required  potentiality  to  make  sense  of  predictive  statements  and  therefore 
dispositions are needed to fill this theoretical hole. I highlighted a conception of     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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dispositional  properties  on  which  they  are  thought  to  be  potencies;  they  are 
potentials  that  exist  when  they  are  not  manifesting  themselves.  I  will  focus  on 
potentiality as a defining feature of dispositions.  
More  specifically  dispositions  are  potentials  for  something  in  particular  to 
happen;  for  example  a  glass  has  the  potential  to  break  whilst  oxygen  has  the 
potential to combine with hydrogen etc. With respect to my chemical case study I 
suggested  in  section  3.4.3  that  dispositions  are  required  to  accommodate  the 
following type of statements. 
B:   It is possible that reaction x will increase in rate in the presence of increased 
heat supply 
C:  It is possible that y will engage in a hydrolysis reaction in the presence of 
water 
Both statements are used by chemists to make predictions and tell us what has the 
potential to happen under certain conditions. Statement C refers to a potential had 
by one entity whilst statement B predicts how a reaction may change under the 
influence of certain environmental conditions.   
We  can  begin  to  compare  reactions  and  dispositions  by  looking  at  how 
reactions are treated in practice. I show that treating a reaction as a potential is an 
initially intuitive option however I argue that this option neglects half of the story 
about the nature of reactions. 
One option might be to assert that if reactions are dispositions then they must 
be a potential for something to happen. Therefore just as an entity has a potential to 
engage in a reaction, similarly a reaction has a potential to bring about a certain end 
product. This is compatible with statement one above. For instance it seems fairly 
intuitive to state that the hydrolysis reaction has the potential to bring about the end 
product  Z.  We  can  even explain how this  is  achieved  by  giving  an  approximate 
specification of the mechanisms by which a hydrolysis reaction operates. The notion 
of a reaction as a potential for the end product can also be made compatible with     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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statement two above, if we accept the existence of a causal chain. We can treat the 
reaction as an intermediate step in the transitive causal chain leading from entities 
to end products.  
There  is  something  intuitively  appealing  about  treating  reactions  as 
potentials. Reactions are directed towards a certain end product just as a disposition 
is  a  potential  for  some  F  to  manifest.  In  addition  there  is  an  absence  or 
incompleteness associated with reactions, a reaction may be ongoing but is still 
incomplete until the appropriate end product has been brought about. This is also 
the case with dispositions. Reactions and dispositions are also alike in that they bring 
about their own destruction. The reaction is complete only when it has brought about 
the appropriate end product. It ceases to occur because the entity ceases to have 
that potential; it has been actualised. 
Nonetheless, there is an opposing intuition which suggests that a reaction is 
more than a mere potential, but is in fact actual; we might consider a reaction as a 
happening or a coming to be. This coming to be is not passive in the sense that a glass 
has  the  property  of  being  fragile  but  might  not  manifest  the  corresponding 
manifestation ‘breaking’. On the contrary, the reaction is an active directedness 
towards the potential such that it eventually brings about the destruction of the 
potential. In other words, the reaction is ongoing.  I suggest that a conception of 
reactions as active and ongoing is crucial if our account is to be descriptively fit for 
purpose. 
This coming to be is akin to the process of unfolding that I discussed earlier in 
section  4.2  where  I  described  how  a  reaction  is  extended  in  time  with  distinct 
temporal intervals. The reaction is not wholly present at any one moment in the way 
that an object might be, nonetheless a part of the reaction is present and is actual at 
any one moment at which it is taking place. This indicates a difference between the 
sorts of potentials that I discussed in chapter 3 and the notion of a reaction as a 
potential. The entity waiting in the test tube has the potential to engage in a reaction 
just as the reaction also has the potential to bring about an end product. However 
the reaction is also bringing about the end product; it is bringing about a change. In     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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this sense it looks like the reaction is both actual and a potential. It is not clear that 
the dispositionalist can accommodate this required level of actuality.  
This is related to the always packing, never travelling objection against the 
dispositionalist according to which dispositionalism contains too much potentiality 
and not  enough  actuality  (Molnar,  2003).  I previously  outlined this  objection  in 
section 3.6.3. The claim is the dispositionalist view is problematic because there is 
nothing that brings actuality to the world. Metaphysically speaking, on this view we 
can only refer to the passing around of powers that do not instance themselves or 
pass into actuality since there is nothing in our ontological framework beyond that 
potentiality. In section 3.5 I argued that the entities – activities ontology does not 
have access to enough potentiality to capture my case study. I now argue that the 
lack of actuality on a dispositionalist account of nature is a reason to doubt it can 
accommodate the classification of reactions. I will return to this point in my positive 
proposal in chapter 6.  
There is also an additional sense in which reactions should be considered as 
an active coming to be. I suggest that we can conceive of interfering with reactions 
and as a result reactions must be treated as at least partially actual. For example, 
enzymatic reactions operate under highly specific conditions. The reaction landscape 
allows chemists to predict such conditions on the basis of their knowledge of similar 
reactions.  An  important  piece  of  information  is  the  optimum  temperature  for 
enzyme functionality, if the enzyme exceeds this temperature the reaction ceases to 
occur. This means that we could in practice stop a reaction whilst it was under way, 
perhaps  when  only  half  the  expected  yield  had  been  produced  by  altering  the 
temperature.  In  this  case  we  would not  want to  say  that  the  reaction  had  not 
occurred because it hadn’t reached completion, rather we would state that the 
reaction  had  partially  occurred.  I  suggest  that  a  descriptively  accurate 
characterisation  of  reactions  involved  a  recognition  that  reactions  have  both 
potential and occurrent components. In this case the reaction has actively occurs but 
has the potential to occur further. The relation between the potentiality and actuality 
is dependent on the unfolding of the reaction.      Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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One might object to this by citing the difference between a reaction and a 
reaction mechanism. We could stop a reaction half way through and maintain only 
that some of the reaction mechanisms required for the whole reaction to come to 
completion had not yet occurred. Perhaps then the potentiality lies in the individual 
reaction mechanism where these constitute the dispositions and the reaction is a 
collection of manifesting dispositions? 
In the previous section I showed that both the reaction and the reaction 
mechanism are extended in time; therefore the reaction should also be considered 
an active unfolding just as the overall reaction is considered in this way. On a much 
smaller time frame we can conceive of halting an individual reaction mechanism and 
stating that some of the reaction mechanism had occurred although the potentiality 
for the end product had not been exhausted. 
The intuition that reactions are more than dispositions is also supported by 
the fact that reactions are measurable and this is a key aspect of chemical practice. 
Rate diagrams allow chemists to plot the speed at which a reaction is occurring at 
each point at which the reaction is extended in time.  
The concept of a reaction as a change is particularly important here as it is 
how chemists tend to conceive of reactions. I stated at the start of this chapter that 
chemists conceive of entities and reactions as two distinct components where by 
reactions  are  dynamic  and  bring  about  a  change  in  entities.  However  reactions 
themselves are capable of undergoing change as well as being the means by which 
reactions change. I explained in the last section that the rate of reaction tends to 
decrease over time as molecules are used up in the reaction so the time between 
collisions becomes longer, thus the reaction slows down. However, there are ways in 
which this can be negated. If we were to increase the temperature for example the 
molecules would have more kinetic energy and so the probability of two molecules 
colliding with enough energy to react will be increased. In addition if we were to 
increase the pressure of the reaction region then the reactants would occupy a 
smaller spatial region and so the frequency of collisions would be increased. The rate 
of  reaction  can  also  be  altered  by  manipulating  the  environmental  conditions.     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
169 
 
Chemists therefore conceive of reactions as capable of changing and the reaction 
identity  as  preserved  through  this  change.  This  must  be  accommodated  in  our 
metaphysics if we are to capture similarities between how different reactions change 
under environmental conditions as revealed by the reaction landscape and provide 
the respective explanation. 
I suggest that in order to provide a metaphysical basis for changing chemical 
reactions we need to treat the reaction as actualising rather than a mere potential. 
This is because it is unintuitive to state that things that are potentials can also 
undergo change. Potentials might go in and out of existence but they cannot change 
in the way that chemical reactions speed up and slow down. Potencies are associated 
with determinate values, for instance an entity might have a charge of -1 so the 
determinate  value  for  the  disposition  is  -1.  If  the  entity  then  becomes  more 
negatively changed and has a change of -3 then we would say that the disposition 
charge has the determinate value -3. In order to get from a charge of -1 to a charge 
of -3, it is not the case that the potency itself changes from one value to another, 
rather the entity itself changes by occupying one distinct value over another. The 
claim that reactions are dispositions looks to be inconsistent with the claim that 
reactions undergo change or at least it is unclear how to unify these two propositions. 
I  avoid  this  problem  with  my  positive  proposal  on  the  metaphysics  of  types  of 
reactions as outlined in chapter 6.  
One might object to the idea that reactions change by asserting that this can 
be captured by the nature of dispositions; for instance by the presence of finks and 
antidotes. However, this would not be sufficient to accommodate the changing of 
reactions. Our ability to manipulate and interfere with reactions occurs whilst the 
reaction is ongoing and actualising itself where the reactions retain their identity 
through this change. 
It’s not clear that it’s possible to characterise the manipulability of reactions 
using finks and antidotes. Finkish dispositions occur because of a time delay between 
the  occurrence  of  the  stimulus  for  manifestation  and  the  occurrence  of  the 
manifestation  and  this  allows  for  the  object  to  lose  the  disposition  before  the     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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manifestation  has  had  an  opportunity  to  come  about  (Bird,  2007,  25).  The 
manipulability associated with finkish dispositions does not convey a change at the 
level of actuality that would coincide with the reaction getting faster or slower. 
Rather,  the  presence  of  finks  represents  a  failure  of  particular  dispositions  to 
manifest as a result of finks. The same is true in the case of antidotes which occur 
before the manifestation of a disposition and break the causal chain leading to the 
manifestation so that if fails to occur (Bird, 2007 27). Again, antidotes cannot capture 
the manipulability which results in a changing chemical reaction. Antidotes bring 
about a change at the level of potentiality but this change is not reflected in the 
actuality of the disposition or reaction. Finks and antidotes, are however still relevant 
to explaining why certain environmental conditions which are disposed to bring 
about certain effects, fail to do so but they cannot capture our ability to manipulate 
reactions when they are in actuality. 
4:4: Reactions as Collections of Entities and Dispositions 
One way to preserve the idea that reactions are dispositions is to reject the 
premise that reactions change. It could be claimed instead that a single reaction 
involves  the  instantiation  of  many  dispositional  properties  each  with  different 
determinate values, in such a way that corresponds to the perceived change. On this 
view a reaction is associated with multiple entities and their dispositional properties. 
In  this  section  I  will  discuss  the  claim  that the  metaphysical  framework  for  the 
classification of reactions can be provided by taking reactions to be collections of 
entities and dispositions. I will argue that this option should be rejected on the 
grounds that it violates the criteria of descriptive accuracy, similarity and explanatory 
unification. I argue that there are important characteristics of reactions that cannot 
be accommodated on this view due to the problem of arity.  
The issue of arity has been discussed by Illari and Williamson (2013) when 
they describe the properties of MDC’s activities. They suggest that entities have a 
one  to  many  arity  such  that  one  entity  can  attach  itself  to  many  dispositional 
properties. Dispositional properties, on the other hand have a one to one arity     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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meaning that one token property can only attach to one entity at a time. In their 
paper In Defence of Activities (2013) Illari and Williamson argue that the restricted 
arity of dispositions leads in some cases to a skewed characterisation of scientific 
phenomena. They discuss cases such as osmosis and suggest that the phenomenon 
require many entities and many properties to occur. In addition, an account of the 
relations  between  all  of  these  entities  and  properties  is  required  for  a  full 
characterisation  of  the  phenomenon.  For  example,  no  single  entity  has  the 
dispositions ‘to osmose’ rather the phenomenon occurs as a result of the many 
interactions  between  the  different  entities  engaged  in  the  system  (Illari  and 
Williamson, 2013, 13). They conclude that we should prefer characterising scientific 
phenomena using activities rather than dispositions since activities have multiple 
arity and can attach to many entities and dispositions. In what follows, I argue that 
reactions also have a multiple arity. They should be treated as a system that cannot 
be reduced to their constituent parts.  
Illari  and  Williamson  also  add  that  there  are  some  phenomena  where  a 
characterisation in terms of entities and dispositions is appropriate and the problem 
of arity does not apply. They state; 
‘This point does not apply equally to all activities, since there are some that 
are not symmetrical and some that attach quite naturally to a single entity. 
Consider  catalysis  –  the  relation  between  the  catalyst  and  the  reaction 
catalysed is asymmetric’ (Illari and Williamson, 2013, 17). 
In the next section I will push the claims by Illari and Williamson further and show 
that even cases that look to be well accommodated by an ontology of dispositions, 
such as reaction catalysis, will turn out to be problematic when we study the chemical 
practice in more detail.  
To explore this problem consider again the reaction between ethane and 
hydrogen bromide to give bromoethane. I will use this reaction to illustrate my point 
because of its simple and well understood reaction mechanism. The conclusions of 
this discussion apply equally to the reactions undergoing classification in the case     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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studies described in chapter 2. The equation for the reaction can be described as 
follows; 
C2H4 + HBr - > C2H5Br  
Each reaction mechanism as described above involves multiple entities however the 
reaction itself involves many instances of the reaction mechanism depending on the 
number of moles of each reactant that are used. If it is to be successful then the 
entities -dispositions ontology must be able to account for both of these aspects as 
both are crucial to practice. An account of the reaction mechanism is important for 
determining how the reaction will proceed and which end products will be formed. 
An account of the reaction as a whole or what I refer to as a reaction system is vital 
for capturing similarities regarding the activation energy or reaction velocity and 
explaining these phenomena.15 
It is helpful to begin the discussion with an account of how the reaction 
mechanism works. Bromoethene is an alkene which means that it contains two 
carbon atoms held together by a double bond. The double bond is present because 
both carbon atoms are disposed towards a stable state which is achieved by having 
a maximum number of electrons in their outer shell. Therefore both carbon atoms 
are disposed to bond with each other in order to share two sets of electrons. The 
carbon atoms each bond to a hydrogen atom in virtue of also being disposed towards 
a more stable state.  
In the case of hydrogen bromide, both the hydrogen and bromine also bond 
covalently due to them being disposed to achieve stability. This results in an unequal 
sharing of the electrons since bromine has a stronger positive charge and thus is able 
to  exert  a  greater  attractive  disposition  than  the  hydrogen.  This  results  in  the 
hydrogen  bromide  molecule  being  polar  with  a  partial  positive  charge  on  the 
hydrogen and a partial negative charge on the bromide.  
                                                           
15 Typically when we refer to a reaction, for example by pointing at a test tube,  we are referring to 
the overall reaction system     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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The  reaction  begins  with  the  partially  charged  hydrogen  acting  as  an 
electrophile (a substance with a strong attraction to a negative region in another 
substance). The hydrogen manifests this disposition and takes a pair of electrons 
from the double bond of the bromoethene leaving a single shared pair of electrons 
between the carbon atoms and a negatively charged bromine ion. This bromine ion 
is  then  attracted  to  the  carbon  atom  forming  bromoethene  and  the  reaction 
mechanism is complete. I suggest that we are able to characterise the unfolding of 
this reaction mechanism in terms of entities and dispositions despite their restricted 
arities, however the situation is more difficult in the case of the whole reaction.  
No single entity engages in a reaction; rather a reaction with one mole of 
reactants will involve 12 x 10  23 atoms where each of these atoms undergoes a 
separate reaction mechanism.  It is the sum of these reaction mechanisms that 
constitutes the reaction. In addition, it is the interactions between the entities as the 
reaction is under way that is crucial in giving a descriptively accurate account of the 
properties of the overall reaction. The restricted arity of entities and dispositions 
means such an account is not possible on the entities - dispositions account. I argue 
this also prevents the entities – dispositions ontology meeting the requirements of, 
similarity and explanatory unification and as a result it is not descriptively fit for 
purpose with respect to the classification of chemical reactions.  
 The assumption behind the investigation into the classification of reactions 
is that the reactions falling within the same cluster will typically be catalysed by the 
same enzyme or a closely related protein molecule. Therefore the similarity relations 
allow chemists to better predict which protein molecules will act as enzymes for 
which reactions. In addition, similar reactions will have similar reaction properties 
such as initial velocity, maximum velocity and activation energy and so will proceed 
in the same way. This allows chemists to predict important features of the reaction 
related to set up requirements, and yield. It also allows chemists to manipulate the 
reaction on a large scale, for instance altering the rate as required. These predictions 
are essential if the classification is to be used for industry applications as discussed 
in chapter 2.      Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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The problem for the dispositionalist is that the increased predictive power 
chemists  want  to  achieve  by  manipulating  similarity  relation  is  with  respect  to 
properties like initial velocity, maximum velocity and activation energy. However 
these properties result from characterising the reaction as a whole system involving 
many reaction mechanisms where the system has a multiple arity. 
Consider the property of reaction velocity otherwise known as the rate of 
reaction.  I  previously  described  that  the  reaction  velocity  is  a  measure  of  the 
frequency at which molecules randomly collide in the proper orientation and with 
sufficient energy for the reaction mechanism to begin. Since reaction velocity is a 
measure of the frequency at which this occurs, it is a property of the reaction and 
not the reaction mechanism. In addition, I previously described how reaction velocity 
will tend to slow down through the course of the reaction as fewer molecules are 
available for collision.  
I  also  described  how  reaction  velocity  is  dependent  on  factors  including 
temperature, pressure and concentration. For instance, the more concentrated the 
hydrogen bromide is within an aqueous solution, the more molecules there are in 
solution and the more frequently these molecules will randomly collide with each 
other. In addition the higher the temperature the faster the molecules will move in 
solution and the more likely they are to collide with sufficient energy for a reaction 
mechanism to be initiated.  Therefore accurate description of reaction velocity that 
can capture the notion of a collision between molecules requires an account of the 
relations  that  hold  between  the  different  parts  of  the  system.  In  other  words, 
reactions, as  opposed  to  reaction  mechanisms  have  multiple  arity.  Consider for 
example the Arrhenius equation. 
4.4.1: Arrhenius Equation  
The Arrhenius equation describes the dependence of the rate constant of a 
chemical reaction on temperature. It is defined as follows;  
k = A e^{-E_a/(R T)}     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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k = rate constant of reaction  
T= absolute temperature in kelvin 
E_a = Activation energy 
R= universal gas constant with a value of 8.314 J/mol K. 
A= pre-exponential factor 
k is the rate constant for the reaction being investigated, it is determined 
empirically for each individual reaction. It is the rate constant that gives an overall 
indication of how fast the reaction will proceed. 
Ea is the threshold energy required in order to for the reaction to begin. A 
reaction with a large activation energy requires much more energy to be initiated 
whilst a reaction with a small activation energy doesn't require as much energy to 
reach the initiated. Typically activation energy is measured in units of kJ/mol. 
The  pre-exponential  factor  is  a  constant  that  characterises  molecular 
collisions and describes the frequency with which molecules collide in the correct 
orientation  and  with  enough  energy  to  initiate  a  reaction.  It  is  determined 
experimentally as it varies for different reactions. It has units of L mol-1s-1 or M-1s(for 
2nd order reactions) and s-1 (for 1st order reactions). 
The first thing to note about the Arrhenius equation is that it implies that 
chemists treat reactions as distinct unified existences where law like statements hold 
over the reaction taken as a whole and describe the behaviour of the reaction. In 
formulating the equation chemists have abstracted away from the entities involved 
in reactions as well as those properties had by the entities involved and instead 
characterised  the  interactions  that  hold  between  them.  This  gives  us  a  general 
account  of  the  reaction  where  it  is  construed  as  a  single  system.  The  reaction 
landscape reveals similarities in properties such as activation energy and reaction 
constant which are referred to in the equation and these properties hold over the 
whole reaction taken as a unified existence. Therefore, in order to capture these     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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similarities in a descriptively accurate way we must commit to reactions as unified 
existent rather than as reducible to entities and dispositions.  
In addition, an explanation of these properties requires an understanding of 
the relations holding between the components engaged in the reaction. An account 
of reactions in terms of collections of entities and dispositions cannot accommodate 
this due to the restricted arity of dispositions and as a result is not descriptively fit 
for purpose. As described above it cannot capture the relations between the many 
collisions which together are responsible for the characteristics of the reaction. The 
Arrhenius equation promotes explanatory unification by allowing the chemist to read 
off from it general statements concerning the typical behaviour of any reaction under 
those conditions. For example, the exponential term in the Arrhenius equation shows 
that the rate constant of a reaction increases exponentially as activation energy 
decreases. This means that the rate of a reaction is directly proportional to the 
activation energy. The rationale behind this is that a reaction with a small activation 
energy does not require much energy to reach the transition state, and so it should 
proceed faster than a reaction with a larger activation energy. 
The Arrhenius equation also implies that the rate of an uncatalyzed reaction 
is more affected by temperature than the rate of a catalyzed reaction. This is because 
the activation energy of an uncatalyzed reaction is greater than the activation energy 
of the corresponding catalyzed reaction.  
The exponential term in the equation involves the activation energy as the 
numerator  and  the  temperature  as  the  denominator.  This  indicates  the 
generalisation that a smaller activation energy will have a reduced impact on the rate 
constant when compared to a larger activation energy. Therefore an uncatalyzed 
reaction is more affected by temperature changes than a catalyzed reaction. 
We are not able to achieve this large scale explanatory unification by reducing 
entities to collections of entities and their dispositional properties as required by the 
entities – dispositions ontology. This is because explanations are not relevant to an 
account of single reaction mechanisms but only to the reaction where the reaction is     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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construed as a single system made up of many reaction mechanisms.  As a result, we 
must treat each reaction as a single existence in its own right. Therefore I suggest 
that we must have access to something to something akin to reactions amongst our 
ontological resources. 
One option is to commit to a third ontological category in which reactions fall. 
This  category  would be  similar  in  spirit  to the  activities described  in chapter 3, 
however to avoid the extra ontological baggage associated with MDC’s account I shall 
call this category ‘processes’. Whilst reactions would fall in this category, it should 
also be realistic to expect that the category has the scope to be applicable to other 
areas of chemical and scientific practice. This option would come at the expense at a 
minimalist ontology.  
A second option would be to address whether it is possible to get access to 
these processes at no extra ontological cost. In chapter 5, I will examine whether this 
second option can be achieved by appealing to causal dispositionalism as advanced 
by  Mumford  and  Anjum.  My  discussion  will  focus  on  whether  the  causal 
dispositionalist  can  ground  processes  using  a  distinction  between  causes  and 
enabling conditions.  
Irrespective of whether we get ontological access to processes via a distinct 
ontological  category  of  processes  or  via  causal  dispositionalism  the  resulting 
processes must have certain features in line with the discussion in this chapter; they 
should be modelled on what we know about reactions. An ontological category of 
processes should be similar in spirt to MDC’s activities in the sense that reactions 
types of changes and the means by which change take place. Typically reactions bring 
about a change in a relevant entity. However, an ontology of processes must be 
compatible with the notion that reactions are themselves capable of undergoing 
change whilst maintaining their identity through this change. Relatedly, reactions are 
capable of being measured and interfered with.  
An account of processes must also accommodate the fact that that reactions 
are extended in time with temporal intervals and therefore not wholly present at any     Chapter 4: Entities and Dispositions 
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one time.  We know also that reactions have a multiple arity in order to capture the 
features of the system that each process constitutes. I will return to this discussion 
in  chapter  6  in  which  I  outline  my  positive  account  of  processes.  I  will  focus 
specifically on the relationship between potentiality and actuality in a given reaction 
system and use this to formulate a definition of a process. In chapter 5 I will examine 
whether causal dispositionalism can offer a suitable account of processes.  
4:5: Conclusion 
In this chapter my aim was to learn more about the nature of chemical 
reactions by comparing the treatment of reactions to entities and dispositions in 
chemical practice. I provided a comparison with the way entities and reactions are 
treated in practice drawing out key differences between the two aspects of chemical 
practice. I then compared chemists treatment of reactions with their treatment of 
physicochemical  properties  which  I’ve  suggested  in  chapter  2  should  be 
characterised as dispositional.  
I argued that reactions cannot be accommodated by taking them to be a 
collection of entities and their dispositional properties, in a way that is descriptively 
fit for purpose. A single reaction is more appropriately characterized as a system 
which cannot be reduced to its constituent parts, i.e. entities and their properties. 
Rather we need to abstract away from these constituent parts in any one case, 
substituting them for place holders. We can then examine the more general relations 
that hold between the place holders in a way that is descriptively fit for purpose, 
captures  similarity  relations  and  promotes  explanatory  unification.  As  a  result  I 
suggest that we need something akin to reactions in our ontology. One option is to 
commit to a third ontological category of processes in which reactions fall. Before 
committing to an additional ontological category of processes I will assess whether 
we can meet this requirement via causal dispositionalism.                                                                                                         Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism 
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Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism: Getting 
Processes for Free 
5:1: Introduction 
The aim of my thesis has been to outline the most appropriate metaphysics 
for the classification of reactions in practice. In chapter 1 I argued that the natural 
kind literature focuses on the classification of entities and has not addressed in a 
scientifically informed way the classification of non- entity like things. In chapter 2 I 
discussed two case studies involving the classification of reactions. I outlined the 
three criteria that a metaphysics must meet if it is to be descriptively fit for purpose: 
descriptive  accuracy,  capture  similarity  relations  and  promote  explanatory 
unification. I showed that strong essentialism and constructivism are inconsistent 
with classification in practice and that a variety of weak realist positions remain 
viable accounts.  
In order to determine which, if any, realist account is most suitable I began to 
address which ontological components are required in the classification of reactions.  
In chapter 3 I established that ontological commitment to dispositional properties is 
required and in chapter 4 I argued that reactions cannot be captured in terms of 
entities and dispositions and instead a reaction should be treated as a unified, single 
existent which I have termed a process. We know some of the features that processes 
must have by appealing to the way reactions are treated in practice.  
In this chapter I will assess causal dispositionalism; an ontological framework 
that if successful offers access to processes at no extra ontological cost in addition to 
commitment to dispositional properties. As I discussed in chapter 1, if two competing 
ontologies are able to do the same work then we should prefer the one with the 
minimal ontological base.  Therefore if causal dispositionalism is able to meet the                                                                                                        Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism 
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requirements on being descriptively fit for purpose with respect to my case study and 
also offers processes in virtue of commitment to dispositions then we should prefer 
this ontological framework. In this chapter I focus on Mumford and Anjum’s account 
of causal dispositionalism however my conclusions are more general. I consider my 
discussion  to  shed  doubt  on  the  possibility  of  getting  processes  in  virtue  of 
commitment to dispositions in a manner that is descriptively fit for purpose.    
In  section  5.2,  I  give  a general  account  of  causal  dispositionalism  and in 
section 5.3, I focus specifically on their distinction between causes and enabling 
conditions  and  the  relation  between  the  distinction  and  the  dispose  towards 
metaphor. I outline how it might provide the identity conditions for processes. In 
section 5.4, I discuss whether the distinction between causes and enabling conditions 
is descriptively fit for purpose. I begin by assessing whether the distinction meets the 
criteria  of  descriptive  accuracy  with  respect  to  the  first  and  second  stage  of 
classification outlined in chapter 2. I compare Mumford and Anjum’s example of 
arsenic poisoning to the classification of reactions in my case study. I highlight an 
important difference between causing an event and causing a process. I conclude 
that chemical reactions are not individuated on the basis of the dispose towards 
metaphor.  I  also  focus on  the  role  of perspective  when  identifying processes.  I 
conclude that Mumford and Anjum cannot meet the criteria of descriptive accuracy. 
I  then  discuss  whether  causal  dispositionalism  can  capture  the  similarity 
relations that hold between reactions. I argue that causal dispositionalism fails this 
criterion because the dispose towards metaphor is too vague and unconstrained. To 
meet this criteria Mumford and Anjum must provide a more detailed account of 
functions which might work in conjunction with claims about powers in order to 
support  explanation  and  prediction  on  the  basis  of  similarity  relations.  Finally  I 
discuss the criteria of explanatory unification. The aim of my case study is a better 
understanding of reactions for the purpose of improved industrial applications of 
chemistry. I turn to the way reactions are used in industry and show that the dispose 
towards metaphor used by Mumford and Anjum does not promote explanatory 
unification or the fruitful development of science.                                                                                                         Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism 
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5:2: Causal Dispositionalism 
The causal dispositionalist account advanced by Mumford and Anjum is an 
application of pandispositionalism to the problem of causation. In Getting Causes 
from Powers (2011) they do not offer a defence of pandispositionalism but accept it 
as a premise and flesh out the account of causation that follows from it. I have 
already argued that ontological commitment to dispositional properties is required 
to accommodate the classification of reactions in practice. Since my aim in this 
chapter  is  to  assess  whether  the  account  of  causation  can  get  processes  from 
dispositions I will follow them in assuming pandispositionalism (Mumford & Anjum, 
2011,  4).  If  a  pandispositionalist  account  of  causation  is  able  to  successfully 
accommodate  scientific  practice  then  this  will  serve  as  evidence  in  favour  of 
pandispositionalism in the context of a broader assessment of the position.    
Pandispositionalism is the view that all properties are dispositional.  Mumford 
and Anjum are committed to powers as the fundamental element of their ontology.  
They identify the ‘power to F’ with the disposition that has a type of manifestation 
‘to F,’ such that the identity of the power is determined by its manifestation. For 
instance, we associate the manifestation dissolving with the power or disposition 
solubility (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 6).   Properties are taken to be clusters of 
powers and are had by things. This means that properties are not ‘free floating.’ For 
example, the property ‘weight’ is associated with a cluster of powers including ‘the 
power to make the pointer on the scale move’ and ‘is had by a packet of sugar’ 
(Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 4). In addition, on the pandispositionalist view, objects 
possess properties (by virtue of powers) even if the powers in question are never 
manifested. It is claimed that the property of ‘being fluent in German’ is had by a 
person even in the case that the person has the potential power to speak German 
but refuses (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 6). 
In  assuming  pandispositionalism  the  distinction  between  categorical  and 
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‘It  is  argued  by  many,  however,  that  at  least  some  properties  are  non-
dispositional or categorical. It is not often said what is meant by categorical, 
but  shape  is  usually  considered  a  paradigm.  A  pandispositionalist  has  to 
defend the view, therefore that even a property such as sphericity is in reality 
a cluster of causal powers’ (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 4). 
They go on to argue that properties which are traditionally thought of as categorical 
such as sphericity can be associated with powers such as ‘will roll down an inclined 
plane’. It is on this basis that the property ‘sphericity’ can be differentiated from the 
property ‘cubic’. Mumford and Anjum rightly note that there will be occasions on 
which an object possesses the property of being spherical but fails, for instance, to 
manifest the property ‘rolls down a spherical plane,’ citing the example of a soap 
bubble. Nonetheless, their version of causal dispositionalism which uses a vector 
model of causation is able to accommodate these cases by appealing to interfering 
factors. 
Mumford and Anjum advocate causal primitivism; they take powers to be real 
existents  in the  world  such  that they  constitute  the  most  fundamental  form of 
modality. They reject attempts by Ryle (1949), Lewis (1997), and Bird (2007) to 
reduce powers or dispositions to the conditional analysis (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 
11).  
Therefore, according to the causal dispositionalist causation is the passing 
around  of  powers.  Consider  a  guitar  which  is  plugged  into  an  amp  and  then 
strummed. The guitar has the power to produce a sound wave and thus create an 
audible noise.  This power is then transferred to the amp which in turn has the power 
to take the sound made by the guitar and produce a louder sound. To summarise 
‘effects are brought about by powers manifesting themselves’ (Mumford & Anjum, 
2011, 6-7). 
An implication of this view is that it is properties that are the true relata of 
causation (in virtue of the powers from which they are constituted). In everyday life 
we tend to think about causation in terms of events or facts, for instance, the event 
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occurred’ caused the fact that ‘the vase is broken’. Nonetheless, it is asserted that 
both of these accounts of causation are true in virtue of properties doing the causal 
work. As Mumford and Anjum state ‘objects, facts and events can all be involved in 
causation, on our view. But they are involved because of the powerful properties that 
they contain’ (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 2). When Mumford and Anjum state that 
‘smoking disposes cancer’ this statement is true in virtue of the possession of the 
relevant powers. For example, the smoking of a cigarette involves the manifestation 
of powers that dispose towards cancer. In the same way chocolate only disposes 
towards happiness in virtue of possessing a power that disposes towards happiness. 
A controversial aspect of their account which I will refer to throughout this 
chapter is that powers are taken to have a direction and an intensity. This allows for 
a vector analysis of causation which is used to provide an insight into the passing 
around of powers. For instance, since the smoking of a cigarette has the power to 
cause cancer, it disposes in the direction of cancer, and it does this with a greater 
intensity than, perhaps, living close to a mobile phone mast. The question of whether 
the presence of this power is essential to what it is to be chocolate is not discussed.  
Mumford and Anjum recommend representing powers in diagrammatic form as 
shown below: 
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The power of smoking to dispose towards cancer can be contrasted with 
exercise which disposes away from cancer and is represented by the dotted arrow 
above. Vector diagrams are used to flesh out the various causal factors at work in 
producing a given effect. In this respect Mumford and Anjum evoke Mill’s notion of 
total cause and reject Lewis’s counterfactual dependence account of causation. They 
aim to do justice to the fact that causation is complex and achieved only as a result 
of numerous factors working together. They see each cause or power as making a 
contribution to bringing about the effect and therefore all causes are ontologically 
on a par. Their commitment to the total cause of an effect is a central tenant of their 
causal dispositionalism. Mumford and Anjum also make the controversial decision to 
exclude negative causes and causes by absence, on the grounds that they are not 
ontologically real. Since this is not relevant to my argument, for the purposes of this 
chapter I will grant them this assumption.  
The notion of total cause and the vector analysis is conceptualised using the 
threshold  model  of  causation,  whereby  the  threshold  represents  the  minimum 
combination of powers required to bring about the effect. This is an extension of the 
notion of mutual manifestation partners.  Consider the causal factors that contribute 
towards the burning of a fire (represented as G on the vector diagram).  These include 
the presence of oxygen, the striking of a match, dryness etc. If a sufficient number of 
these powers are present they will combine in the vector space and the threshold 
condition will be overcome. The threshold condition is indicated by the vertical 
dashed line.                                                                                                        Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism 
 
185 
 
 
Figure 22: Vector analysis representing the addition of powers to bring about the effect G 
The examples cited above model the relationship between the compositional 
and resultant power on the principle of additive composition. The effect is the sum 
of  the  constituent  powers  however  addition  is  only  one  way  in  which  powers 
operate. Mumford and Anjum advocate compositional pluralism, whereby there are 
numerous  potential  functions  that  govern  how  powers  combine  (Mumford  and 
Anjum, 2012, 96 – 101).   
One example of non- linear combination is gravitational attraction where 
mass and distance combine to produce a resultant force the size of which is governed 
by the inverse square law.  Mumford and Anjum also refer to overdose cases in which 
adding  additional  amounts  of  the  same  power  does  not  produce  an  increasing 
tendency to the same effect.  For example, a drug will tend to have an increasingly 
positive effect on health up until the optimum dosage level, after which it will tend 
to have a negative effect on health as a result of overdose (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 
96). 
In other cases two powers acting in isolation from each other will dispose 
towards an effect F, however when acting together will dispose away from F. The 
most common examples of this kind of antipathetic case arise in medicine. Mumford 
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dispose towards low blood pressure but when taken together have the opposite 
effect (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 91).  They conclude that there are different 
functions  that  govern  how  powers  combine,  but  that  we  should not treat  such 
functions as laws of nature. I shall return to the question of functions in section 5.4.3. 
It  is  worth  noting  that,  non-linear  addition  of  powers  has  important 
implications for the debate surrounding emergentism;  
‘Many natural phenomena involve interaction of the components where they 
produce something together that is not the mere addition of the components. 
This involves a genuine joint effort of two or more powers where the resultant 
is  composed  by  some  non-linear  function.  Any  such  function  could  be 
involved: multiplicative, inverse square, or far more complex’ (Mumford & 
Anjum, 2011, 98). 
The coming together of powers to do joint work may produce an effect that bears no 
resemblance to any of the component powers; the effect is more than the sum of 
the  parts.  In  this  sense  compositional  pluralism  introduces  an  element  of 
emergentism although this is described as ‘weak, uncontroversial emergentism’ in 
which a supervenience relation holds. The presence of identical component powers 
will result in the same resultant power. Nonetheless this isn’t to suggest that the 
same outcome would occur, merely that the resultant power would dispose towards 
it. (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 100).  
The various objections I will raise to the causal dispositionalist account focus 
on  the  notion  of  ‘disposing  towards’  and  the  work  this  does  for  their  account. 
Mumford and Anjum do not flesh out what it is for one thing to dispose towards 
another but illustrate by examples. I argue that this is insufficient to establish their 
account. With regard to the above discussion of the functions that govern how 
powers combine with each other I argue that a more nuanced account of the place 
of functions within their  ontology and their relationship to powers is required if 
causal dispositionalism is to accommodate scientific practice.  
In chapter 2 I outlined the constraints on my project and in order to accurately 
assess the causal dispositionalist project I need to understand the constraints that                                                                                                        Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism 
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their account of causation is working within. Firstly with respect to the scope of the 
project they claim that causation in physics has received the majority of attention in 
the literature and that there is reason to believe that this is unwarranted. Causation 
occurs not just in physics but in biology, psychology, economics and society generally 
and it is important that we are able to give an account of these cases. In so far as 
reductionism to physics remains only a possibility we should be able to provide causal 
explanations at the most appropriate level (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 101). A 
causal explanation of why I crossed the road is perhaps best provided in terms of my 
fear of dogs rather than the firing of neurons although this may provide a true 
description of the situation. 
Secondly,  with  respect  to  the  relationship  between  metaphysics  and 
empirical  science  Mumford  and  Anjum  suggest  that  the  two  disciplines  should 
interact  through  a  reflective  equilibrium.  A  metaphysics  is  strengthened  by  an 
understanding of the empirical science and empirical science can also benefit from 
reflecting on the metaphysical assumptions that underlie it. They state that ‘our 
philosophical  theory  should  thus both  inform and be informed  by  our  concrete 
understanding  of  causation.  Our  knowledge  of  causation  is  best  developed  by 
understanding both in tandem, but where neither comes first’ (Mumford & Anjum, 
2011, 215).  
Consequently, if causal dispositionalism is to be philosophically respectable 
then it must be compatible with contemporary scientific practice. Mumford and 
Anjum go to some lengths in Getting Causes from Powers, to show that their account 
can accommodate biological practice, it is my aim in this chapter to assess whether 
their account can accommodate the classification of chemical processes in practice.  
I will argue that causal dispositionalism cannot do so in a way that is descriptively fit 
for purpose.  
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5:3: Enabling Conditions and Causes 
In section 5.2 I provided an exposition of the pandispositionalist account of 
causation. In this section, I will focus in on the role played by causal processes and 
the ontological distinction that is drawn between causes and enabling conditions. I 
will  provide  a  brief  description  of  this  distinction  and  the  motivation  for  its 
introduction. An account of these motivations and the work that the distinction does 
in each case will be important to my analysis in section 5.4 of whether the account 
can meet my criteria. The distinction between causes and enabling conditions can be 
summarised as follows;  
Causes  will  dispose  towards  an  effect  whilst  enabling  conditions  do  not  dispose 
towards or away from an effect.  
Mumford and Anjum add that; 
‘We can have cases where a caused b and b caused c but it is not the case that 
a caused c. The reason for this is that while a disposed towards b, and b in 
turn  disposed  towards  c,  there  was  nevertheless  no  disposition  from  a 
towards c’ (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 176). 
In this case a enables c but does not cause c. It is a mere enabling condition for c. At 
times Mumford and Anjum refer to enabling conditions as sin qua non, for instance 
they state; 
‘Your  grandfather’s  conception  is  certainly  a  necessary  condition  for you 
scratching your nose, in the sine qua non sense. You wouldn’t have scratched 
your nose without it. But it is not a cause because it didn’t dispose towards it’ 
(Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 176) 
Enabling conditions or sine qua non conditions are at other times referred to as 
causally irrelevant; 
‘The  vector  model  enables  us  to  separate  causally  relevant  from  causally 
irrelevant powers, as the first would dispose with some intensity within the 
model’s quality space while the latter would not dispose in either direction’ 
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As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, a key motivation for the introduction of the 
distinction between causes and enabling conditions is Mumford and Anjum’s desire 
to retain the idea of the total cause of an effect.  Mumford and Anjum accept Mill’s 
thesis that all causes of an effect are ontologically on a par. They refer to the straw 
that broke the camel’s back analogy and argue that even though different powers 
might contribute in different amount they are all equally significant in bringing about 
the effect. As a result they reject the distinction between causes and background 
conditions; 
‘the  grounds  for  asserting  the  distinction  [between  causes  and  background 
conditions], however, seem entirely pragmatic: usually to do with explanatory 
practices and assumptions rather than to do with the efficacious powers in the 
world. The distinction is therefore primarily an epistemic one, rather than a 
matter for the ontology of causation’ (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 32). 
The  reasoning  behind  the  rejection  of  the  distinction  between  causes  and 
background conditions will be important to section 5.5.3 as I will suggest that their 
own  distinction  between  causes  and  enabling  conditions  suffers  from  a  similar 
problem.  
In  addition,  whilst they  embrace the notion  of  the  total  cause  they  also 
acknowledge an objection to it and the need to pose some limit to the transitivity of 
causation in order to support their thesis that cause and effect are simultaneous. 
They state; ‘there may be an objection that Mill’s notion of cause includes too much. 
Might every previous event in the universe count as a cause of every later effect, or 
at least everything in an event’s backwards light cone?’ (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 
13). 
To be forced to admit that everything in an event’s past acts as a cause is both 
counterintuitive and seems to devalue the notion of cause. Consequently Mumford 
and Anjum look for a way to restrict what should fall within the notion of the total 
cause for a given effect. The distinction between causes and enabling condition is an 
attempt to help them achieve this aim. It is worth quoting them in full on this point 
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‘Causal dispositionalism, however, has some resources for limiting the causes 
of an effect... We count only as a cause of an effect something that disposes 
towards it and not everything in the backwards light cone will have done this. 
If you speed up your walking, for instance, there will be many factors in the 
past that simply did not bear on it: they had no disposition to increase or slow 
down your walking. Causes can be big, therefore, as Mill’s notion suggests, 
without being too big’ (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 13). 
Modifying  Mill’s  concept  of  total  cause  by  introducing  the  distinction  between 
enabling  conditions  and  causes  allows  for  all  causes  that  contribute  to  the 
overcoming of the threshold condition to be considered ontologically on a par. It also 
provides principled justification for limiting the remit of the total cause. We can see 
the distinction in action via two case studies provided by Mumford and Anjum.  
Firstly  they  describe  the  process  by  which  arsenic  causes  death  when 
ingested. They argue that we can attribute this power to arsenic since it initiates a 
causal chain which begins with the disruption of ATP production leading to organ 
failure and then to death whereby each stage of the process disposes towards the 
next. As a result the causal chain is transitive and it is correct to assert that arsenic 
causes death.  
Secondly they describe a causal chain that begins with weather conditions in 
the Caribbean and ends with a broken elbow but where causation is not transitive as 
a result of an enabling condition in the causal chain.   
‘Conducive weather in the Caribbean leads to a bumper banana crop. The 
fine crop leads to reduced prices and this influences you to buy bananas. 
Having bought the bananas, you eat them more often and on one such 
instance you discard the skin. Later, you slip on the skin, fracturing your 
elbow. Did the good Caribbean weather cause you to fracture your elbow?’  
(Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 171) 
From this, the following causal chain can be identified; 
Hot weather → More bananas → Cheaper bananas → I buy more bananas → I eat 
bananas more often → I slip on banana skin → I fracture my elbow 
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nothing about the hot weather that disposes towards my fractured elbow. Although 
they do not point it out themselves it seems that the point at which transitivity breaks 
down and thus the existence of the enabling condition must occur between eating 
bananas more often and slipping on the banana skin.  
To summarise Mumford and Anjum have rejected the distinction between 
background conditions and causes on the basis that identifying a special or more 
significant  causal  factor  involves  an  appeal  to  pragmatics  and  this  shouldn’t  be 
tolerated in questions of ontology. Instead they embrace the idea of a total cause 
where all the powers that contribute towards an effect are ontologically on a par. 
They then seek to limit the total cause via the presence of enabling conditions in the 
causal  chain  that  do  not  dispose  towards  the  end  effect  and  therefore  limit 
transitivity. 
It is important to make clear the direction of explanation at work. Failures in 
transitivity result from the presence of enabling conditions in the causal chain and 
the  distinction  between  enabling  conditions  and  causes  rests  on  the  notion  of 
disposing towards. The distinction between causes and enabling conditions therefore 
provide the identity conditions for causal processes such as the one by which arsenic 
disposes towards death as described above. In what follows I will assess whether the 
dispose towards metaphor is capable of bearing this weight.  
A further motivation for Mumford and Anjum’s introduction of the distinction 
is their belief that cause and effect are simultaneous and non-instantaneous. They 
object to ascribing temporal priority to causes over effects on the grounds that this 
leads to a regress. If causes are prior to effects then something must be said about 
the temporal gap between them and in particular what causes the gap to close and 
the effect to come about.  
By appealing to an ontology of powers the causal dispositionalist has the 
resources for overcoming this problem. Since metaphysically speaking properties do 
the work of causation not events they argue that  it is mistaken to assume that cause 
precedes effect on the grounds that one event precedes another. They describe the                                                                                                        Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism 
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dropping of sugar in tea and suggest that dissolution is a causal process in which 
cause and effect are simultaneous. For instance, we can imagine stopping the process 
half way through and exclaiming that half the sugar has dissolved. We wouldn’t want 
to wait to the end of the process to say the effect occurred. Instead it is claimed that 
the  ‘the cause will be depicted as merging into and becoming the effect through a 
natural process’ (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 107).  
They use the distinction between enabling conditions and causes to reject any 
claim that one process causes another and therefore to rebut any objection to the 
simultanity of causation; the idea is one process merely enables another. I will not 
deal explictly with the claim that cause and effect are simultaneus but will discuss 
the treatment of processes that is required to establish this claim. I will argue that it 
is not descriptively fit for purpose with respect to my case study. 
5:4: Causal Dispositionalism: Descriptively Fit for Purpose? 
In  the  above  section  I  have  outlined  Mumford  and  Anjum’s  causal 
dispositionalist account. I focused specifically on Mumford and Anjum’s distinction 
between causes and enabling conditions and the work that the distinction does for 
their account. I also described how the distinction rests on the disposing towards 
metaphor. In the remaining part of this chapter I will discuss whether this distinction 
is descriptively fit for purpose with respect to my case study. If it is successful and 
Mumford  and  Anjum’s  causal  dispositionalism  is  able  to  provide  the  identity 
conditions for processes then their account could give us the processes we required 
as discussed in chapter 4 at no extra ontological cost. I will begin by looking at the 
criteria  of  descriptive  accuracy  and  then  turn  my  attention  to  similarity  and 
explanatory unification. 
5:4:1: Descriptive Accuracy 
In this section I will argue that the distinction between enabling conditions 
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in  practice.  I  will  discuss  this  point  with  respect  to  the  second  stage  of  the 
classification process and then with respect to the first stage of classification.16 
5.4.1.1: Stage Two of the Classification Process 
In this section I will proceed by clarifying how Mumford and Anjum use the 
distinction between enabling conditions and causes to individuate processes and 
then  I  will  compare  this  to  the  treatment  of  reactions  in  the  second  stage  of 
classification in my case study. 
In their discussion of the biological process associated with ‘arsenic causing 
death’, Mumford and Anjum state; 
‘Arsenic, can be thought of as having multiple powers: of disrupting ATP 
production, of causing organ failure, of killing. A reason why we can attribute 
all these powers to arsenic is that it is able to initiate a biological process, 
going through various stages’ (Anjum & Mumford, 2011, 168). 
They claim that this constitutes one biological process because each step in the 
causal process from ingestion to death disposes towards the next and therefore the 
causal chain is transitive. We can identify the process as follows; 
Ingesting arsenic → Disrupted ATP production → Organ failure → Death 
The process by which arsenic leads to death is an example of what Mumford 
and Anjum refer to as a ‘biological process’ (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 168). They 
individuate the process from its context in virtue of the enabling conditions versus 
cause distinction. Other factors that form part of the causal chain that leads to ‘death’ 
do  not  form  part  of  this  biological  process  because  they  are  merely  enabling 
conditions rather than causes and so their presence produces a break in transitivity. 
I argue that the disposing towards metaphor can be made applicable to the 
second  stage  of  classification  of  reactions  however  it  does  not  give  identity 
                                                           
16 I discuss the two stages in this order since it is the second stage of classification that is the more central 
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conditions for the reactions in my case study as is suggested in the case of arsenic. I 
argue  that  the  reason  for  this  involves  an  important  difference  on  the  causal 
dispositionalist  account  between  the  causing  of  an  event  and  the  causing  of  a 
process. 
It is worth mentioning that Mumford and Anjum themselves hint at this 
difference although they do not explore it in detail. As I outlined in section 5.2 
Mumford and Anjum discuss the threshold model of causation and conclude that x 
causes event y if and only if x disposes towards event y. This is the case regardless of 
whether x is sufficient for bringing about the event y. This account allows Mumford 
and Anjum to maintain, for example, that the presence of oxygen disposes towards 
the fire and is therefore a cause of the fire. 
However, in their discussion of processes Mumford and Anjum hint at a 
different account. They state; 
‘According to the causal dispositionalist theory, the cause of each process is 
the various mutual manifestation powers that, having come together, do 
their joint work and go through a transformation: a change of properties…As 
causation typically involves changes, it thereby makes new powers available 
for composition and thus instigation of new causal processes. But it would be 
wrong  to  think  of  this  as  one  process  causing  another  in  a  sequential 
temporally separated chain. All it does is contribute a power or powers to a 
further process that might occur if the other partners for that process also 
become available’ (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, 126). 
With  respect  to  processes,  Mumford  and  Anjum  seem  to  maintain  that 
contributing a power is not enough to be considered part of the cause of a process. 
This suggests something else is required, however they do not specify what this extra 
requirement amounts to. Nonetheless a consideration of the difference between 
causing  processes  and  causing  events  sheds  light  on  how  the  dispose  towards 
metaphor applies to my case study. 
Consider again, the case of the burning of the house. We can list the factors 
that dispose towards the burning of the house such as the presence of oxygen, the 
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out each of these factors forms part of a causal chain that leads to fire. Nonetheless 
I suggest that by identifying these factors Mumford and Anjum have not individuated 
the specific transitive causal process by which the house is burnt down. They have 
successfully identified factors that form part of the causal chain that leads to the 
burning of the house but they have not given identity conditions for the process. 
There is an important difference between this case and the case of arsenic described 
above in which Mumford and Anjum claimed to have isolated a section of the causal 
chain that is individuated by the presence of enabling conditions and labelled it a 
biological process. 
This point can be made more obvious with a consideration of my case study.  
Consider again the classification of reactions on the basis of six physicochemical 
variables. I argued in section 3.5 that these physicochemical variables should be 
characterised as dispositional properties. I also described in section 2.2 how each 
reaction is associated with values for each of the six properties and these six values 
are  thought  to  encode  the  reaction.  This  encoding  of  reactions  is  taken  to  be 
sufficiently reliable to retrieve accurate similarity relations between the different 
reactions.  At  first  glance  there  is  a  sense  in  which  causal  dispositionalism  does 
capture my case study. The belief underlying QSAR is described as follows; 
QSAR: the reaction centres of entities that possess similar physicochemical 
variables will undergo similar kinds of reactions 
An equivalent statement can be made for causal dispositionalism; 
Causal dispositionalism: entities with similar powers operating under similar 
functions will undergo similar reactions. 
The six determinate properties could be construed as vectors that each dispose by 
varying amounts to the instantiation of a particular reaction. 
It is useful here to return to my discussion in chapter 4.5. I argued that 
reactions are processes but the processes are defined in terms of their end products. 
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presence of the polar change on a H2O molecule. This definition was used to isolate 
this particular group of reactions that are similar enough to undergo QSAR analysis. 
I suggest this helps illuminate how the dispose towards metaphor applies to 
my case. In so far as the physicochemical variables encode hydrolysis reactions, they 
dispose towards the pre-specified end product occurring. They are a strong indicator 
that this reaction will occur.  
As a result, I argue that the identification of these six properties does not 
provide the identity conditions for the reaction process by individuating the state and 
end points of the process. Rather by identifying these properties chemists have 
highlighted parts of the causal chain that dispose particularly strongly towards the 
end product associated with the process. There is a clear difference in the way in 
which reactions are individuated and the case of the ‘biological process’ involving 
arsenic. 
As I discussed in section 2.1 a full account of the causal process (or what 
chemists refer to as the chemical mechanism) by which a reaction comes about 
requires a quantum mechanical specification of the reaction mechanism including 
reference to the characteristics and movements of the atoms and bonds. I explained 
that  such  an  account  is  currently  beyond  the  capabilities  of  chemistry  and 
physicochemical variables are used instead since they are thought to be the best 
indicators of similarities in reactions mechanism which are beyond our epistemic 
reach. As a result I suggest that causal dispositionalism fails the criteria of descriptive 
accuracy with respect to stage two of the classification process. In practice reactions 
are not individuated using the dispose towards metaphor or the distinction between 
enabling conditions and causes which is built on the basis of this metaphor. 
5.4.1.2: Stage One of the Classification Process 
It is also worth assessing the descriptive accuracy of the causal dispositionalist 
account  against  stage  one  of  the  classification  process.  This  highlights  another 
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descriptive accuracy whilst revealing an aspect of chemical practice that will be 
relevant to my positive proposal outlined in chapter 6. My discussion also hints at a 
tension within the causal dispositionalist account. 
I  will  focus  on  the  role  of  perspectivalism  when  identifying  reactions. 
Mumford and Anjum indicate the question of the intensity and direction of powers 
is an empirical matter;  
‘Substances can be more or less explosive, flammable, corrosive, volatile, 
soluble, poisonous, alkaline or acid. Some of these intensities are already 
quantified by a standard scale, such as using the pH scale for acid and alkaline. 
The understanding of their intensities is regimented in a robust scientific 
theory. Some may be less regimented. There may not be an exact science that 
measures degree of fragility. But clearly this is an empirical matter: there 
could be one’ (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 25).  
Appealing to scientific practice when examining the presence of powers is a sensible 
approach; the best evidence concerning the properties that are had by entities, and 
the direction and intensity of powers comes from science. I’ll follow this approach in 
the following discussion. 
Chemists  are  interested  in  solving  particular  chemical  problems  and  this 
directs their inquiry. In case study two chemists were interested in improving the 
efficiency of hydrolysis reactions. Therefore hydrolysis reactions were identified as 
the activity of interest with respect to QSAR and token instances were identified on 
the basis of a theoretically prior definition of the reactions.  Hydrolysis reactions are 
defined in terms of a specific start and end point as previously discussed. Given the 
interest directedness of the inquiry we can conceive of a different situation in which 
another reaction or process was investigated and so another end point is specified 
but where this new type of process involves a hydrolysis reaction as a component 
part.   
To explore this point consider again the hydrolysis reactions discussed in 
chapter 2. Organic chemists interested in the making and breaking of bonds will take 
the process to end when a hydrolysis reaction has taken place, that is, when water                                                                                                        Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism 
 
198 
 
has been added to the original molecule such that both the molecule and the water 
split in half forming a hydroxide and with the remaining components combining with 
the positive ion. They will consider this to be one distinct process. Note that on 
Mumford and Anjum’s view this reaction process ends due to the presence of an 
enabling condition; the formation of the end products of the hydrolysis reaction do 
not  dispose  towards  the  next  part  of  the  causal  chain.  I  suggest  this  claim  is 
problematic since the end products of the process have multiple powers that will 
dispose towards in lots of different directions. I maintain that whether we choose to 
take them to be part of the original process depends on the particular interests of 
scientists. 
Consider one situation in which hydrolysis reactions occur inside the body. 
During the process inside the body in which proteins are prepared for their role in 
digestion, a hydrolysis of proteins occurs producing amino acids. However these 
amino acids then react with glucagon which is a catabolic hormone that mobilizes 
amino acids into blood. The amino acids then undergo polymerization to produce 
more useful proteins. The chain can be described as follows; 
Water reacts with a peptide bond on a protein → the protein splits into smaller chains 
of amino acids →  the amino acids react with glucagon → the amino acids enter the 
blood stream → the amino acids undergo polymerisation to form new proteins 
The  process  by  which  proteins  are  prepared  for  their  role  in  digestion  involves 
hydrolysis but the end products of this hydrolysis then dispose towards a reaction 
with glucagon and form part of a much bigger biological process. Hydrolysis occurs 
in  lots  of  different  biological  and  chemical  contexts  and  in  each  case  it  might 
reasonably be thought to contribute powers that dispose towards the next stage of 
that particular chemical or biological causal chain.  
I suggest that the identity conditions for what chemists might refer to as 
biological  or  chemical  processes  in  stage  one  of  the  classificatory  process  are 
determined by the broader context of the scientist’s work and in particular what they 
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considered  to  dispose  towards  the  next  stage  of  the  process  i.e.  whether  it 
constitutes a cause or an enabling conditions, is also dependent on the aims and 
interests of the scientists. 
The  problem  for  Mumford  and  Anjum  is  that  the  impact  of  interest 
dependence on the transitivity of causation is not consistent with the rest of their 
account. I suggest that the role of contextualism and pragmatics goes much deeper 
into  the  causal  dispositionalist  account  than  can  be  consistent  with  their  initial 
position and as a result their account is brought into tension. Consider again the 
reason why the distinction between causes and background conditions was rejected. 
Mumford and Anjum state; 
‘the grounds for asserting the distinction [between causes and background 
conditions],  however,  seem,  seem  entirely  pragmatic:  usually  to  do  with 
explanatory practices and assumptions rather than to do with the efficacious 
powers in the world. The distinction is therefore primarily an epistemic one, 
rather than a matter for the ontology of causation’ (Mumford and Anjum, 
2011, 32). 
The causal dispositionalist wants to treat all causes as ontologically on a par. They 
suggest to prioritize certain causes over others rather than cite the ‘total cause’ of an 
effect  would  require  us  to  appeal  to  epistemic  considerations  and  this  is  an 
illegitimate  move  when  investigating  the  metaphysics  of  causation.  I  challenge 
whether Mumford and Anjum are able to remain faithful to this view given the above 
discussion.  
Since  the  specification  of  processes  in  practice  involves  an  appeal  to 
pragmatics they are unable to get an account of a natural process that meets their 
needs or is compatible with my case study. The distinction between causes and 
background conditions  was rejected because it left room for user ‘pragmatics’ and 
according to Mumford and Anjum dissolved into an epistemic distinction. I suggest 
that the distinction between causes and enabling conditions fares no better. If they 
are to reject the distinction between causes and background conditions and replace 
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distinction should not suffer from the same problem for which they rejected the 
former.  
There is no real, ontological distinction between enabling conditions and 
causes, it is a tool that helps us isolate a process that is undergoing a particular 
empirical inquiry in a given domain. The classification of reactions in chemistry is 
conducted on the basis of pragmatic interests. I shall return to this point in chapter 
6.  As  a  result  I  suggest  that  causal  dispositionalism  cannot  give  an  account  of 
processes that meets my criteria of descriptive accuracy. 
5:5:2: Similarity and Explanatory Unification  
In this section I will address whether the causal dispositionalist account can 
capture the criteria of similarity and explanatory unification with respect to my case 
study.  I will argue that causal dispositionalism fails both criteria as a result of the 
vague and unconstrained notion of the disposing towards metaphor. It is for this 
reason that I will discuss the two criteria side by side. I begin by assessing the causal 
dispositionalist’s ability to capture the similarities revealed by the reaction landscape 
and will go on to discuss its ability to explain the industrial applications of enzymatic 
reactions  in  a  way  that  promotes  explanatory  unification  and  the  fruitful 
development of science.  
The vague nature of the dispose towards metaphor can initially be illustrated 
through examples. Consider the enzymatic reaction described in chapter 2 between 
ethyl ethanoate and dilute hydrochloric acid. The ethyl ethanoate reacts with water 
and acid acts as a catalyst. Chemists have provided a rough characterisation of how 
the underlying reaction mechanism proceeds. For present purposes I’m interested 
only  in  the  first  stage  of  the  reaction  mechanism.    Ethyl  ethonate  is  a  stable 
compound held together by covalent bonding; 
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Figure 23: Ethyl ethanoate 
The oxygen atom which is attached via a double bond to the carbon atom is 
disposed to bond with the carbon atom and this explains the stable nature of the 
compound. In the presence of water however the oxygen is disposed to dissociate 
from the carbon bond and bond with another oxygen. This power is referred to when 
explaining why the compound breaks down. The disposing towards metaphor is able 
to account for all of the different behaviours of the oxygen atom because, I suggest, 
it only amounts to an expression of nomological possibility. As long as there is some 
conceivable situation in which x will be part of the cause of y, then on Mumford and 
Anjum’s account this makes it legitimate to say that x disposes towards y. We can 
claim x disposes towards y no matter how rare this occurrence is and regardless of 
other situations in which x disposes away from y. This expression of possibility might 
be  helpful  for  a  philosophical  understanding  of  causation  but  it  does  not  help 
chemists capture similarities or provide useful explanations.  
Consider the sort of similarities that chemists want to capture. Their aim is to 
synthesise as much information from the reaction landscape as possible. Enzymatic 
reactions are particularly difficult to instantiate and require specific environmental 
conditions such as temperature, pressure and PH. Typically there is only a small 
window when these optimum conditions exist and in which the reaction will take 
place. Since similar reactions have similar optimum conditions the reaction landscape 
can be used to improve predictability. Mumford and Anjum’s view might try to 
accommodate this by asserting that similar reactions will be associated with similar 
powers, however I suggest their account is unable to account for the complexity of 
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unification to state that ‘the hydrolase enzyme disposes towards increased rate of 
reaction’ as this is only the case under exceptional and often rare circumstances. 
The effect of temperature on enzyme activity is particularly relevant. The 
ability of enzymes to catalyse reactions increases as temperature increases until an 
optimum temperature is reached. As a result we can state the heat energy disposes 
towards the instantiation of an enzymatic reaction. However once the optimum 
temperature is reached a further increase in temperature causes the enzyme to 
deactivate  and  its  functionality  to  be  reduced.  The  causal  dispositionalist  can 
accommodate this situation by maintaining that heat energy also disposes away from 
the instantiation of enzymatic reactions.  
  I suggest that the following assertions are unhelpful to chemical practice as 
more information is required for them to be useful to the formulation of predictions 
and explanations; 
a.  Heat energy disposes towards increased enzymatic activity 
b.  Heat energy disposes away from enzymatic activity 
Mumford and Anjum would respond to this objection by appealing to the functions 
that govern how powers combine. They discuss this kind of overdose case when they 
introduced compositional pluralism. They state;  
‘It should be clear from overdose cases that simple addition is not the mode 
of composition because the resultant power fails to be doubled when we 
double the extent of the component powers. Hence, these cases count as 
non-linear composition’ (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 89). 
‘There are some cases that can be explained additively but we should accept 
a  position  of  compositional  pluralism:  addition  is  just  one  among  many 
different  functions  according  to  which  causes  compose’  (Mumford  and 
Anjum, 2011, 86). 
Mumford and Anjum argue that functions govern how powers combine however 
they do not further elaborate on the nature of functions and add only that they 
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argue that given the crucial work functions do for their account and in particular, in 
capturing the kind of similarities revealed by the reaction landscape an ontological 
account of functions is required.  
Secondly,  even  given  an  ontological  specification  of  the  mathematical 
functions by which powers combine, the causal dispositionalist account contains 
insufficient  information  to  formulate  successful  predictions  and  provide  useful 
explanations.  I suggest that, in addition, all power attributions must come with a 
specification of the conditions under which that power is operative. For instance, 
enzyme E will dispose towards an increased rate of reaction R under conditions C.  
  I suggest that statements concerning powers disposing towards an effect are 
useless without additional disclaimers regarding  
a.  the required conditions  
b.  mutual manifestation partners  
c.  functions under which they combine in order to produce the effect.  
In chapter 3, I criticised the entities - activities ontology on the basis that it did not 
contain enough possibility. I argue, in this case that causal dispositionalism contains 
too  much  possibility.  It  is  both  functions  and  a  specification  of  the  required 
environmental conditions that provide insight into which effects will come about and 
why. An attribution of a power should come with both, otherwise it appears that we 
can attribute a power to accommodate any situation and this is unilluminating from 
a scientific perspective.  
In addition to the objections described above there is a further problem 
concerning  whether  Mumford  and  Anjum’s  account  can  capture  the  criteria 
explanatory unification which again results from the unconstrained nature of the 
disposes towards metaphor. As I described in section 2.2. the aim of my case study 
is to meet the demand from industry for more efficient reactions with higher yields. 
These reactions are then used in applications from medicine to dye making. I suggest 
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how  these  reactions  are  able  to  function  in  industry.  This  is  again  due  to  the 
unconstrained nature of the dispose towards metaphor 
At several points in this chapter I have discussed Mumford and Anjum’s 
example of the biological process describing the way in which the ingestion of arsenic 
causes death. I described how Mumford and Anjum attribute these causal powers to 
arsenic because each step in the causal process disposes towards the next and 
therefore, it is claimed, that the causal chain is transitive.  
In the next section I provide other examples of causal chains that result from 
the application of enzymatic reactions in industry. I suggest that the application of 
the dispose towards metaphor fails to do justice to the importance of chemical 
manipulation and ingenuity and as a result is inhibited in the kind of explanations it 
can support. 
Consider an industrial application of a hydrolysis reaction in which enzymatic 
reactions are used to convert biomass into biofuel as an alternative form of greener 
energy.  As  a  result  of  the  environmental  and  economic  impact  of  fossil  fuels 
investigations into this process have received substantial investment since the 1970s, 
however progress has been slow. The process begins with plants that are intensively 
grown to produce lignocellulosic biomass which contain cellulose, a long chain of 
glucose  molecules  with  the  formula  (C6H10O5)n.  This  is  converted  into  ethanol 
through a multistage process and is burnt to produce energy (Hendriks and Zeeman, 
2008).  Is it the case that cellulose disposes towards ethanol production in the same 
way that Mumford and Anjum argue that the oxygen disposes towards the lighting 
of the fire? I argue that the causal dispositionalist isn’t able to point to a difference 
between these two processes and as a result the dispose towards metaphor ceases 
to be useful. 
Cellulose  is  a  polymer  containing  individual  units  which  are  intimately 
connected in a complex structure that is resistant to attempts to break it down. An 
important step in the process is the pre-treatment of cellulose in order to disrupt its 
naturally  resistant  structure.  This  pre-treatment  involves  mixing  cellulose  with                                                                                                        Chapter 5: Causal Dispositionalism 
 
205 
 
alkaline  materials  such  as  sodium,  potassium,  calcium  and  ammonia  at  specific 
temperatures and pressure. This causes the cellulose to swell which leads to a greater 
surface area for the enzymes to act on, it reduces the crystallisation and removes 
additional products such as dissolved hemicelluloses, lignin, and some unreacted 
inorganic chemicals. How should we interpret the process thus far? 
X1. Cellulose is disposed to swell and increase in surface area  
The next stage in the process is the hydrolysis of the cellulose to release shorter 
chains of soluble glucose sugar. The reaction is catalysed by cellulase which is a 
combination of enzymes that together lower the activation energy for the reaction 
to take place.  
X2. Swelled cellulose is disposed to react with water to form a glucose solution  
Finally the remaining water needs to be distilled via fermentation, the solution is 
heated and water is evaporated leaving ethanol and carbon dioxide. 
  X3. Glucose is disposed to produce ethanol via distillation.  
If we assess these claims together we have; 
X1. Cellulose is disposed to swell and increase in surface area  
X2. Swelled cellulose is disposed to react with water to form glucose solution  
X3. Glucose solution is disposed to produce ethanol via distillation.  
X4. Ethanol has the power to produce energy when burnt 
It looks like we have a causal chain much like the process by which arsenic 
disposes towards death in which one step causes the next and the transitivity of 
causation holds. However, to argue that transitivity holds in this case and so cellulose 
disposes  towards  the  release  of  energy  is  not  a  helpful  explanation  from  the 
perspective  of  practice.  It  ignores  the  huge  amount  of  chemical  ingenuity  and 
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from biomass. It is seems unnatural and counter intuitive to explain the process by 
stating    that  cellulose  disposes  towards  energy  given  that  the  original  cellulose 
molecules have extremely complex structures which resist attempts to break them 
down.  The problem is that whilst the ‘disposes towards’ metaphor can be made to 
apply to any case it does so at the expense of becoming so weak it is unhelpful. I 
suggest  that  the  statement  ‘cellulose  disposes  towards  the  release  of  energy’ 
amounts to a statement of nomological possibility and this is not explanatorily useful. 
5:6: Conclusion 
My motivation for this chapter was the hope that the ‘disposes towards’ 
metaphor and the corresponding distinction between enabling conditions and causes 
might provide identity conditions for processes. If viable this would give us the 
processes appealed to in chapter 4 at a reduced ontological cost. I have shown that 
this is not the case and therefore commitment to an additional category of processes 
is required to accommodate the features of reactions discussed in section 4.4. 
I began this chapter by outlining causal dispositionalism and the motivation 
for  the  distinction  between  causes  and  enabling  conditions.  I  described  how 
Mumford and Anjum want to retain the notion of the total cause whilst placing a limit 
on transitivity. An enabling condition is a part of the causal chain that does not 
dispose towards the next step in the chain thus constituting a break in transitivity. If 
this account is successful, the presence of enabling conditions in a causal chain could 
be used to individuate processes. 
I showed that the causal dispositionalist account is not descriptively fit for 
purpose.  It  fails  to  give  a  descriptively  accurate  account  of  how  processes  are 
identified in practice because the physicochemical variables that might be construed 
as the powers at work in my case study act as causes of an event rather than causes 
of a process. I also argued that the causal dispositionalist underplays the role of 
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I suggested the claim that x disposes towards y amounts to the claim that it is 
at least possible that x will be part of the cause of y; as a result causal dispositionalism 
contains too much possibility to capture similarity and give useful explanations. This 
problem  could  be  overcome  by  a  more  through  metaphysical  account  of  the 
functions  by  which  powers  combine  and  the  constraints  under  which  they  are 
operative.                                  Chapter 6: A Metaphysics for the Classification of Reactions in Practice 
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Chapter 6: A Metaphysics for the 
Classification of Reactions in Practice  
6.1: Introduction 
The  aim  of  my  thesis  has  been  to  investigate  the  most  appropriate 
metaphysics for the classification of chemical reactions in practice. In this chapter I 
will outline my positive proposal. My thesis was motivated by the fact that the 
philosophy of classification pays little attention to the classification of non-entity like 
things yet the classification of reactions is a key component of chemical practice and 
is essential to the fruitful development of chemistry and its industrial applications. 
My approach has been to engage in a particular variety of naturalised metaphysics 
that is led by chemical practice, in order to provide a metaphysical framework that is 
fit for this practice.  
My  strategy  has  been  to  investigate  which  ontological  components  are 
required  to  accommodate  the  classification  of  reactions,  in  order  to  adjudicate 
between the accounts of classification outlined in chapter 1. I have already ruled out 
Ellis’s  strong  essentialism  on  the  grounds  of  the  perspectivalism  and  interest 
dependence that directs chemical inquiry. On this basis I reject commitment to kinds 
of  reactions  where  those  kinds  have  essences.  In  chapter  3,  I  showed  that 
commitment to dispositions is required to capture the classification of reactions in 
practice and in chapter 4 and 5 I showed that commitment to an extra ontological 
category of processes is also required. Since none of the remaining accounts of 
classification  outlined  in  chapter  1  contain  commitment  to  dispositions  and 
processes, none are sufficient to accommodate the classification of reactions and I 
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My positive proposal  is  an ontological  one  concerning  realism  about  the 
categories that are required for classification.  I offer a two-fold proposal: 
Part 1a: Realism about processes as a distinct ontological category is necessary 
Part  1b:  Realism  about  the  ontological  category  of  entities  and  the  ontological 
category of    dispositional properties is also necessary in addition to the category of 
processes.  None  of  these  categories  are  on  their  own  sufficient  to  capture  the 
classification of reactions in practice 
Part 2: A type of process is one where all token processes engage in the actualising of 
the specific potentiality that is associated with that type    
I will begin by discussing part 1 of my positive proposal. I’ve previously argued 
that a commitment to dispositional properties and processes are required and in 
section 6.2 I will address why an additional commitment to entities is also necessary. 
This discussion will distinguish my account from the recent account of processes 
provided by Dupré. In section 6.3 I will focus on part two of my positive proposal in 
which I appeal to the discussion of reactions throughout my thesis in order to outline 
the metaphysical picture underlying types of processes. In section 6.4 I will show how 
my 3-category ontology accommodates my case study and use this as an opportunity 
to flesh out the relations between the different ontological components. In section 
6.5 I will offer some clarificatory remarks. I will highlight a further respect in which 
my account of processes differs from the account of processes offered by Dupré. I 
also address why I am optimistic about the scope of the ontological category of 
processes.  
6.2: Commitment to entities 
I suggest that to give a metaphysics of classification that is descriptively fit for 
purpose an additional ontological category of entities is required. This is the first way 
in which my account can be distinguished from Dupré’s process ontology. Dupré 
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world of processes where it is the interaction of many processes working together 
that produces a level of stability. It is this stability that, according to Dupré, gives the 
illusion of entities. He suggests that we abstract away the relevant processes in order 
to identify a stable entity. On his view scientists identify stability in different scientific 
domains and so assert the existence of different and perhaps contradictory entities 
(Dupré 2012). It is the idea that processes are both fundamental and responsible for 
giving  the  illusion  of  stability  that  does  the  work  in  outlining  the  metaphysical 
framework behind Dupré’s promiscuous realism.  
Whilst I am ontologically committed to processes, I do not follow Dupré in 
taking processes to be fundamental.  In chapter 4, I highlighted the distinction drawn 
by chemists between ‘the thing that is changed’ (the entity) and ‘the change itself’ 
(the reaction). The distinction is crucial in enabling chemists to meet the aims of their 
inquiry and should therefore be reflected in our ontology. This is evident through an 
assessment of the role of entities in the 3-stage classification process outlined in 
chapter 2. Stage 1 involves the identification of what chemists refer to as an activity 
of interest. This requires chemists to isolate a set of reactions that are known to be 
similar enough that a QSAR analysis can fruitfully be applied to reveal more fine 
grained similarities between the reactions. I showed in chapter 2 that each activity 
of interest is defined in terms of entities. For example,  
Hydrolysis reactions involve the breaking of a chemical bond of an entity by the 
addition of water. 
  This  approach  to  defining  reaction  is  confirmed  when  we  look  to  other 
examples of reactions as described in section 1.2: 
·  Neutralization Reactions are a special type of double displacement reaction 
that involve the reaction between an acid and base to form a salt and water.  
acid + base → salt + water 
·  Combustion Reactions occur when a hydrocarbon combines with oxygen to 
produce carbon dioxide and water.  
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·  Polymerization is a type of chemical reaction that occurs when monomer 
molecules combine together to form polymer chains or three-dimensional 
networks.  
·  Photosynthesis reactions occur in all plant life. Carbon dioxide and water 
react with energy from the sun to produce glucose, oxygen and water 
6 CO2 + 12 H2O + photons → C6H12O6 + 6O2 + 6H2 
Defining  reactions  in  terms  of  a  change  in  a  particular  entity  is  required  if  the 
classification landscape is to be produced. Therefore, treating entities as distinct 
from reactions is key to capturing similarity relations.  
This point is confirmed by looking at the second stage of classification in 
which  determinate  values  for  physicochemical  variables  are,  for  each  reaction, 
imported into a neural network to reveal the similarity relations that hold between 
the reactions. As I discussed in section 4.6.4, an appeal to practice reveals that these 
physicochemical properties are taken to be possessed by entities. For example, the 
property  sigma  electronegativity  describes  the  ‘ability  of  an  atom  to  attract 
electrons’.  Therefore,  treating  entities  as  distinct  from  reactions,  i.e.  as  wholly 
present,  and  possessing  a  range  of  potentialities  is  important  if  we  are  to 
accommodate  the  second  stage  of  classification  and  the  identification  of  the 
similarity relations between reactions. The distinction enables chemists to meet the 
aims of their practice and should be reflected in ontology. 
Commitment to entities is also required to meet the criteria of explanatory 
unification. In section 4.3. I described how chemists explain the features of reactions 
such as the rate of reactions and activation energy by appealing to entities. A given 
reaction involves many entities that each undergo a distinct reaction mechanism 
when they collide with the appropriate entity with sufficient energy. Explanations for 
why  a  reaction  decreases  in  rate  or  how  the  rate  of  a  reaction  is  affected  by 
environmental conditions involve appealing to the relations between the entities 
involved  in  the  reaction.  Understanding  these  relations  is  crucial  to  making 
predictions  about  the  behaviour  of  reactions.  The  fact  that  entities  function  in 
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ontological category is required to meet the criteria of explanatory unification.  It is 
for these reasons that, unlike Dupré, I retain ontological commitment to entities.  
6.3: A Metaphysics for Types of Reactions  
I  have  so  far  proposed  a  3-  category  ontology  consisting  of  entities, 
dispositional properties and processes. I suggested in chapter 4 and 5 that reactions 
fall into the ontological category of processes and throughout my thesis I have been 
concerned with illuminating chemists’ treatment of reactions in practice. In this 
section, I will outline my key findings and use them to build a positive proposal for 
the metaphysics underlying my category of processes.  
In section 4.2 I described the key differences between reactions and entities 
as they are treated in practice. I showed firstly that chemists introduce a distinction 
between entities and reactions whereby reactions are described as the means by 
which entities change.  Chemists treat this as a fundamental distinction in chemical 
practice. In addition they identify reactions as being extended in time with distinct 
temporal intervals separating the start of the reaction from its coming to completion. 
This is in contrast to entities, which are wholly present at each point at which they 
exist.  
In section 4.3 I discussed the way in which reactions and dispositions are 
treated  in  practice  and  concluded  that  the  relationship  between  reactions  and 
potentiality is unclear. I argued that there is something intuitively appealing about 
treating reactions as potentials. Reactions tend to be directed towards a certain end 
product just as a disposition is a potential for some ‘F’ to manifest. In addition, I 
showed that there is an absence or incompleteness associated with reactions; a 
reaction may be ongoing but is incomplete until the appropriate end product has 
been brought about. This is also the case with dispositions. Finally, reactions and 
dispositions bring about their own destruction, the reaction ceases to occur because 
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However, I also described an opposing intuition in which reactions seem to 
be more than a mere potential, but also actual. They are described as a happening or 
a coming to be. I suggested in section 4.3 that the idea of a reaction as an active 
coming to be is supported by the fact that reactions can be interfered with, stopped 
or  increased  in  rate  whilst  they  are  in  actuality.  This  is  an  important  aspect  of 
chemical practice and is key to the manipulability of reactions in industry. 
In section 4.4. I also showed that reactions involve multiple entities and 
dispositions  and  it  is  the  relations  between  these  component  parts  that  are 
important for explanation and prediction. Finally in chapter 5 I showed that the way 
in which a reaction is distinguished from its context is dependent on the aims and 
interests of chemists conducting the investigation.  
The characteristics of reactions that have emerged throughout my thesis can be 
summarised as follows. I will use these characteristics to build my account of the third 
ontological category of processes in which reactions fall.   
1.  Reactions are the means by which entities change 
2.  Reactions have temporal intervals 
3.  Reactions are not wholly present at any one time  
4.  Reactions are directed towards a certain end product  
5.  Reactions are incomplete until it is over, at which point it has brought about 
its own destruction 
6.  Reactions can be measured  
7.  Reaction can undergo change 
8.  Reactions have multiple arity 
9.  The identification of reactions from their context is dependent on the aims 
and interests of scientists  
I suggest that the most fruitful way to proceed is to focus on the relationship between 
potentiality and actuality in a given reaction. I suggest that when we are led by 
chemical practice in this way we can give an account that meets all the criteria 
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6.3.2: An Aristotelian Account of Change 
My account is inspired by an Aristotelian account of change as developed by 
Coope (2009). I will begin by outlining this account of change and showing how it 
applies to reactions.  
Aristotle asserts that things can change in terms of quality, quantity and place 
and attempts to provide a general account of change in which he is committed to the 
view that change is real (Physics III.1–3). According to Parmenides, change is not 
possible because something cannot come from what is not. Aristotle acknowledges 
this latter point but maintains that change is still possible. For Aristotle, change is real 
and possible so long as something is preserved through the change (Physics I.7–9). In 
the case of chemical reactions it is the constituent matter that is retained through 
the change even though its arrangement into particular entities might be altered.  
Aristotle  asserts  that  change  is  related  to  the  notion  of  incompleteness 
however, he notes that there is a distinction between being incomplete and changing 
since it is possible for something to be incomplete and yet not undergo any change. 
Aristotle attempts to provide an account that characterises change as real, but also 
captures the manner in which it is incomplete thus showing the important relation 
between incompleteness and change. He gives a definition of change such that it is 
the 'actuality of that which potentially is, qua such' (Physics III, 201a10 - 11).  
The  first  thing  to  note  is  that  the  potentiality  associated  with  change  is 
defined in terms of some specific actuality that isn’t yet fulfilled, for example the 
actuality of a lump of bronze qua potentially a statue. Coope points to a problem with 
this view in that it allows for an interpretation of the actuality associated with change 
as merely the product of the change rather than the change itself. Coope argues that 
this is not a sufficient account of change and is not what Aristotle had in mind (Coope, 
2009, 279). She asserts that Aristotle wants to capture the change as the becoming 
of the end product, for instance the change as the becoming of the statue, even if 
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changing so it is counter intuitive to associate change with the production of the 
required end products.  
This corresponds to our understanding of chemical reactions, a reaction is the 
means by which an entity changes and is therefore more than the end products of 
that change. Instead, the reaction is the active and directed unfolding over a number 
of temporal intervals until the end products are brought about via the reaction. 
Coope  utilises the concepts of potentiality, actuality and change to clarify 
Aristotle’s position. She argues that what Aristotle has in mind is that change is the 
actualising of a potential for being. She states ‘change is the actuality of what is 
potentially  in  some  particular  different  state  qua  such  i.e.  the  change  that  is 
becoming a status is the actuality of what is potentiality a statue qua potentially a 
statue’ (Coope, 2009, 282). Coope comments that when Aristotle defines change as 
an actuality then he is suggesting change is real and is more than the existence of a 
potentiality but the becoming of the potentiality. Again, this corresponds to practice. 
Reactions are treated as real phenomena by chemists; they can be interfered with, 
made to go faster or slower and measured whilst they are in actuality. They are also 
real in the sense that they are deemed worthy of classification in their own right in 
order to achieve the aims of scientific inquiry.  
In addition, Coope claims that by stating that change is the actuality of what 
is potentially qua such Aristotle highlights that the actuality associated with change 
is directed towards the fulfilment of a certain potentiality. It is a change in a certain 
respect. In the case of the bronze statue the actuality associated with the change is 
the actuality insofar as it is merely potentially a statue. This actuality is most fully 
actual prior to the bronze becoming a statue. When the bronze has become the 
statue then it no longer has the potential to be a statue and therefore the ‘potential 
to be a statue’ cannot be further actualised (Coope, 2009, 283). 
I suggest that this account of change fits with the way in which chemists 
characterise and explain the initial stage of the classification process. The hydrolysis 
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water. The water molecule is able to break the bond due to the polar charge on the 
H2O molecule, which attracts the shared pair of electrons in the reactants covalent 
bond. This is the defining feature of hydrolysis reactions and was used to identify a 
set of reactions sufficiently similar to engage in QSAR analysis and classification via 
neural networking. 
Following Aristotle’s’ approach, we can identify types of reaction using the 
reaction type’s corresponding potentiality where those reactions are considered to 
be the actualising of this potentiality. In the case of hydrolysis reactions we can 
identify the corresponding potentiality as ‘a broken bond due to the presence of the 
polar change on a H2O molecule’.  It is the coming into actuality of this specific 
potentiality that all members of the type ‘hydrolysis reaction’ have in common. A 
hydrolysis reaction isn’t just any change in the entities involved in the reaction, the 
change is the actualising of this particular potentiality. When the change has reached 
the designated end product the potentiality has been fully actualised, the change is 
complete and the reaction ceases to exist.  
Aristotle develops his account of change by examining the process of building 
a house, he states ‘the actuality of the buildable, qua buildable, is the process of 
building. For the actuality is either the process of building or the house, but when the 
house is, the buildable no longer is’ (Physics 111, 201b9–11). Change is the process 
of ‘coming to be’ of a specific potential and it is the identification of this specific 
potential that distinguishes one reaction from another i.e. distinguishes reaction 
types. This point is further elucidated by examining the difference between the 
process of changing and the state that the entity it is in when it has the potential to 
change, but is not yet changing. Coope claims that this is achieved in virtue of the 
qua clause. In the case of the bronze and the statue it highlights a difference between 
the bronze being actual qua bronze and the actuality of the bronze qua potentially a 
statue. The bronze possesses the potentiality to be a status before it began changing 
but as Coope states, at this point, the potential was dormant, it didn't make a 
difference to the world or at least a difference with respect to the relevant end i.e. 
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began to be actualised that the potential made a difference to the world i.e. there is 
one more statue in the world.  
This is a fruitful way to think about chemical reactions as it captures the 
distinction that is cited in chemical practice between entities and their properties on 
the one hand and reactions on the other, whilst retaining the notion that reactions 
are active and actual.  Entities have the potential to engage in reactions and as I 
described in chapter 3 this is accommodated via a commitment to dispositional 
properties. Nonetheless, reactions involve something more than this, they involve 
the active coming to be of a potential. This actualising of the designated potential is 
extended over a temporal period and is not wholly present at any point at which it 
exists. Rather it is present at each time interval through which it is unfolding. Treating 
reactions as actual, rather than as potentials accommodates the feature of practice 
by which reactions are measured and can be interfered with.   
We can now flesh out the metaphysics underlying the ontological category of 
processes. My strategy has been to appeal to the features of reactions to illuminate 
the category of processes. I have shown in chapter 4 that an additional ontological 
category  of  processes  is  required  to  capture  the  classification  of  reactions  and 
therefore the best information we have about what a category of processes is like 
comes from our knowledge of reactions since we know that reactions fall within this 
category. However, I also hope to provide an ontological framework that is general 
and is applicable beyond this particular aspect of chemical practice. With this in mind, 
I have labelled this category ‘processes’ rather than ‘reactions.’ I expect that other 
phenomena, which are not chemical reactions will constitute processes and fall in 
this category. I will explore the scope of the category of processes section 6.5 below.  
I now suggest that a type of process is associated with the actualising of a 
particular  potentiality.  The  process  is  bounded  by  the  dormant  status  of  the 
potentiality  before  it  has  begun  to  be  actualised  and  its  full  actualisation  and 
therefore the destruction of that potentiality. An entity will have the potential to 
undergo many different processes and it is a matter for science to identify which 
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science to fill out the placeholders of my account of processes in each case, as below 
in the case of hydrolysis reactions. I can now flesh out part 1b of my positive proposal. 
 1.b A type of process is one where all token processes engage in the actualising of 
the specific potentiality that is associated with that type    
For example: 
 A hydrolysis reaction is the actuality of the potentiality ‘to break due to the presence 
of the polar change on a H2O molecule’  
This allows us to accommodate the fact that reactions are a change and this 
change is real and active. The change is the coming to be of a potential although this 
may involve other changes such as the gain or loss of parts in the entities involved in 
the reaction. In addition the reaction is an unfolding that is directed towards the 
actualisation of a certain potentiality, in the example above the actualisation of any 
other potentiality would not constitute a hydrolysis reaction.  
My account is also able to capture and explain the ways in which reactions 
are similar to dispositions in the sense that reactions involve a potential and thus, an 
incompleteness. However my account also allows for the required actuality that 
taking reactions to be dispositions forbids. By including commitment to processes 
and clarifying the relation between potentiality and actuality my account is not 
subject to the ‘always travelling, never packing’ objection against the dispositionalist 
account since it contains sufficient actuality. My account is compatible with the idea 
that reactions can be measured, interfered with and changed. 
The metaphysical status of types of processes is therefore captured by taking 
them to be the temporally extended exchange from the potentiality to x to the 
actualisation of x; the process is the ‘actualising of x’.  
I will show in the next section that treating reactions in this way within the 
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aims of chemical practice. I will also flesh out the relations that hold between the 3-
catagories. 
6.4: Capturing my Case Study 
In chapter 2, I highlighted that the aim of the case study was to achieve a 
better understanding of the similarities that hold between the reactions undergoing 
classification in order to make the kinds of predictions that are required by industry. 
It is stated that;  
‘the similarity analysis of enzyme catalysed reactions can form the basis for 
searching for other enzymes that can catalyse a given reaction. Or, vice versa, 
for a given enzyme, different or novel reactions might be found that are 
catalysed by the same enzyme’ (Sacher, Reitz, Gasteiger, 2009, 1525). 
In particular, I described the desire to provide a ‘definition of similarities between 
reactions’ (Sacher, Reitz, Gasteiger, 2009, 1525).  
I showed in chapter 2, that the information that is required to manipulate 
reactions for industrial purposes is also included in this definition of similarities 
revealed on the reaction landscape. For example, hydrolysis reactions form part of 
complex industrial processes that require continual management with the reaction 
conditions  monitored  and  adjusted  to  produce  the  required  yield  and  improve 
efficiency. Consider one of the reactions undergoing classification in case study 2. 
Below is a general reaction equation for the reaction type whose members are 
catalysed by enzymes from the EC 3.2.1.d subclass. 
 
Figure 24: General reaction equation for the reaction type whose members are catalysed by enzymes from the 
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In this reaction the entities involved in the reaction are sugar molecules, 
oxygen and hydrogen with the R standing for an additional group that is not involved 
in the reaction centre.  
The overall reaction itself consists of many instances of the same reaction 
mechanism  illustrated  above  over  a  temporally  extended  period.  It  is  the 
instantiation of these reaction mechanisms that constitutes the reaction as a whole. 
I showed that due to the restricted arity of entities and dispositions reactions cannot 
be reduced to entities and dispositions. Rather, an account of properties of reactions 
such as the rate of reaction requires an analysis of the relations that hold between 
the many entities involved in the reaction as a whole.  I have not addressed whether, 
generally speaking, reaction mechanisms can be accounted for in terms of entities 
and dispositions. Nonetheless, this is irrelevant to my argument that a category of 
processes is required to capture the classification of reactions. If it turns out that 
reaction mechanisms cannot be captured by entities and dispositions then they will 
fall in the category of processes alongside reactions themselves.  
To return to the example above, all reactions of the type EC 3.2.1.d have in 
common that they involve the breaking of an O- glycosidic bond in the presence of 
water. The O- glycosidic bond is a covalent bond involving oxygen that links a sugar 
molecule to another group R. This constitutes the definition for this type of process 
and we can use this definition to isolate the corresponding potentiality. The reaction 
type EC 3.2.1.d is the actualising of the potentiality to break an O- glycosidic bond in 
the presence of water. It is important to clarify that this is the general potentiality 
associated with the reaction as a whole. Each entity involved in the reaction has a 
number  of  dispositional  properties  and  the  actualisation  of  these  dispositional 
properties  is  associated  with  a  particular  reaction.  According  to  chemists  they 
‘encode the reaction’ though reactions cannot be accommodated in terms of the 
manifestation of these dispositions due to the restricted arity of dispositions. 
The ‘actualising’ of the potential associated with the reaction as a whole can 
be increased or decreased in speed by manipulating the environmental conditions. 
This is important to industry because to keep a reaction running at a reduced rate is                                 Chapter 6: A Metaphysics for the Classification of Reactions in Practice 
221 
 
more  efficient  than  stopping  and  starting  a  given  reaction.    The  ‘definition  of 
similarities’ referred to above gives chemists the resources to control the ‘actualising 
of the reaction’. For example, there are 180 enzymatic falling within sub group EC 
3.3.2.d and each of these reactions exhibits a high degree of similarity to each other. 
The particular degrees of similarity are revealed in the reaction landscape. One 
member of this group is the enzymatic reaction EC 3.2.1.4 which involves the enzyme 
Cellulase (otherwise known as 1,4 β-endoglucanase) and which is used to produce 
glucose on an industrial scale. Due to the importance of this reaction in industry 
numerous investigations have been carried out into the optimal conditions for the 
cellulose  enzyme  to  operate  (Yennamalli,  2013).  It  was  found  that  activity  was 
optimised when the substrate was treated with an alkali at PH 5.5. and when the 
reaction occurred at 30˙C.  This information is also used to predict the optimum 
condition for reactions that appear close to EC 3.2.1.4 on the reaction landscape.  
In order to accommodate chemists’ attempts to manipulate reactions in this 
way we must treat each reaction as a single unified being falling in the ontological 
category of processes. This accommodates the fact that reactions are treated as 
retaining their identity throughout the ‘actualising of the designated potential’ even 
though the rate at which the actualising is taking place might change.  The reaction 
itself changes and as well as it being the means by which a change is brought about 
in  the  entities  (O  –  Sugar  –  R)  and  (  O-H-O)  in  the  diagram  above.  The  exact 
relationship  between  environmental  conditions  and  the  rate  of  reaction  can  be 
described using the Arrhenius reactions and used to make quantitative predictions. 
This involves the identification of empirically determined properties of each reaction 
such as rate coefficient and frequency factor. These are the properties of the reaction 
taken as a whole and again this suggests that the reaction be treated as a separate 
ontological category in order to support chemists’ need for manipulability.  
I described in chapter 2 that the aim of the inquiry was a better understanding 
of the similarities that hold between the reactions in order to make predictions as 
required by industry. In particular I described how chemists wanted to ‘explore the 
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dispositional properties that do the work in supporting predictions and explaining 
which bonds will break.  
In the reaction equation described in figure 24 above, all of the entities that 
break or make bonds during the reaction are identified as the reaction centre. This 
includes the O-R bond (which is also attached to the sugar molecule) and the O-H 
bond in the water molecule. For each of the 180 sub types of reactions that fall within 
this group, the reaction centre is identified and corresponding data describing each 
reaction centre retrieved. This data concerns the dispositional properties associated 
with the reaction centre.  
The  reaction  was  premised  on  the  notion  that  the  presence  of  certain 
dispositional properties over others corresponds with the instantiation of certain 
reactions. For example, when taken in isolation from other factors, an entity (or 
reaction centre) with a particularly high value for polarity is more likely to undergo a 
hydrolysis reaction in the presence of water.  
The investigation into the classification of chemical reactions was premised 
on the notion that entities with similar values for each dispositional property will 
each undergo a similar reaction mechanism and therefore produce similar reactions. 
In addition, a difference in physicochemical variables or dispositional properties is 
indicative  of  different  reaction  mechanism  and  therefore  different  bonds  being 
broken. The production of the reaction landscape using dispositional properties had 
by entities supports more general predictions concerning which enzymes are most 
likely  to  catalyse  which  reactions  on  the  basis  of  reaction  similarity.  Therefore 
dispositional properties are essential to meeting the aims of classification of demand 
from industry.  
In  addition  the  potentiality  associated  with  predictive  statements  about 
whether the reaction will occur requires commitment to dispositional properties. 
This is because the potentiality cannot be grounded in the reaction itself as that 
reaction  hasn’t  come  into  existence.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  ontological 
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concerning  the  environmental  conditions  under  which  an  enzyme  will  reach  its 
optimum level of activity when the reaction is ongoing.  
I suggest that the relations between the three ontological components is 
captured by stating that dispositional properties play the role of anchoring entities 
to processes.  According to my notion of anchoring, the reaction process that takes 
place is dependent on the presence of those determinate values for the dispositional 
properties  had  by  entities.      Physicochemical  properties  of  the  reaction  centre 
correlate with which reaction will occur. It is important to note, however, that the 
reaction isn’t fully determined by physicochemical variables and chemists actively 
investigate how the rate of reaction can be altered when it is underway.  
This notion of dispositional properties anchoring entities and processes also 
applies to the completion of the reaction. Throughout the course of the reaction, the 
entities  that  are  undergoing  changes  to  their  identity  will  manifest  different 
dispositional  properties.  These  properties  direct  the  course  of  the  reaction  and 
variation  in  these  dispositional  properties  will  equate  with  variation  between 
reaction processes. Those properties that manifest themselves during the reaction 
process will determine which entities are formed as final products of the reaction i.e. 
which intermediate products of the reaction have the greater electron attracting 
power will determine which new bonds are formed.  
An account of dispositional  properties  as  anchoring  entities to processes 
represents an advantage of my ontology over the entities – activities ontology. MDC 
are unable to explain why an entity engages in a particular activity at a given time. 
Whilst MDC might state that the entity functions as part of a mechanism, they cannot 
explain ‘in virtue of what’ the entity functions or takes part in that mechanism. I am 
able to explain the relation between entities and processes in terms of dispositional 
properties. Entities take part in particular processes as a result of the manifestation 
of their potencies. Whilst entities, dispositions and processes are clearly related none 
can be reduced to the others in a way that is descriptively fit for purpose. I showed 
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processes are required due to the problem of arity. I also showed that processes 
cannot be reduced to entities and dispositions due to the problem of potentiality.  
The relations between the three ontological categories are also captured in 
my  definition  of  a  process.  A  particular  reaction  process  is  itself  defined  as  a 
manifestation of a certain disposition that is had by the entities involved in the 
reaction. As a result of the reaction process coming to completion that potentiality is 
destroyed and the entities produced at the end of the reaction will have different 
potentialities  in  virtue  of  the  change  that  has  just  occurred.  Each  of  the  three 
categories are therefore ontologically on a par but intimately related. 
6.5: Clarifications 
I previously stated that my ontology of processes is distinct from the account 
provided from Dupré (2012) because I also commit to a category of entities whilst 
Dupré takes processes to be fundamental. However, it’s also interesting to assess 
important differences in our treatment of processes. Dupré defines a process as 
‘something that must continue to change in order to continue to exist’ (Dupré, 2012). 
His definition is similar in sprit to the one I have outlined. On my view, a process must 
be  actualising  a  specific  potential  in  order  to  continue  to  it  exist.  When  this 
‘actualising’ has come to completion, the potentiality has been destroyed and the 
reaction has come to completion. In this sense, Dupré is correct to say processes 
must be continually changing to exist since it is feasible to equate this changing with 
actualising. However, my account of a process is more illuminating that Dupré’s 
because it captures the directedness of processes and as a result is able to distinguish 
the different types of process that chemists are interested in. Dupré is not concerned 
with this because he does not commit to natural kinds of process or deal with the 
classification of processes. He is interested instead in outlining the metaphysical 
picture behind his promiscuous realism with respect to the classification of entities. 
Given the importance of the classification of reactions in practice, Dupré’s account is 
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One aspect of Dupré’s account that I retain is his perspectivalism. Within the 
remit of chemoinformatics chemists are primarily interested in solving industrial 
problems and it is this that directs their inquiry. As I discussed in chapter 5, this 
interest-dependentness is determined by the chemist’s inquiry. Chemists interested 
in hydrolysis reactions will describe the breaking of a bond with water and the 
formation of the new bond as the end point of the reaction. In chapter 5, I also 
discussed an example in which chemists interested in pancreatic digestion will specify 
a more complex chain of reactions in which a hydrolysis reaction forms a part. This 
process involves the breaking of a bond using hydrolysis to form amino acids, a 
reaction with a substance known as glucogon and the polymerisation of the amino 
acids to form more useful proteins. Nonetheless, biochemists take these component 
parts to form one distinct process.  
I suggested in chapter 5, that this interest-led individuation of processes is 
problematic for causal dispositionalists such as Mumford and Anjum, given that they 
reject the notion that epistemological concerns are relevant to matters of ontology. 
Nonetheless, this perspectivalism is compatible with a non-essentialist but realist 
account of processes such as mine.  My account is non-essentialist because I do not 
commit to the claim that processes have essences in order to accommodate this 
perspectivalism. All that is required for realism about types of processes is that the 
unity  associated  with  the  whole  process  permits  inductive  inferences  i.e.  the 
similarities hold over the process as a whole as is the case with those revealed by the 
reaction landscape reaction such as velocities and activation energies.  
A potential objection to my account concerns its applicability beyond the field 
of chemoinformatics and the case studies described in chapter 2. I suggest however, 
that there is reason to be hopeful about the scope of my account when we note the 
development of Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) by Smith (2012). This is a top level 
ontology  which  has  been  embraced  across  scientific  disciplines  with  the  aim  of 
enhancing  scientific  practice  by  allowing  unification  across  separate  domains  of 
inquiry.  The ontological framework offered by BFO is similar to my account in that it                                 Chapter 6: A Metaphysics for the Classification of Reactions in Practice 
226 
 
consists  of  three  ontological  categories  that  map  onto  the  categories  I  have 
committed to. 
The framework was developed to bring order to the terminology used by 
scientists across different disciplines.  In this sense it is a domain neutral ontology 
(Seppala, Smith Ceusters 2014). It is stated that; 
‘Numerous domain ontologies use the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as an 
upper level reference ontology. BFO is a realist, formal and domain-neutral 
upper level ontology that is designed to represent at a very high level of 
generality the types of entities that exist in the world and the relations that 
hold between them [1-3]. BFO is intentionally very small, since it is intended 
to provide only the most basic building blocks for the construction of domain-
specific ontologies at lower levels.’ (Seppala, Smith Ceusters 2014). 
BFO differs from my account in the sense that it is domain neutral and is instead 
aimed at providing unification across domains whilst my account is built by looking 
specifically at the details of inquiry within a domain. 
BFO  was  developed  as  a  result  of  the  rapid  growth  of  computer  processing 
techniques required to analyse the large volumes of data becoming available to 
scientists. In order to better cope with this data, scientists tended to develop their 
own domain-specific organisational systems that categorised data in a way that was 
relevant to them and that best suited their needs. The idiosyncratic way in which this 
data is organised by different groups of scientists working within different domains 
often led to difficulties (Smith, 2012, 463). For example, it is unhelpful to build a 
scientific database using terms that are domain specific as this can mean that the 
data  is  inaccessible  to  neighbouring  domains  to  which  it  may  also  be  useful. 
Additionally, the meaning of terms or the terms themselves may change over time 
causing confusion and inhibiting scientific progress. BFO provides a domain neutral 
ontology that helps scientists better organise data by tagging it in a way that is useful 
across scientific disciplines and in such a way that searches of large volumes of data 
can be easily conducted. (Smith, 2012, 463). 
BFO serves as a starting point for the production of over 100 domain specific 
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2004) and biomedicine (Ceusters and Smith, 2006) to environmental science (Bittner, 
Donnelly and Smith, 2009) and computer science (Smith, 1998). It provides ‘formal 
ontological architecture’ via a set of general terms and relations that appear in each 
of the 100 ontologies covering distinct scientific domains. BFO includes only 34 terms 
including; ‘process’ ‘object’ ‘function’ ‘role’ ‘disposition’ ‘generically dependent’ and 
‘continuant  fiat  boundary’  (Smith,  2012,  469).  Each  term  included  within  the 
ontology must either be primitive or derivable from a term that is itself primitive. The 
most successful scientific ontology in use is the gene ontology which comprises 
30,000  terms  that  correspond  to  types  and  subtypes  of  biological  processes, 
molecular functions, and cellular functions.  
The key point to note for present purposes is that BFO is similar to the 
ontology I have developed through the course of my thesis. BFO contains three 
distinct ontological categories each of which is divided into types and tokens as 
outlined below.  
The first category is the category of ‘independent continuants’ which contains 
objects such as cells, humans or receptors. This resembles my category of entities. 
Secondly,  there  is  the  category  of  dependent  continuant  which  is  akin  to  my 
dispositional properties and require things to exist for their instantiation. Examples 
of dependent continuants on BFO are the power of the vegetable to rot, or the 
function of the canal to enable transportation (Grennon and Smith, 2004, 150). Also 
included in this category are qualities such as shapes, sizes, and elevations (Grennon 
and Smith, 2004, 151).   The third category of occurrents is akin to my category of 
processes. An example of an occurrent on BFO is the eroding of the rock, tornadoes 
or troop movements in an army (Grennon and Smith, 2004, 154). It is claimed that 
continuants and occurrents mark two ways of existing; for an occurrent there is a 
temporal interval in which it occurs and for a continuant there is a temporal interval 
in which it exists. Occurrents also require independent continuants in order to exist.  
Whilst it is beyond the scope of my thesis to offer a comparison between my 
account and BFO, the similarities in the 3 ontological categories and the widespread                                 Chapter 6: A Metaphysics for the Classification of Reactions in Practice 
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application of BFO in other scientific domains suggest that my ontology has the 
potential for a broad scope. 
To  conclude,  I  propose  a  3-category  ontology  consisting  of  entities, 
dispositional  properties  and  processes.  I’ve  given  a  metaphysics  for  types  of 
processes where a type of processes is defined as the actualising of an empirically 
specified potentiality. Types of reactions as identified in classification are also types 
of process.  
6.6: Conclusion   
In this chapter I have outlined my positive account for a metaphysics of 
classification of chemical reactions in practice. I proposed a 3 category ontology 
consisting of entities, dispositional properties and processes where reactions fall 
into the category of processes.  
I outlined the metaphysics underlying my category of processes by 
appealing to an Aristotelian account of change that captures the relationship 
between potentiality and actuality. On my account a type of process is one where 
all token processes engage in the actualising of the specific potentiality that is 
associated with that type. I showed how my proposal captures the way in which 
reactions are both similar and different to dispositions.  
I then fleshed out my case study in light of my positive proposal and 
discussed the relations that hold between the different ontological components 
such that dispositions anchor entities to processes and vice versa.  
Finally I showed two ways in which my account is different to the account of 
processes offered by Dupré. Unlike Dupré, I remain committed to entities. In 
addition, my account of processes is similar in spirit to Dupré’s but goes further by 
fleshing out the relation between potentiality and actuality in the context of 
scientific examples. My account also has the advantage over Dupré that it can 
accommodate the types of reactions revealed during classification. I ended this                                 Chapter 6: A Metaphysics for the Classification of Reactions in Practice 
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chapter by offering a reason to believe my account has scope to be applicable 
beyond this particular aspect of scientific practiceConclusion 
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Conclusion 
The aim of my thesis was to provide an appropriate metaphysics for the 
classification of chemical reactions in practice. My thesis was initially motivated by 
the  observation  that  chemical  reactions  are  classified  into  types  and  subtypes.  
Common types of reactions include acid - base reactions, combustion, oxidation, 
isomerization, and hydrolysis reactions.  I noted that there has been an extensive 
literature on the classification of chemical entities with the periodic table remaining 
the paradigmatic example of a natural kind, however a philosophical account of the 
classification of reactions has been largely neglected. I noted that the most likely 
reason for this is 20th century philosophy’s preoccupation with objects and entities 
as the building block of natures as opposed to any fundamental difference in the way 
chemists’ treat classifications of entities and classifications of reactions. 
My  aim  in  chapter  1  was  to  given  an  account  of  the  approaches  to 
classification  in  the  philosophy  of  science  that  might  be  applicable  to  the 
classification  of  reactions.  In  the  chapters  that  followed  I  employed  a  highly 
naturalistic methodology that was led by scientific practice, in order to learn more 
about the nature of reactions, their classifications schemes and their place within 
scientific  inquiry.  The  aim  was  that  this  analysis  would  provide  the  means  for 
analysing which of the accounts of classification discussed in chapter 1 would best 
suit the classification of chemical reactions in practice.  
In  chapter  1  I  discussed  conventionalism  about  classification,  semantic 
essentialism, metaphysical essentialism as well as Quine, Boyd and Dupré’s varieties 
of weaker realism. I argued none of these accounts at present, have the resources 
for  capturing  the  classification  of  chemical  reactions  however,  several  accounts 
offered hope for fruitful development in this respect. For instance, Ellis’s scientific 
essentialism offers a place for kinds of processes in his ontology, Boyd utilises the Conclusion 
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notion of a causal mechanisms in his account of natural kinds whilst Dupré argues 
that processes are themselves more fundamental than entities.   
In chapter 2 I turned to chemical practice. It was beyond the scope of the 
thesis to look at all instances of chemical classification so I chose to focus on the 
classification of reactions within the domain of chemoinformatics. Chemoinformatics 
is a fairly new methodology that was developed to utilise the large volumes of 
chemical data that is now available for analysis. The approach is driven by empirical 
data  and  the  desire  to  understand  and  manipulate  it.  Reaction  classifications 
produced using chemoinformatics are intended to solve real world problems and 
improve and develop the application of chemistry in industry for example, in drug 
discovery.    Taken  together  these  two  reasons  mean  that  focusing  on  those 
classifications  of  reactions  within  chemoinformatics,  allows  me  to  best  avoid 
antirealist accusations that the classification of reactions is for the purpose of more 
efficient storage or effective teaching and should not be taken as seriously as the 
classification of entities. Appealing to chemoinformatics suggests that, for at least 
some classifications of reactions, there is reason to believe this is not the case.  
In chapter 2 I fleshed out the criteria that a metaphysics of classification must 
meet to capture my case study. I referred to this generally as being descriptively fit 
for purpose. By this I had in mind that it should be consistent with and led by the 
aims and interests of scientific inquiry and facilitate scientists meeting the end goal 
of their investigation. The aim of the case study discussed in chapter 2 is a growth in 
the knowledge of different enzymes and an understanding of how this scientific 
knowledge can be manipulated to produce greater predictive accuracy.  
In order to be descriptively fit for purpose I argued that a metaphysics of 
classification of reactions must meet three more specific criteria. Firstly, it should be 
descriptively accurate or rather descriptively accurate enough. This means that it 
should  not  contain  claims  that  are  inconsistent  with  theoretical  knowledge. 
Abstractions and approximations are permitted in so far as they do not inhibit the 
predictive ability. There are two specific features of the methodology of classification 
with which a descriptively accurate metaphysics must be consistent with. Conclusion 
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  Firstly,  the  classification  process  uses  higher  level  reactions  as  heuristic 
devices. An initial type of reaction is identified on the basis of theoretical knowledge 
and then a more refined classification of token instances of that reaction type is 
produced. This second stage of classification has been the focus of my investigation. 
Here, QSAR is used to identify the lower level properties that are responsible for the 
instantiation of reactions. This data is then input into a neural network to produce a 
2- dimensional classificatory scheme representing the similarity relations that hold 
between the reactions. I discussed how the purpose of QSAR is to provide a unified 
account of the reaction in terms of the most appropriate lower level structural 
properties.  In addition a difference in the instantiation of a reaction is indicative of 
a difference in the structural properties of the entities involved in the reaction.  
Secondly, I noted how neural networking is used to organise the data in a 2-
dimensional reaction landscape. I concluded that in so far as chemists are interested 
in  using  these  classifications  to  make  predictions,  then  the  2-  dimensional 
representation takes priority since this reveals the types and degrees of similarity 
that hold between individual token reactions as well as clusters of reactions. 
  In order to be descriptively fit for purpose, a metaphysics must also capture 
the similarity relations that hold on a reaction landscape.  If chemists identify that 
two reactions are similar then this can be used to make predictions about how the 
reaction will behave under a variety of conditions. In chapter 2 I argued that the kinds 
of similarities that need to be accommodated by our metaphysics when making 
predictions are as follows: 
1.  Reactions falling within the same cluster will tend to be activated by the same 
type of enzyme. 
2.  Reactions falling within the same cluster will tend to require a similar amount 
of activation energy.  
3.  Reactions falling within the same cluster have a tendency to be affected by 
environmental conditions such as temperature, pressure and concentration.  
4.  Entities with similar physicochemical properties will tend to engage in similar 
reactions. Conclusion 
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  In addition to these direct statements regarding how a reaction will proceed 
there  is  another  variety  of  similarities  that  need  to  be  accommodated  by  our 
metaphysics. These are revealed by the classification of enzymatic reactions and are 
shared by the members of a particular subclass or cluster. These similarities include: 
5.  Number of bonds broken during the reaction.  
6.  The change in bond order (i.e. single bond to double bond). 
7.  The consecutive vs. simultaneous breaking of bonds. 
8.  Substructure of the reaction i.e. 
a.  Part of the entity of which the reaction is centred. 
b.  Substances released during the reaction in addition to the desired 
product. 
These similarities are not directly used to formulate predictions but instead 
are added to the bank of theoretical knowledge and promote a better understanding 
of reactions. This leads to the third requirement on our metaphysics. A metaphysics 
that is descriptively fit for purpose is one that promotes explanatory unification. 
More specifically, it promotes better explanations of why reactions behave the way 
they do, giving chemists the resources to more successfully manipulate chemical 
knowledge to meet the aims of their inquiry.  
 
At this point in my thesis I was able to make some initial claims about the kind 
of account of classification that is appropriate to the classification of reactions. I 
suggested that we can rule out a constructivist account of classification. The reaction 
landscape is successful in supporting inductive inferences regarding the way in which 
reactions proceed, which proteins will act as catalysts and the optimum conditions 
by which the reactions proceeds. We can appeal to the no miracles argument and 
assert that the best explanation for the successful predictions made on the basis of 
similarity relations is that those similarities exist in nature. In addition, in so far as the 
investigation is led by human interests it is led by a desire to better understand a 
particular chemical phenomenon.  Conclusion 
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A discussion of my case study also revealed that strong essentialism of the 
sort outlined by Ellis is also inappropriate for the classification of chemical reactions. 
According  to  Ellis,  kinds  of  reactions  have  essences.  The  reaction  landscape  is 
produced with a specific research interest or investigation in mind and this dictates 
the  particular  reactions  inputted  into  the  reaction  landscape.  In  addition,  the 
similarity relations revealed on the landscape are themselves dependent on the 
reactions that are inputted. Therefore, whether two reactions are deemed to be 
similar depends on the other reactions under investigation. This perspectivalism is a 
reason to reject strong essentialism about kinds of reactions.  
I concluded that a weak realist account of the types of reactions revealed by 
the classification scheme would be most appropriate. In order to evaluate which, if 
any, of the remaining accounts were suitable, my strategy was to determine which 
ontological components are required for our metaphysics to be descriptively for 
purpose. This could then inform my choice between the accounts of classification 
and  the  ways  in  which  they  need  to  be  developed  to  accommodate  reaction 
classification in practice.  
I  began  by  looking  in  chapter 3  at the  mechanisms  literature  within the 
philosophy of science. There were two motivations for this; firstly we intuitively think 
of reactions in terms of their reaction mechanism and secondly MDC’s account of 
mechanisms is committed to entities and activities, and activities as referred to by 
chemists are also a key part of my case study. 
I began chapter 3 by giving an account of the term activity as it is used by MDC 
and then compared this with the way the term is used in my case study to ensure the 
two were consistent. I concluded that both take activities as distinct beings in their 
own right and as distinct from the entities which engage in them. They also both take 
activities to be a kind of change. Thirdly, they agreed that activities tend to involve 
more than one entity.  
I hinted at a problem for the entities – activities ontology’s ability to capture 
my case study by showing that the properties on which classification is based can be Conclusion 
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characterised  as  dispositional  properties  as  well  as  activities  where  there  is  no 
obvious reason to prefer one characterisation to another. I developed this point by 
asking whether a characterisation in terms of activities could do the work that was 
required of it. I began by suggesting that the entities – activities ontology must be 
able  to  ground  the  kinds  of  possibility  statements  that  are  used  to  formulate 
predictions using the reaction landscape. 
For activities to do this work they must have a modal quality, I then engaged 
in an interpretative project examine the modal nature of activities. I concluded that 
even if MDC intend to give a modal reading to activities, additional commitment to 
dispositional  properties  is  also  required  to  capture  certain  types  of  possibility 
statements. Commitment to dispositional properties also accommodates the way 
potentiality is treated in chemical practice.  
I  suggested  that  commitment  to  dispositional  properties  improves 
explanatory  unification  by  providing  a  way  of  anchoring  activities  and  entities 
together.  Entities  engage  in  a  certain  reaction  as  a  result  of  the  dispositional 
properties that they possess however, the reaction then produces a new entity with 
a  new  set  of  dispositional  properties.  Therefore  commitment  to  dispositional 
properties gives a better understanding of the relationship between entities and 
activities. I concluded that the physicochemical variables on which classifications are 
based fall into a distinct category of dispositional properties.   
Having established that dispositions are a required ontological element, in 
chapter 4 I went on to investigate whether an entities – dispositions ontology is 
sufficient to accommodate chemical practice. I began by comparing the treatment of 
reactions in practice to the treatment of entities and the treatment of dispositions 
(physicochemical  variables).  The  aim  was  to  better  understand  the  metaphysics 
underlying types of reactions. 
I argued that reactions are different from entities in the sense that they are 
treated as the means by which entities are changed. Also, unlike entities they are Conclusion 
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extended along distinct temporal intervals and are not wholly present at any one 
time at which they exist.  
My comparison of reactions and dispositions is particularly interesting as it 
reveals some keys similarities as well as important differences.  For example, both 
reactions and dispositions are directed towards a designated end point and are 
associated with an incompleteness. In addition, both reactions and dispositions bring 
about their own destruction by attaining this completeness. However I also showed 
that characterising reactions as dispositions neglects part of the story about reactions 
that is essential to classification into types. Treating reactions as dispositions neglects 
the fact that reactions constitute an unfolding or a happening that extends across 
distinct  temporal  intervals  and  is  measurable  at  each  point  at  which  it  occurs. 
Secondly, treating reactions as dispositions doesn’t reflect the fact that reactions are 
active, ongoing and capable of change. 
I also showed that the classification of reactions cannot be accommodated by 
treating reactions as collections of entities and dispositions. This is because the 
restricted arity of dispositions means they cannot be used to give an account of 
properties of the system. These properties such as reaction velocity and activation 
energy  result  from the interactions  between  the  many  entities  and  dispositions 
involved in the reaction process. It is the relations between these component parts 
that  are  used  for  making  the  kind  of  predictions  and  providing  explanations 
concerning the behaviour of reactions. Treating reactions as distinct existences that 
have properties attributed to them is also in line with how they are treated in 
practice. Law-like generalisations are taken to apply to types of reactions whilst the 
entities and properties involved in the reaction are abstracted away. 
I concluded this chapter by suggesting that a distinct ontological category is 
required to accommodate reactions. I labelled this category ‘processes’. 
In  chapter  5  I  investigate  the  possibility  that  the  causal  dispositionalist 
account can provide identity conditions for processes at no extra ontological cost in 
addition to dispositions. Conclusion 
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I  introduced  the  ‘disposes  towards’  metaphor  and  the  corresponding 
distinction between enabling conditions and causes. I showed that according to the 
causal dispositionalist, enabling conditions place a limit on the transitivity and as a 
result are able to individuate causal processes.  
I then argued that the causal dispositionalist account is not descriptively fit 
for purpose. It fails to give a descriptively accurate account of how processes are 
identified in practice due to a discrepancy between the causing of an event and the 
causing of a process. I also argue that the causal dispositionalist underplays the role 
of perspective when identifying processes in practice.  
I  show  that the  causal dispositionalist  account fails  to  meet the  capture 
similarity relations and promote explanatory unification due to the dispose towards 
metaphor being vague and unconstrained. Any possible situation can be explained 
by the presence of a particular power. I argue that the attribution of powers should 
come with a specification of the various conditions under which that power might be 
operative. Mumford and Anjum appeal to functions that govern powers but tell us 
they  should  not  be  considered  laws  of  nature.  A  more  detailed  account  of  the 
ontological status of function is also crucial if the causal dispositionalist account is to 
be descriptively fit for purpose. 
Finally, in chapter 6 I outlined my positive proposal for a metaphysics for the 
classification  of  chemical  reactions  in  practice.  I  suggested  that  ontological 
commitment to entities, dispositional properties, and processes is required if my 
account is to be descriptively fit for purpose. I added that on my account: 
 A type of process is one where all token processes engage in the actualising of the 
specific potentiality that is associated with that type  
For example: 
A hydrolysis reaction is the actuality of the potentiality ‘to break due to the presence 
of the polar change on a H2O molecule’ Conclusion 
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 I showed how my proposal captures the way in which reactions are both 
similar and different to dispositions. A reaction is a manifestation of a particular 
potentiality  that  brings  about  its  own  destruction  when  the  reaction  comes  to 
completion and the potentiality no longer exists. In addition, by characterising a 
reaction as the actualising of a potentiality I am able to capture the way in which it is 
active, can be interfered with, measured and changed in practice.  
I’ve  also  suggested  that  my  three  ontological  categories  are  intimately 
related. Entities engage in certain processes as a result of that entity possessing 
certain determinate dispositional properties. In addition the unfolding of the process 
produced entities with further dispositional properties.  
I ended by remarking on the separate development of Basic Formal Ontology 
as  a  top  level  ontology  which  is  intended  to  unify  the  way  in  which  scientific 
terminology  is used  across  different  scientific disciplines.  Basic  Formal  Ontology 
contains  three  ontological  categories  of  independent  continuant,  dependent 
continuant and occurrent which match onto my category of entities, dispositional 
properties and processes. Since Basic Formal Ontology has been embraced across a 
range of scientific disciplines and used to construct over 100 lower level domain 
specific ontologies I suggest that there is reason to believe my ontology will be 
applicable beyond the classification of chemical reactions.  
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